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ABSTRACT  
   
Sustainability depends in part on our capacity to resolve dilemmas of the 
commons in Coupled Infrastructure Systems (CIS). Thus, we need to know more about 
how to incentivize individuals to take collective action to manage shared resources. 
Moreover, given that we will experience new and more extreme weather events due to 
climate change, we need to learn how to increase the robustness of CIS to those shocks. 
This dissertation studies irrigation systems to contribute to the development of an 
empirically based theory of commons governance for robust systems. I first studied the 
eight institutional design principles (DPs) for long enduring systems of shared resources 
that the Nobel Prize winner Elinor Ostrom proposed in 1990. I performed a critical 
literature review of 64 studies that looked at the institutional configuration of CIS, and 
based on my findings I propose some modifications of their definitions and application in 
research and policy making. I then studied how the revisited design principles, when 
analyzed conjointly with biophysical and ethnographic characteristics of CISs, perform to 
avoid over-appropriation, poverty and critical conflicts among users of an irrigation 
system. After carrying out a meta-analysis of 28 cases around the world, I found that 
particular combinations of those variables related to population size, countries corruption, 
the condition of water storage, monitoring of users behavior, and involving users in the 
decision making process for the commons governance, were sufficient to obtain the 
desired outcomes. The two last studies were based on the Peruvian Piura Basin, a CIS 
that has been exposed to environmental shocks for decades. I used secondary and primary 
data to carry out a longitudinal study using as guidance the robustness framework, and 
different hypothesis from prominent collapse theories to draw potential explanations. I 
   ii
then developed a dynamic model that shows how at the current situation it is more 
effective to invest in rules enforcement than in the improvement of the physical 
infrastructure (e.g. reservoir). Finally, I explored different strategies to increase the 
robustness of the system, through enabling collective action in the Basin. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
Sustainability depends in part on our capacity to resolve dilemmas of the 
commons in Coupled Infrastructure Systems (CISs) (Anderies, 2015).1 To be able to 
resolve those dilemmas, we need to know more about how to incentivize individuals to 
take collective action to manage shared resources (Janssen & Anderies, 2013). Empirical 
studies have shown that some communities organize themselves effectively to attain 
desirable outcomes, while other communities face resource over-appropriation and/or 
critical conflicts that they are unable to resolve (Cox et al., 2010; Winters et al., 2000; 
Ostrom, 1990; Poteete & Ostrom, 2004; Poteete et al., 2010; Schlager & Ostrom, 1992).  
Elinor Ostrom’s Nobel-Prize-winning work on the characteristics, management, 
and outcomes of common-pool resource governance has not only increased our 
understanding of what makes collective action successful or not, it also provides rich 
grounds for asking many more questions about what contributes to these different 
outcomes. In Chapter 2, I studied the eight design principles (DPs) for long enduring 
systems of shared resources that Ostrom (1990) noticed. I addressed the question: “What 
considerations should we have when using the design principles for theory building 
and/or policy making in order to obtain clarity and comprehensiveness?” by performing 
an analytical literature review of 64 studies that analyzed Ostrom’s design principles in 
real world case studies, and others that did not explicitly mention the design principle but 
                                                
1 Coupled Infrastructure Systems (CIS) refers to Socio Ecological Systems (SES), but in 
CISs the joint causation by the different components (or Infrastructures) of a system is 
explicit. For a more detailed explanation, read Anderies (2015). 
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that included an institutional analysis on their study. I looked for clarity of each DP, for 
desired outcomes intended by each DP, and for circumstances found in the field or in 
research that suggest a direction for the refinement of the DPs.  
For the following chapters, I focused on irrigation systems (a kind of CIS on 
which much data is available) to contribute to the  development of an empirically based 
theory of commons governance.  I chose to study irrigation systems because they are pure 
cases of shared resources:  there is clear presence of resource appropriation, a public-
infrastructure provisioning dilemma, and a relationship between the two phenomena. 
Other CISs such as forests, fisheries, and rangelands are particular cases of the general 
one represented by irrigation systems (Janssen & Anderies, 2013). Because my results are 
from pure cases of shared resources, they may be useful in generalizing about patterns in 
other CISs, and for informing theories of CIS governance. Moreover, the study of 
irrigation systems is timely given the anticipated impacts of climate change on freshwater 
availability, and given that agriculture, the main sector in terms of water use (70% of 
total global freshwater supply), will be one of the sectors most adversely affected by 
climate change (Cifdaloz, Regmi, Anderies & Rodriguez, 2010). 
In Chapter 3, I leverage findings of chapter 2, and addressed the question: Given 
the biophysical and ethnographic characteristics (typologies) of a CIS, which institutions 
are necessary and/or sufficient to avoid over-appropriation, poverty and critical conflicts 
among users of an irrigation system? I performed a meta-analysis of 28 cases around the 
world, using qualitative comparative analysis (QCA) to find conjoint causation of 
different contextual variables  (biophysical and ethnographic characteristics), and 
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institutional variables (design principles) as conditions that cause a desired outcome (an 
indicator of levels of over-appropriation, poverty and conflicts in the system).  
Chapters 4 and 5 are focused on the contribution on theory building for 
Robustness of CIS to environmental threats. In both chapters, using two different 
methods, I studied the Peruvian Piura Basin, a CIS that has been exposed to 
environmental shocks for decades. For Chapter 4, I used secondary and primary data to 
carry out a longitudinal study and address the question: How did the Piura Basin react to 
El Niño disturbances of 1982/1983 and 1997/1998, why did it react the way it did, and 
how are actors in the system preparing themselves for future events to come? I explore 
different hypothesis from prominent collapse theories to draw potential explanations. In 
Chapter 5, I developed a dynamic model to 1) understand the core dynamics of the 
systems with respect to the relationship between public-infrastructure and collective 
action, 2) to understand how robust the irrigation systems is to extreme flood events, and 
3) to explore potential interventions to increase the robustness of these systems to flood 
events. Finally, in Chapter 6, I synthesize the research findings and discuss their 
theoretical and practical implications.  
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CHAPTER 2 
A CRITICAL REVIEW OF OSTROM’S INSTITUTIONAL DESIGN PRINCIPLES 
AND A THEORY BUILDING AGENDA FOR SHARED RESOURCES 
MANAGEMENT 
Introduction 
When Elinor Ostrom, in “Governing the Commons” (1990) brought evidence to 
disprove the conventional wisdom that suggested that top-down governance, either by 
private companies or by the State, was the only way to avoid a tragedy of common goods, 
she unarguably enhanced our understanding of common pool resource (CPR) governance 
in socio-ecological systems (SES). Ostrom (1990) shared eight design principles (DPs) 
for long enduring systems of shared resources, and outlined how complex SES need 
context-specific propositions. This claim included the need for more empirically based 
research to observe commonalities at different layers of analysis and for different types of 
variables (biophysical, cultural/social and institutional) that foster sustainable CPR 
governance.  
As an excellent scientist, Ostrom knew that she could not be sure that she had 
found the core set of principles, and she laid out her findings so other scholars could 
challenge them. In a 2008, in a conference article “Design Principles of Robust Property 
Rights Institutions: What Have We Learned?” Ostrom suggested rephrasing and 
expanding some of the original design principles based on some articles that studied the 
design principles on different case studies, in order to clarify them. However, she called 
again for the analysis of additional studies for its further refinement. 
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Since the publication of Governing the Commons, many authors have evaluated 
the management performance of different sets of real world CPRs, which purposely or 
not, reflect the presence of the design principles. Keeping in mind that Ostrom’s analysis 
was on small-scale self-governing CPRs the challenge has been not only to test Ostrom’s 
findings in small community-based systems, but also to look for their application and 
usefulness in different types of SES. Since every system contains a self-organizing 
component (Anderies, 2015), the applicability of the DPs to different SES remains 
strong.  
Some studies have focused on single cases, and some have applied the analysis to 
a larger sample set (Cox et al. 2010, and Baggio et al., 2016). Some authors have studied 
the applicability of the principles to large-scale cases (Pomeroy et al. 2001, Young 2002, 
Berkes 2005, 2006), even to the global commons (Stern, 2011, Young 1997, 1999, Dietz 
et al., 2003, Epstein et al. 2014).  
Table 2.1 reflects the variability of the types of research on the performance of 
design principles that we have identified and used for the analysis in this paper. To date, 
we have not found a single study that challenges the validity of the DPs. However, given 
the DPs lack of precision and that they are not considered a theory, they are not 
falsifiable, and vice versa (Popper, 1963). The immediate question is then, how are the 
DPs useful for theory building? Popperian science philosophers argue that the mediation 
of auxiliary assumptions often protects theories from direct falsification (Forster, 2000), 
which may have been the case of conventional CPR management theories before 
Ostrom’s finding that context (in this case, a long list of auxiliary assumptions) matters. 
Given that the DPs are a logical, well-organized bundle of aspects shown to be relevant 
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for governance, we believe that the DPs may be the unifiers of context and theory 
prediction. In other words, we believe that the DPs can help us answer in which context a 
CPR existing or future theory may be accurate at predicting outcomes, which is very 
much needed for SES governance. To get to this point, however, the DPs need a 
refinement, as Ostrom anticipated and as many authors suggest, to also be able to expand 
them to more complex CPRs and contemporary governance challenges.   
Table 2.1 
Type Of Research On The Performance Of Design Principles 
N of 
Studies Authors Method 
17 
Araral, E. (2013), Berkes, F. (2002), Cleaver, F. D., & Franks, T. R. 
(2005), Cousins, B. (2000), Cox, M., & Ross, J. M. (2011), Epstein, 
G., Pérez, I., Schoon, M., & Meek, C. (2014), Gibson, C. C. (2001), 
Gonzalez-Aubone, F., Miranda, O., Montenegro, F., & Andrieu, J. 
(2014), Lam, W. F. (1996), McPartlon, E. (2016), Morrow, C. E., & 
Hull, R. W. (1996), Nilsson, T. (2001), Sarker, A., & Itoh, T. (2001), 
Steins, N. A & Edwards, V. M (1999), Trawick, P. B. (2001), Vogt, N. 
D., Banana, A., Gombya-Ssembajjwe, W., & Bahati, J. (2005) & 
Stern, P. (2011). 
1 Case Study 
6 
Boyer, M., Speelman, S., & Van Huylenbroeck, G. (2011), 
Fleischman, F., Ban, N., Evans, L., Epstein, G., Garcia-Lopez, G., & 
Villamayor-Tomas, S. (2014), Garrido, S. (2011), Gautam, A. P., & 
Shivakoti, G. P. (2005), Huntjens, P., Lebel, L., Pahl-Wostl, C., 
Camkin, J., Schulze, R., & Kranz, N. (2012), Ross, A., & Martinez-
Santos, P. (2008), 
Comparative Case 
Study (Between 2 
and 5 cases) 
4 Agrawal, A. (2014), Berkes, F. (2005). Berkes, F. (2006), Dietz, T., 
Ostrom, E., & Stern, P. C. (2003) 
Analytical Review 
of Literature of 
Empirical Cases 
4 
Lam, W. F. (1998), Tang, S. Y. (1992), Quinn, C. H., Huby, M., 
Kiwasila, H., & Lovett, J. C. (2007), Cox, M., Arnold, G., & Tomás, 
S. V. (2010), 
Statistical 
Comparative Case 
Analysis  
(Between 38 and 
150 cases) 
1 Baggio, J., Barnett, A., Perez-Ibarra, I., Brady, U., Ratajczyk, E., 
Rollins, N., ... & Anderies, J. (2016). 
Qualitative 
Comparative  
Analysis 
1 Agrawal, A. (2002) 
Qualitative Analysis 
of Meta-Analysis 	
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We analyze individual and common research findings of the applicability of the 
design principles in real world CPRs. We share which are the common challenges that 
researchers had when studying the DPs, what are the main critiques and gaps that we 
need to address, and finally we share some thoughts and suggestions in order to offer a 
concise, but comprehensive compendium of the knowledge of design principles, and how 
they can be expanded to other CPRs governance systems, so it can be used and improved 
by scholars and practitioners interested in analyzing the design principles in different 
settings, either for CPR theory development, or for practical commons governance.  
Method 
We did a literature review of 64 studies that analyzed Ostrom’s design principles 
in real world case studies, and others that did not explicitly mention the design principle 
but that included an institutional analysis on their study (see table 2.2). We are aware of 
the confirmatory bias challenge discussed by Araral (2014) and Cox et al. (2016), with 
regard to the inclination of authors that study DPs on real cases to confirm Ostrom’s 
claim. The exercise done on this research is not to validate the DPs, since as we 
mentioned before we find this impossible from a logical and philosophical point of view; 
on the contrary, it includes the suggestions of those authors that found that some DPs 
should be modified, which also suggests that their analyses were critical of the DP, which 
is what we are looking for to advance our theory. 
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Table 2.2 
Studies Included in the Analysis 
 
No Reference Method N of cases 
Design 
Principles  
Analysis 
Type of 
Research 
1 
Agrawal, A. (2002). Common resources and 
institutional sustainability. The drama of the commons, 
41-85. 
Qualitative 
Comparative 
Analysis of Meta-
Analysis 
3 Meta-
Analysis. 
Wade (1988) 
31 Villages, 
Ostrom (14 
cases), 
Baland and 
Platteau 
Partially Book Chapter 
2 
Agrawal, A. (2014). Studying the commons, governing 
common-pool resource outcomes: Some concluding 
thoughts. Environmental Science & Policy, 36, 86-91. 
Analytical Review 
of Literature -- Yes 
Journal 
Article 
3 
Araral, E. (2013). What makes socio-ecological 
systems robust? An institutional analysis of the 2,000 
year-old Ifugao society. Human Ecology, 41(6), 859-
870. 
1 case Study 1 Yes Journal Article 
4 
Baggio, J., Barnett, A., Perez-Ibarra, I., Brady, U., 
Ratajczyk, E., Rollins, N., ... & Anderies, J. (2016). 
Explaining success and failure in the commons: the 
configural nature of Ostrom's institutional design 
principles. International Journal of the Commons, 
10(2). 
Qualitative 
Comparative  
Analysis 
69 Yes Journal Article 
5 
Bardhan, P. (2000). Irrigation and cooperation: An 
empirical analysis of 48 irrigation communities in 
South India. Economic Development and cultural 
change, 48(4), 847-865. 
Quantitative 48 No Report 
6 
Berkes, F. (2002). Cross-scale institutional linkages: 
perspectives from the bottom up. The drama of the 
commons, 293-321. 
1 case Study 1 Partially Book Chapter 
7 
Berkes, F. (2005). Commons theory for marine 
resource management in a complex world. Senri 
Ethnological Studies, 67, 13-31. 
Analytical Review 
of Literature -- Yes Article 
8 
Berkes, F. (2006). From community-based resource 
management to complex systems: the scale issue and 
marine commons. Ecology and Society, 11(1). 
Analytical Review 
of Literature 4 Partially 
Journal 
Article 
9 
Berry, S. (1993). No condition is permanent: The social 
dynamics of agrarian change in sub-Saharan Africa. 
University of Wisconsin Pres. 
1 case Study 1 No Research Paper 
10 
Berry, S. (1994). Resource access and management as 
historical processes-conceptual and methodological 
issues. Occasional Paper, (13). International 
Development Studies, Roskide University, Roskilde, 
24-45. 
1 case Study 1 No Book Chapter 
11 
Boyer, M., Speelman, S., & Van Huylenbroeck, G. 
(2011). Institutional analysis of irrigation management 
in Haiti: a case study of three farmer managed 
schemes. Water Policy, 13(4), 555-570. 
Comparative Case  
Study 3 Yes 
Journal 
Article 
12 
Brewer, J. D., Sakthivadivel, R., & Raju, K. V. (1997). 
Water distribution rules and water distribution 
performance: a case study in the Tambraparani 
irrigation system (Vol. 12). IWMI. 
1 case Study 1 No Report 
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13 
Chakraborty, R. N. (2004). Sharing rules and the 
commons: Evidence from Ha'apai, Tonga. 
Environment and Development Economics, 9(4), 455-
472. 
1 Case Study. 
Qualitative and 
Quantitative 
1 No Journal Article 
14 
Cinner, J., & McClanahan, T. R. (2006). 
Socioeconomic factors that lead to overfishing in 
small-scale coral reef fisheries of Papua New Guinea. 
Environmental Conservation, 33(1), 73-80. 
1 Case Study 1 No Journal Article 
15 
Cleaver, F. D., & Franks, T. R. (2005). How 
institutions elude design: river basin management and 
sustainable livelihoods. 
1 case Study 1 Yes Research Paper 
16 
Cousins, B. (2000). Tenure and common property 
resources in Africa. Evolving land rights, policy and 
tenure in Africa., 151-180. 
1 case Study 1 Partially Book Chapter 
17 
Cox, M., Arnold, G., & Tomás, S. V. (2010). A review 
of design principles for community-based natural 
resource management. Ecology and Society 15(4): 38. 
Statistical 
Analysis 91 Yes 
Journal 
Article 
18 
Cox, M., & Ross, J. M. (2011). Robustness and 
vulnerability of community irrigation systems: The 
case of the Taos valley acequias. Journal of 
Environmental Economics and Management, 61(3), 
254-266. 
1 case Study 1 Yes Journal Article 
19 
Deribe, R. (2008). Institutional Analysis Of Water 
Management On Communal Irrigation Systems: The 
Case Of Atsbi Wemberta District In Tigray Region 
And Ada’a District In Oromiya Region, Ethiopia 
(Doctoral dissertation, Addis Ababa University). 
Comparative Case  
Study 2 No Thesis 
20 
Dietz, T., Ostrom, E., & Stern, P. C. (2003). The 
struggle to govern the commons. science, 302(5652), 
1907-1912. 
Theoretic Review -- Yes Journal Article 
21 
Downing, T. E. (1974). Irrigation and moisture-
sensitive periods: A Zapotec case. University of 
Arizona Press,Tucson, AZ, USA. Chapter 10: 113-122. 
1 case Study 1 No Book Chapter 
22 
Epstein, G., Pérez, I., Schoon, M., & Meek, C. (2014). 
Governing the invisible commons: Ozone regulation 
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We address the research question: What considerations should we bear in mind 
when using the design principles for theory building and/or policy making in order to 
obtain clarity and comprehensiveness? In this sense, the literature review was guided by 
the following specific questions for each design principle:  1) Which is Ostrom’s explanation of the DP? We analyze component 
by component2 each DP as explained in Ostrom (1990, 2005 and 2009).	
2) Which are the desired outcomes and which are the potential threats 
that are intended to be prevented with this DP?  
3) Which are some of the studies that have conflicting arguments 
among them for this DP? 
4) Which circumstances have been found so far that would make the 
implementation of this DP more or less likely? 
                                                
2  The Design principles are considered as general features for “successfully” managed SES. Subdividing the 
DP in components or subsets can be useful exercise for diagnostic approaches (Young, 2002; Ostrom, 2007) 
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5) Based on these studies, which special consideration—that was not 
specified or clarified before—should we have related to this DP? 
Results, Analysis And Recommendations  
Commons governance outcomes. One of the reasons why CPR governance 
theory building is a difficult endeavor is because of its difficulty agreeing on the 
normative component: the outcome of systems governance. Initially scholars were 
looking to avoid, as called by Hardin (1968), “the tragedy of the commons,” which would 
strictly imply no over-exploitation of a resource, and thus avoidance of the collapse of a 
system centered on a CPR.  When Ostrom proposed the DPs, she said that those were the 
regularities that she found in self-managed long-enduring systems. By long-enduring she 
meant “resource systems, as well as the institutions, [that] have survived for long periods 
of time” (Ostrom 1990, p. 58)3.  
Following the sequence of studies from the “tragedy of the commons” to 
Ostrom’s research, it was logical to aim for systems that last over time. However, we 
agree with Berkes (2006) in that “long-enduring” as an outcome measure can be 
problematic in contemporary SES because of the novel perturbation of globalization 
(including climate change). It thus becomes necessary to include in the analysis the type 
of perturbations, if any, that the system has been exposed to, and analyze its level of 
                                                
3  Ostrom (1990) clarifies that long period of time means at least 100 years, and that 
institutions have not been necessarily fixed, but that they have been robust, as defined by 
Shepsle (1989). “Shepsle (1989b, p. 143) regards “an institution as ‘essentially’ in 
equilibrium if changes transpired according to an ex ante plan (and hence part of the 
original institution) for institutional change.” In these cases, the appropriators designed 
basic operational rules, created organizations to undertake the operational management 
of their CPRs, and modified their rules over time in light of past experience according to 
their own collective-choice and constitutional-choice rules. (Ostrom 1990, p. 58) 
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robustness to them. Thus, the need to make a distinction between system longevity, 
because of solving the inherent social dilemmas of CPRs, and the system robustness is 
evident (Steins and Edwards 1999). Another interesting and relevant question from this 
analysis is what is the interplay between overcoming social-dilemmas and system 
robustness to potential shocks? In the Piura basin described in chapter 4, for example, the 
farmers’ collective action for improving public provisioning (disaster prevention) was 
triggered by a series of environmental events.  
We use the term robustness in regard to SES as the adaptability to disturbances, 
such that some desired system characteristics are maintained even though the behavior of 
the SES components have fluctuated (Carlson and Doyle 2002, Anderies, Janssen, and 
Ostrom 2004; Janssen and Anderies 2007). This fluctuation is normally due to a 
perturbation, and because different perturbations have different impacts on the system 
adaptability, the analysis of robustness needs to address a particular perturbation 
(Anderies et al. 2004). Moreover, when a system is robust to one perturbation, it becomes 
fragile to a different perturbation (Anderies and Janssen 2011). This means, that there 
exist robustness–fragility tradeoffs inherent in different designs. Under these 
circumstances defining a CPR management as successful because of its longevity without 
analyzing potential perturbations to its components may be problematic.    
Another reason why the longevity of SES can be a problematic measure is 
because it may be that a system that has lasted for centuries has not necessarily been 
managed properly. For example, there are many irrigation systems that last for long 
periods of time with disruptive conflicts, impoverished farmers, and / or polluted water. 
Take the case of the irrigation system in the Usangu basin, in Tanzania. The system dates 
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back to the early 19th century, but disparities, poverty and land degradation are current 
problems (Cleaver & Franks, 2005) 
Ostrom was well aware of the need to take into account other outcome indicators, 
such as the need to achieve “productive outcomes” (Ostrom 1990, p 5), or “appropriation 
rule compliance” (Ostrom et al. 1989, p 10), or the outcome variables that she proposed 
in the SES framework (Ostrom, 2007): efficiency, equity, accountability, sustainability, 
resilience, bio-diversity, and indicators of externalities to other SESs.  However, there is 
still the challenge of differentiating clearly between “different measures and dimensions 
of commons outcomes” in the analysis, and to avoid vague terms such as 
“sustainability”, “long-term viability” or “conditions of the commons” as proposed by 
Agrawal (2014, p 89). 
A more helpful exercise for theory building (although contested4) is to use more 
precise definitions of success rather than using vague definitions that limit comparability 
of results. Baggio et al. (2016), for example, proposed as a measure of outcome: “Those 
that have not displayed ecological deterioration, nor conflict or trust issues” (Baggio et al. 
2016). As in this last case, it is sometimes useful to include more than one measure of 
success. For example, in the Agcuyo irrigation system (Romana & los Reyes, 1980) the 
public infrastructure (dam) is always destroyed after strong rains. This causes economic 
damages because the community grows fewer crops as a consequence, and users have to 
repair the dam after the rain. In this case there is appropriation and provisioning rule 
compliance, and there are no social conflicts, but the farmers are still impoverished. If we 
                                                
4 Some researchers argue that the definition of success should come from the community 
itself, though this definition could be biased or may neglect its impact on another system.   
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consider only the first two outcomes (rule compliance and disruptive conflicts), then it 
may seem that this case is successful, however, if the aim of the system actors is to 
achieve productive outcomes, then the system is not successful.  
Another option for classifying SES outcomes is to assess a more continuous 
indicator rather than dichotomizing governance performance. For example, in the Agcuyo 
case, since it has 2 out of 3 measures (if those 3 measures are chosen for the analysis) of 
desired outcomes, then its performance can be seen as moderate, whereas a case that has 
3 out of 3 desired measures can be seen as strongly successful.  
Findings about each design principle 
 
DP 1: Clearly defined boundaries. “The boundaries of a resource system (e.g., 
irrigation system or fishery), and the individuals or households rights to harvest resource 
units are clearly defined” (Ostrom 2005, p 259). Boundary rules should state who can 
access or enter the resource system, who can appropriate or harvest the resource unit, 
who can manage and, who can exclude others from all these types of rights of the 
resource system (Ostrom, 2008)5.   
We identify three components of this DP: (1) clearly defined physical boundaries, 
(2) clearly defined user group (access and/or appropriate a resource), (3) clearly defined 
managers, and (4) clearly defined individuals who can exclude others—not included in 2 
and 3—from the benefits created in the system. The benefit of having clearly defined 
                                                
5  Schlager and Ostrom (1992) identify five property rights for the use of CPR: 
access, withdrawal (harvest), management, exclusion and alienation. Alienation is 
generally related to the ownership of private property, and it is not mentioned in DP1 
since the study was performed on community managed CPRs. This DP suggests that 
there should be position rules for each type of property right (except alienation). 
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physical boundaries is that everyone can know what is being managed and where they 
may go or not go (Ostrom 1990). The advantages of clearly defining the members of the 
resource system is that they know the size of the population among whom they will share 
the resource units and know who has access rights. The advantage of knowing the 
managers is that they know the decision making process with regard to the system. 
Finally, the advantage of the fourth component is that if users collectively arrived at some 
agreement to produce some benefits—which is the purpose of collective action—the risk 
of these benefits being reaped by others who have not contributed to the collective action 
(free-riding behavior) is reduced. If non-members find the resource valuable, they may 
want to use it, and potentially overharvest it (Ostrom 1990), or damage the ecosystem. 
Despite the relevance of all the components of this DP, we found in our literature review 
that less attention is paid to components 3 and 4 of this DP. Cox et al. (2010), for 
example, divided the DP1 into two parts: DP1A “Community Boundaries” and DP2B 
“Resource Boundary.” This shows the importance of discussing the components inside 
each DP to make sure we capture their full conceptualization in the analysis.  
One aspect of this DP that has been a matter of discussion is the flexibility of the 
definition of boundary rules. Some authors have interpreted this DP as proposing to 
define fixed boundaries and have criticized it for been too rigid. Cousins (2000) found 
that in semi-arid regions of Africa the resource availability (e.g. water, grassland) varies 
spatially and temporally, and users require access to the resource from different areas at 
different times. Similarly, Quinn et al (2007) argues that to increase rangeland carrying 
capacity when an area is about to be over-grazed, users need to move to other regions and 
thus, they proposed fluid rules to avoid impoverishing users and over-grazing in some 
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parts of the range. However, it is still not clear how fuzzy rules and flexible boundaries 
affect the outcome of resource management. Take the case of the Mali irrigation system 
(Vandersypen et al. 2009) where the boundary rules were so flexible that they had to 
discuss how to apply it in particular cases every time water was scarce. On the other 
hand, very rigid rules are also problematic. In the Mara River Basin, where clan 
migration is a problem, boundary rules are defined by clans in such a way that they are 
forbidden to migrate to other territories. This generates high population density in some 
of the clans’ territories (Majule, 2010). Wade (1988) suggests that rules can be flexible 
but they still need to be specific, and managers or decision makers for this matter should 
be aware that there is a trade-off between being specific and flexible.  
We think that this trade-off between clarity and flexibility can be reduced if 
boundary rules are combined with appropriation and provision rules. The necessity of 
these two rules is not explicitly mentioned in the DPs, though it is implicitly mentioned 
for the discussion of some of their characteristics in DP 2. We think that appropriation 
rules very much need to be combined with boundary rules because it does not help to 
avoid open access scenarios if defined users are allowed to appropriate as much as they 
desire. Moreover many times boundary rules are subject to compliance with 
appropriation and provisioning rules. Some systems define their social boundaries subject 
to compliance with other rules such as land tenure, water and management tariff payment 
or other provisioning rules, user registration, resource units appropriation rules, among 
others. In the Chancay–Lambayeque irrigation system for example, social boundaries are 
linked to land tenure within the physical boundaries, but they are not allowed to withdraw 
water if they do not pay a water tariff first. We propose then, to include a fifth and a sixth 
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component to this DP: (5) clearly defined appropriation rules and (6) clearly defined 
provisioning rules. Steins and Edwards (1999), Berry (1993, 1994) and Peters (1994) 
studied cases where users of the same resource system, used different resource units or 
used the same resource unit but for a different purpose (e.g. forest, water for irrigation 
and other uses), and they found that resource and user’s boundaries are “extremely high 
cost to define.” We argue that this can be solved with the help of appropriation and 
provision rules. In the Piura Basin for example, there are temporary water users who can 
appropriate water only when water is abundant (appropriation rule) and subject to the 
payment of water tariffs (provisioning rule) (see chapter 4). 
Table 2.3 
DP1 With Proposed Modification 
DP1: Clear Distribution Rules 
Components: 
1.     Clearly defined physical boundaries  
2.     Clearly defined user boundary rules 
3.     Clearly defined manager 
4.     Clearly defined who can exclude others from the system 
5.     Clearly defined appropriation rules 
6.     Clearly defined provisioning rules 
 
Interrelationship with other design principles. As we can infer from the 
discussion above, the characteristics of the boundary rules should depend on the situated 
conditions (we will discuss this further on DP 2), and since SES are constantly changing, 
rules that govern them should change accordingly. The mechanism of rule changing is 
described in DP 6 (Conflict resolution mechanisms) and who should be involved is 
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described in DP 3 (Collective Choice). Also, rules that are part of this DP should also be 
enforced as suggested by Morrow and Hull (1996), but since we believe that every rule of 
the system should be enforced, we suggest including it in DP 4 (Monitoring).  
Context matters. As we know from Ostrom (1990), context matters. We have 
done here an initial exercise that might be useful to map out a direction for future 
research with regards to how context matters for this DP. We identify 3 crucial aspects to 
take into account for boundary rules crafting: 
A) Social (including political) and biophysical congruence. We found in some 
cases that the physical boundary is different than the political boundaries, making both 
boundaries fuzzy (Quinn et al. 2007, Cousins 2000) and problematic to govern. One 
potential way to overcome this problem is by relying on other mechanisms such as the 
use of physical infrastructure to delimit resource systems. Vogt et al. (2005) found that in 
many forests of Uganda with fuzzy boundary rules, deforestation was a big problem; 
however, in one forest that had been closely demarked with cairns that depicted drawings 
of tree species that could be (could not be) harvested, forest conservation was quite 
effective. It might be that for these cases, the presence of other principles becomes even 
more relevant; for example, an adequate coordination with managers of the related 
communities that share the ecological region (DP 8, nested enterprises).  
B) Information flow. One type of information challenge concerns the knowledge 
of SES itself. Groundwater systems, for example, have diffuse hydrological boundaries 
and are difficult to define due to the connection of individual aquifers with other aquifers 
and surface water (Gonzalez-Aubone et al, 2014). It is likely that this information 
problem will be solved with progress in science and technology, but not all the systems 
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will necessarily have access to this type of information immediately. In the Dubre system 
of Haiti (Boyer & Van, 2011), for example, users did define the ecological boundary of 
their irrigation system. However, the author considers that it was not clearly defined since 
the levels of the river flow were unknown, and thus, this created problems of water 
allocation for individual users. Today’s technology allows for the measure of river flows, 
but in that particular system, users did not have the financial capacity to acquire such 
technology. Also, as Schlager, Blomquist, and Tang (1994) stated, there are some 
resources that are generally easier to measure and control than others, which depends 
heavily on the mobility of the resource and its storage.  
Another type of information challenge occurs when governmental authorities 
define the boundaries of a SES, such as paper parks, and then fail to make sure that 
participants are aware of it (Hayes 2004, Dietz, Ostrom, and Stern 2003). In paper parks 
that have failed in their management, it is generally because users are not aware of the 
paper parks, and thus are not able to enforce them locally. Sundberg (1998), for example, 
found that the boundaries of the Maya Biosphere Reserve in Guatamala City are well 
defined on maps, but 80% of surveyed farmers were unaware of the Reserve boundaries. 
C) System size, networks (sub-groups) and population growth. Literature of the 
commons suggests that larger groups and more heterogeneous groups are more likely to 
fail in collective action. However, there are some cases in which SESs with these two 
characteristics managed to overcome that problem by dividing the management in sub-
organizations in a polycentric governance structure (Keohane & Ostrom 1994, Ostrom 
2012). How to define these sub-groups and their boundaries may be relevant and thus 
applicable to this principle.  Thus, even though we found authors like Stern (2011), who 
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suggests that for the global commons DP 1 is less significant because there is only one-
way to set boundaries for the world, DP 1 may be relevant for defining sub-groups.  
DP2: Proportional equivalence between benefits and costs “Rules specifying the 
amount of resource products that a user is allocated are related to local conditions and to 
rules requiring labor, materials, and/or money inputs.” (Ostrom 2005, p. 259). 
We identify four components of this DP: (1) There should be appropriation rules 
indicating how much, when, and how different products can be harvested, (2) and 
provision rules to determine how members will bear individually the costs of the 
operating shared system, (3) Provision rules should be proportional to the individual 
benefits (benefits that are derived from appropriation), so that they perceive that rules are 
fair. “If some people pay low costs but get high benefits over time, this inequity frustrates 
the other participants and may cause more and more to consider the rules unfair and 
refuse to abide by them.” (Ostrom, 2009, p 40). And, finally, (4) appropriation rules need 
to be related to local conditions. The cases that Ostrom studied were relatively small SES, 
and local conditions was the proper term, however, if we intend to expand the DP for 
large-scale SES also, we need a different term. We think that the term “situated 
conditions” is a better fit.  
The first two components “appropriation and provision rules” were discussed in 
the previous DP, and we think that because of their strong interconnection with boundary 
rules they should be included in the first DP that we have renamed as “clear distribution 
rules.” Moreover, we think that components (3) Cost benefit equivalence and (4) The 
importance of considering situated conditions, should be applicable to all the rules, and 
thus, to all the DP when possible. We discuss further how (3) and (4) are related to other 
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principles throughout the paper, however a quick example is the case of DPs that 
suggests monitoring of users behaviors. With respect to (3), if the perceived benefits of 
monitors are lower than their costs, they may end up relaxing their work, or accepting 
bribes to compensate for their costs of monitoring. With respect to (4), the perceived 
benefits of the monitor may not be necessarily monetary, but in the shape of sense of 
social contribution or prospective in the governance system. Then, how to design the 
rules to incentivize monitors to be aligned with the systems’ desired outcome depends on 
the shape of the monitor’s values. 
We have already discussed how context matters for DP 1. We show for the other 
DPs the importance of situated conditions as well. It is important to highlight that the 
term “situated conditions,” does not refer only to ecological conditions, but also includes 
social conditions. This idea has been accepted by Ostrom and is clearly expressed in the 
Institutional Analysis and Development Framework (Ostrom, 2011) as well as in the 
Social-Ecological Systems Framework (Ostrom, 2007), where authors manifest the 
importance of specific variables of the biophysical and social aspects of the system that, 
combined with the institutional arrangements, affects a determined outcome. We claim 
here that there should be an explicit statement in this DP that all of the components of the 
DPs should have these situated conditions in mind when being designed.  
Last, this DP has a special characteristic that makes it different from the other 
DPs. When an exercise for identifying if rules fit with the situated conditions, it is 
extremely difficult to determine how well its fit is with all situations and conditions and 
without including the analysis of the outcome of the system, and thus, it cannot be really 
assessed as a causal condition for an outcome.  We believe that this very important aspect 
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of rules should be of special attention for practical and methodological reasons. It is a DP 
that has to be taken into account across all the other DPs. If we consider this requirement 
as such, we could move on to identify, as mentioned in the preceding paragraph, how 
specific conditions (that are included in this DP) and other DPs interact with each other to 
produce different outcome.  
Table 2.4 
DP2 With Proposed Modification 
 
DP2: Rules Congruence 
Components: 
1.     Congruence between rules and physical characteristics of the system  
2.     Congruence between rules and social characteristics of the system 
3.     Cost and benefits congruence among, and between rules.  
 
 
DP3: Collective Choice Arrangements. “Most of the individuals affected by a 
resource regime are authorized to participate in making and modifying the rules” Ostrom 
(2009). This DP addresses the need to design rules that fit with local circumstances, 
including participants’ perception of fair rules. Empirical research has shown that fairness 
is a crucial attribute of the rules needed to avoid free-riding behavior (Wade, 1988), and 
many scholars (Chakraborty 2004, Trawick 2001, Tang 1992 and Lam 1998, Marwell 
and Ames 1981, Margolis 1982) have supported the importance of fairness for 
sustainable management of CPRs.  
Ostrom (1990) argues that the resource users who are in more direct contact with 
the resource and exposed to the system dynamics on a daily basis know better than others 
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about the specifics of the interaction and conditions in a SES. She argues that they should 
participate in the rule making process on a constant basis to include modifications needed 
when changes happens to the specific characteristics of their settings. However, there are 
many cases in which users are in charge of rule crafting and have failed, and other 
situations where users not in charge of rule crafting have succeeded. An example of the 
former are the cases studied by Nilsson (2001) and Bardhan (2000), who found that elites 
prevented others from participating in rule-making processes in Tanzania and India, 
respectively. Cleaver and Franks (2005) argue that, in the cases that they studied, because 
of their high opportunity cost, users with few resources tend to be excluded or even 
exclude themselves from participating because of high opportunity cost. In all these 
cases, even though most of the users had the right to participate in rule crafting, this was 
not a de facto rule since only wealthy users affect rules. Sekher (2000) found that in India 
the wider the representation of the community in the organization, the better are its 
chances of securing local cooperation and rule confirmation for managing and preserving 
the resource. Then, it seems that it helps if most of the users participate in decision 
making, however, it is not enough to just have the right to do it, it is important to consider 
situated conditions (such as income level, distance to travel to participate, local elites, 
etc.) to guarantee its viability, and to ensure that the perceived benefits of participating 
outweighs the cost of doing so (DP 2) 
Furthermore, if the rationale of this DP is that decision makers should have the 
best available information to fit rules with the situated context, then there might be 
alternative ways to achieve that outcome. On one hand, it is not always true that a 
system’s users have complete information, especially not of novel shocks, social trends, 
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ecological changes; and on the other hand, we may want to consider possible externalities 
from or to another interconnected system or sub-system (Ostrom, 2007). Then depending 
on the situated condition, other non-users actors should be involved in the rule crafting 
process for achieving a desired outcome. For example Fleischman et al. (2014) described 
how systems were able to successfully overcome the CPRs challenges by replacing the 
original requirements of this DP by other similar-in-purpose mechanisms that are also 
linked with the DP6. In the Indonesian Forest, for example, this DP was absent, but an 
improved democratic system guarantee users’ participation.  
In any case, the focus of this DP is on making sure that managers have the right 
information based on who needs to participate to provide the information, which depends 
on the situated conditions. Where and how they may interact to make the information 
flow is a concern of DP 6 “Conflict resolution mechanism” that we analyze below. It is 
important for the fulfillment of this DP, as we are proposing it, to have clear working 
rules about who should participate and the decisions that will be made (e.g., voting rules). 
We would only say that this DP is fulfilled when most of the users’ (as well as other 
relevant non-user stakeholders’) points of view and knowledge are effectively taken into 
account6.  
 
                                                
6It is easy to confuse this DP with DP6, because how effectively stakeholders opinion and 
knowledge are taken into account will also depend on how they are actually discussing 
conflicting topics. In some systems where the government intervenes in important 
decisions, they invite users to participate; however, the communication in the meetings 
flows only in one direction, and users’ perspective are not necessary taken into account. 
In some other cases, the meetings that are organized are far from users houses or are held 
in critical working hours.  
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Table 2.5 
DP3 With Proposed Modification 
DP3: Stakeholder Effective Participation 
Components 
1.           Users point of view and knowledge are effectively taken into account 
2.           Other relevant non-users’ point of view and knowledge are effectively 
taken into account.  
 
DP4: Monitoring. “Monitors, who actively audit biophysical conditions and user 
behavior, are at least partially accountable to the users and/or are the users themselves” 
(Ostrom 2005, pp 259).  
We identify three components in this DP. One is that there are monitors, or there 
is a monitoring mechanism of how users comply appropriation rules (e.g. harvesting). 
This is important because the next challenge after convening the rules is to actually 
follow them, and in CPRs systems actors generally face the temptation of non-
compliance, given that, if others do comply, defectors may increase their individual 
benefit. This is why such situations are referred to as social dilemmas, because actors 
face the dilemma of collaborating with the group by following the rules, or just looking 
after their self-interest and betraying the agreement (Ostrom, 1990).  
Many authors agree that appropriation rule enforcement is crucial for collective 
action (Gibson, Williams, and Ostrom, 2005; Ostrom and Nagendra, 2006; Hayes and 
Ostrom, 2005; and Schweik, 2000). We agree that this component is important, but we 
suggest a modification. Morrow and Hull (1996, 1643), for example, suggested 
rephrasing the first design principle to guarantee enforcement of boundary rules. Many 
authors (Gibson, Williams, and Ostrom 2005; Hayes and Ostrom 2005, Ostrom 2009) 
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have supported this suggestion. However, as with the example of boundary rules we 
could analyze other rules that may affect users’ and managers’ behaviors, such as the 
compliance with provision rules. We can argue that the congruence between 
appropriation and provisioning rules are necessary, but for it to be really fair, both need 
to be enforced. Many of the studies of complex novel CPRs pay no attention to 
monitoring provision rules, for example, so we find it relevant to explicitly mention the 
importance of rules enforcement in general, including appropriation rules, boundary 
rules, provision rules, but other rules also.  
The second component of this DP is that monitors need to be accountable. 
Sometimes monitors are disconnected with the final goal of monitoring by virtue of being 
appointed by higher levels of governance; and, if they are not held accountable, they can 
let users appropriate more than their allotment for retribution, or be somehow careless 
with rule compliance. When users need to monitor the monitors, collective action 
becomes very costly. Brewer et al. (1997) propose to instead consider monitors’ 
incentives too so that the benefit of doing their job is higher than the cost of not doing it. 
One incentive is to reward with a career path in the system subject of their monitoring. In 
that sense payoff congruence (a component of DP 2) should also be applicable for 
monitors, and using the same logic, we can suggest this proposition for managers in 
general. Moreover, how actors decide to monitor the system should also depend on the 
local context. If it is small and terraced as in the cases of Arequipa (Tarwick, 2001), then 
there is less need to hire special monitors; actors can naturally monitor others’ behavior. 
If the system is productive enough to allow users to invest in a high technology 
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computerized monitoring mechanism as in the case of Campo de Dalías (Lopez-Galvez & 
Villasante, 2001), their monitoring mechanism then can be even more precise.  
The last component of this DP is the environmental monitoring. Managers need to 
know the ecological condition of the system to make decisions according to the 
difference between the desired outcome and the observed one (Ostrom, 2008). We found, 
that researchers have focused less on this component of the DP. For some type of CPR 
governance, such as wildlife, this is a key component given that international treaties 
specially focus on the resource condition.  We also find it relevant to add as a component 
a human-made hard infrastructure monitoring mechanism, such as reservoirs and canals, 
for irrigation systems, or fishing technologies, so managers can make decisions 
accordingly for its maintenance or regulation, respectively, that ultimately will affect the 
outcome of the CPR management. The functioning of this type infrastructure can affect 
users’ payoffs and change incentives for cooperating resulting in changes in users 
strategies.  
Ostrom (2005) suggests that it is preferable that users are the monitors because 
they get to know when others are complying with the rules, which increase users’ trust in 
the agreement and a stable sense of fairness. However, this may not be necessary if 
monitoring with a transparent monitoring system. This is especially relevant for large-
scale systems, in which it is not possible for users to monitor themselves. We suggest a 
fifth component: it is also important that users are aware of rules compliance.  
One purpose of monitoring actors’ behavior is to send a sign to actors that if they 
do not comply with rules there is some possibility of getting caught, which, depending on 
the sanction for non-compliance, may reduce the payoff (benefit) of non-compliance 
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(monetary and non-monetary, sometimes users payoffs also incorporates a cost of 
embarrassment), reducing the temptation to defect. Then, even if monitoring is 
functioning well, when a defector is caught and there is no sanction – or nothing happens 
(even if it is just warning, admonition, or the embarrassment of getting caught) then the 
act of monitoring is not necessarily translated into enforcement. Users need to know not 
only that if they defect they might be caught, but also that if it happens, then his or her –
monetary or non-monetary- payoffs may be reduced. Take as example the Chancay-
Lambayeque irrigation system case, where infractors appropriated water outside of the 
rules in front of the monitors.  This DP and DP5 (Sanctioning) are strongly associated 
(Gibson, Williams & Ostrom, 2005). 
Table 2.6 
DP4 With Proposed Modification 
DP 4: Monitoring 
Components 
1.           Presence of a monitoring mechanism of rule compliance  
(Relevant rules to be defined depending on the context of the system, but some 
examples are) 
a.     Boundary rules 
b.     Appropriation rules (either as choice or scope rules) 
c.     Provisioning rules  
d.     Other choice rules not included in appropriation or provisioning rules 
e.     Information Rules 
f.      Position Rules 
g.     Aggregation Rules 
h.     Payoff rules 
2.           Monitoring mechanisms are accountable 
3.           Users know the level of rule compliance 
4.           Monitoring of the ecological condition 
5.           Monitoring of the human-made hard infrastructure 
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DP5: Graduated Sanctions. “Users who violate rules in use are likely to receive 
graduated sanctions (depending on the seriousness and context of the offense) from other 
users, from officials accountable to these users, or from both.” Ostrom (2005) 
This DP addresses the need for a negative consequence for users that do not 
comply with rules by receiving a type of sanction. This is the first component of this DP. 
A second component is that the determined sanction should be graduated in the sense that 
it depends on the type of infraction, the degree and the frequency. When sanctions are 
graduated, the system is tolerant to mistakes, but at the same time communicates to the 
offender that the manager and/or other users have notice his non-cooperative behavior 
(Ostrom, 2009).  
It is key here to suggest an explicit mention of sanctions enforcement, which we 
think are as important as the other components but is not mentioned in the original 
descriptions of the DPs. In many systems, graduated sanctions are clear but are, however, 
never applied. See for example how in the Chancay-Lambayeque Basin in Peru, 
offenders never pay the fees related to their sanctions (Rubinos, 2013). If users think that 
it is very likely that sanctions will be imposed if they do not comply, then it reduces their 
incentives to defect.  On the other hand, it increases their confidence that others will 
comply with the rules. Then, it is also important to communicate to others when a 
sanction has been imposed to increase actors’ trust in rule enforcement. As we can see, 
monitoring and sanctioning are strictly connected since there is no sense of monitoring if 
there would not be any consequence of being caught, and it is not possible to be caught if 
there is not a type of monitoring in the system. We suggest then, that DP4 (monitoring) 
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and DP5 (graduated sanctions) should be combined in only one design principle given 
their strong interdependence.  
Sanctions can be in any form, which will depend on the situated conditions. There 
are cases where reputation is more valued than money, thus monetary sanctions would 
not be as effective as the threat of others knowing about their non-cooperation, as in the 
case of the Nishikambara irrigation system (Sarker & Itoh, 2001). Moreover, as in the 
case of monitoring, we believe that sanctions are necessary not only for non-compliance 
of appropriation rules, but also for infraction in other rules, and they can be also applied 
to actors that hold different positions in a system (users, monitors, managers, etc.) 
Table 2.7 
DP5 With Proposed Modification 
DP 5: Sanctions 
Components 
1. There is a negative consequence for users that do not comply with rules by 
receiving a type of sanction.  
2. Graduated sanctions depending on type of infraction, the degree and the 
frequency. 
3. Sanctions are effectively enforced  
4. Users know when sanctions are imposed 
 
DP6: Conflict Resolution Mechanism. “There are rapid, low-cost, local arenas in 
which to resolve conflict among users or between users and officials” (Ostrom 2005, 
259).  
Conflicts (discrepancies) are necessary for social construction, but if the structure 
of a system is too rigid, then conflicts scale into social problems (Stamm & Aliste, 2014). 
This DP represents the sole governance component that addresses the capacity of the 
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system to solve conflicts. Human beings in general have different interpretation of rules 
and situations as well as interests (Ostrom, 2008), thus it becomes critical to discuss those 
potentially conflicting perspectives. It is then necessary to include in the system 
mechanisms to communicate conflicting positions, to be able to come up with solutions, 
and, if necessary, change the institutions. Generally, authors use the idea of conflict with 
a negative connotation. Huntjens et al. (2012) for example, differentiate mechanisms for 
conflict prevention and resolution, which manifest the existences of conflict levels.  
Conflict resolutions mechanism and spaces can be present at different scales, depending 
on the number of users involved and the type of conflict. One way of resolving conflicts 
(different perspectives) at the individual level is by different type of communication. This 
may be one of the reasons why communication among users has been found to be 
important for collective action in lab experiments (Ostrom, 2010).   
When it is not possible to solve conflicts through communication of the 
conflicting parties, then neutral formal or informal arbiters of law (e.g. judge, mediator, 
tribunal of elders, a respected leader, a priest, etc.) may be necessary as proposed by 
Ostrom (1990, 2005). The characteristics of these conflict mechanisms will depend then 
in the situated conditions. For example, Ostrom’s explanation of this DP mentions that 
the mechanism should be “rapid,” however, we argue that this should depend on the 
situated conditions. Gautam and Shivakoti (2005) argue that systems that are more 
exposed to novel shocks will need to coordinate and share information for fast decision 
making. However there are some systems that may prefer to avoid rapid local arenas to 
resolve conflicts, and take their time to process the nature of the conflict, as in the case of 
the Usangu system in Tanzania (Majule, 2010).   
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As we mentioned when analyzing DP3, which actors should participate in rule 
crafting is not a matter of this DP; DP6 includes the interaction where different opinions 
and situations are exposed and considered to solve conflicts, which may imply or not, 
rules modification. 
Table 2.8 
DP6 With Proposed Modification 
DP 6: Conflict Resolution Mechanisms 
Components 
1.    Different opinions and situations are exposed and considered in order to 
solve conflicts, which may imply or not, rules modification.  
2.  This should be considered for different levels of conflicts. Conflict of 
perspective are considerated in this DP, then simple communication is also part 
of this component 
 
DP7: Minimal Recognition of Rights to Organize. “The rights of users to devise 
their own institutions are not challenged by external governmental authorities, and users 
have long-term tenure rights to the resource” (Ostrom 2005, pp 259) 
The components that we can identify in this DP are: (1) that users have the right 
to devise their own institutions (which is Ostrom’s original proposition of DP 3)7, (2) that 
this right is not to be challenged by external governmental authorities (which is, as we 
will explain better, contained in DP 8), (3) that users have long-term tenure rights (which 
is DP 1, as we already explained), and (4) that users have the right to organize. 
Because this DP suggests that users should have recognized authority to design 
the institutions in a system, this DP, as it is, is applicable only for self-governed systems 
                                                
7  Some authors, like Fleishchman, Ban, Evans, Epstein, Garcia-Lopez and Villamayor-Tomas (2014) confess 
that for large scales systems it is hard to differentiate DP 7 from DP 3.  
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as those that Ostrom studied. As we explained in DP3, many systems are interconnected 
with other systems of different scales either by the resource system (e.g. river, 
groundwater in the water cycle, energy consumption, air pollution and forestry activity 
are strongly connected) or by the outcomes of governance (e.g. economic dependence, 
multi-systems externalities). If we want to target systems that are nested or 
interconnected to other system, users may not have the authority to fully design their 
institutions, because they have to consider how these rules affect or are affected by other 
actors in other systems. It is however important that they at least participate in their 
design (which is, as discussed before, DP 3). Moreover, regardless of users’ degree of 
participation in rule making, it is also important that users have the right to organize. If 
users of a system are to coordinate rules and enforcement with actors from other systems, 
they need to coordinate among themselves first, and then bring a unified or discussed 
position. Even for large-scale and heterogeneous groups in a system, organizations at a 
micro level are critical for discussion among users.  In the Acequias irrigation system in 
Texas, for example, the problematic characteristic of having a large and heterogeneous 
group of users was offset by the capacity of conforming modular networks that 
decomposed the large groups into subgroups, reducing the transaction costs of collective 
action (Cox, 2010). For even a larger scale as the global commons, the importance of 
networks or organizations in sub-groups may be critical for achieving collective action 
(Ostrom, 2012). However, how these sub-groups should interact among them and 
between other groups is a matter of discussion of the following DP.   
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Table 2.9 
DP7 With Proposed Modification 
DP 7: Rights to Organize 
Components 
1.    Users have the rights to organize 
2.    Users effectively are part of a formal or informal organization that is not 
undermined by other instance of governance.  
 
DP8: Nested Enterprises. “Appropriation, provision, monitoring, enforcement, 
conflict resolution, and governance activities are organized in multiple layers of nested 
enterprises” (Ostrom 2005, p 259)  
Ostrom’s (1990) explanation of this DP was specific to vertical linkages. 
However in later publications (e.g. Ostrom 2005, 2009), she incorporated in the 
description of this DP the notion of polycentric systems as defined by Vincent Ostrom 
(1999, p 57): “one where many elements are capable of making mutual adjustments for 
ordering their relationships with one another within a general system of rules where each 
element acts with independence of other elements” 
The only confusion that we found in the literature, is related to the term “nested,” 
which implies levels of governances that are inside each other, and that omits the 
horizontal linkages that are very much needed for polycentric governance. A rewording 
of this DP may be necessary. We propose to change it to: “Effective relations with other 
tiers of rule-making authority (polycentric governance).” Where “effective relations” can 
mean that these authorities coordinate among each other so that their rules and their 
enforcement, as well as other governance activities, are adjusted for ordering their 
relationships. 
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This definition covers concepts that are proposed by other authors such as “multi-
level governance,” “multilayered institutions” or “multi-dimensional linkages” (Marshall, 
2008; Poteete, 2012), “federated systems” (Agrawal, 2002), “cross scale interactions” 
(Berkes, 2002), and “agency coordination” (Wade 1988) that are suggested as important 
for the outcome of systems governance. 
Table 2.10 
DP8 With Proposed Modification 
DP8: Appropriate relations with other tiers of rule-making authority  
(polycentric governance) 
Components 
1. Authorities coordinate among each other so that their rules and their 
enforcement, as well as other governance activities, are adjusted for ordering 
their relationships. 
 
Concluding Thoughts  
When Ostrom (1990) analyzed self-governing systems and found regularities in 
long-enduring systems, which she called designed principles, she identified core 
characteristics that enable collective action. To move forward in theory building we need 
to learn how these self-organizing components are influenced by contextual factors and 
vice versa. Some reviews have proposed some modifications of the DPs to make them 
clearer and enhance the study of them in real world cases. The need for this modification 
was even recognized by Ostrom (2009). We have incorporated those propositions as well 
as others from more recent literature and our own from both the analysis of these two and 
our own revision of cases.  
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We found that the desired outcome of system governance needs to be more 
specifically defined for CPR theory building. We show in table 2.11 outcome examples 
that have been proposed in the literature that we reviewed. We suggest that sometimes it 
might be helpful to choose more than one outcome for the analysis, as done by Baggio et 
al. (2016). A clear distinction needs to be made between a desired outcome that includes 
frequent perturbations (also called internal or external shocks), or less frequent 
perturbations. In the case of including less frequent and strong perturbations, we suggest 
a clear definition of the outcome (e.g. robust, resilient) to a particular shock (e.g. robust 
to droughts).  
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Table 2.11 
Summary of Recommendations 
 
DP 2: Congruence 
 
Contextual Variables 
 
System Size  
Homogeneity/ 
Heterogeneity of 
Groups 
 Leadership 
Resource Dependence  
Mobility 
Storage Capacity 
Market Integration  
Market Proximity  
External Government 
Policies  
Cross-Scale Linkages 
Topography  
Weather Predictability  
Etc.  
DP1: Clear Distribution Rules 
Outcomes 
 
 Ecological Deterioration 
 Critical Conflicts  
 Trust Issues 
 Poverty Persistence 
Appropriation Rules 
Compliance 
Provisioning Rules 
Compliance 
Efficiency 
Equity 
Accountability 
Resilience to a 
disturbance 
Robustness to a 
disturbance 
Non externalities to other 
CIS 
1.     Clearly defined physical boundaries  
2.     Clearly defined user boundary rules 
3.     Clearly defined manager 
4.     Clearly defined who can exclude others from the system 
5.     Clearly defined appropriation rules 
6.     Clearly defined provisioning rules 
DP3: Stakeholder Effective Participation 
1.           Users point of view are effectively taken into 
account 
2.           Other relevant non-users’ point of view are 
effectively taken into account.  
DP 4: Monitoring 
1.           Presence of a monitoring mechanism of rule 
compliance  
2.           Monitoring mechanisms are accountable 
3.           Users know the level of rule compliance 
4.           Monitoring of the ecological condition 
5.           Monitoring of the human-made hard infrastructure 
DP 5: Sanctions 
1. There is a negative consequence for users that do not 
comply with rules by receiving a type of sanction.  
2. Graduated sanctions depending on type of infraction, the 
degree and the frequency. 
3. Sanctions are effectively enforced  
4. Users know when sanctions are imposed 
DP 6: Conflict Resolution Mechanisms 
1.    Different opinions and situations are exposed and 
considerate in order to solve conflicts, which may imply or 
not, rules modification.  
2.  This should be considered for different levels of conflicts. 
Conflict of perspective are considerate in this DP, then 
simple communication is also part of this component 
DP 7: Rights to Organize 
1.    Users have the rights to organize 
2.    Users effectively are part of a formal or informal 
organization that is not undermine by other instance of 
governance.  
DP8: Appropriate relations with other tiers of rule-
making authority  
(polycentric governance) 
1. Authorities coordinate among each other so that their rules 
and their enforcement, as well as other governance activities, 
are adjusted for ordering their relationships. 
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For the analysis of each DP we made explicit the components that we identified 
that conforms each DP and analyzed it in detail. This exercise revealed specific overlaps 
and interrelationship among the DPs, which stress not only the need for their 
clarification, but also suggest a direction of change. We summarize in table 2.11 the 
proposed modifications. DP 2 indicates that rules should fit with the SES context and, as 
we discussed before, also across all the other DPs. This is important because this also 
implies that the DPs do not show their underlying causal processes alone (Ostrom 2009). 
“Situated conditions” comprehends a long list of variables that are grouped as 
“Biophysical Context” and “Attributes of the Community” in the Institutional Analysis 
and Development Framework, and “Social, Economic, and Political Settings,” “Resource 
Systems,” “Resource Units,” “Governance Systems” and “Actors” in the Socio-
Ecological Framework. Many scholars have also suggested the inclusion of those 
variables such as system size, homogeneity/ heterogeneity of groups, leadership (Baland 
and Platteau 1996); dependence on a resource (Gibson 2001, Pinkerton and Weinstein 
1995); market integration (Tucker 1999; Tucker, Randolph, and Castellanos 2007); urban 
or market proximity (Bardhan 2000, Cinner and McClanahan 2006); external government 
policies (Rodriguez 2007); cross-scale linkages (Berkes 2002; Young 2002); topography, 
weather predictability (Wade 1988), heterogeinity in information (Libecap, 1994) among 
others.   
Generally, the study of these causal variables related to CPR conditions has been 
performed without incorporating the analysis of institutions and their characteristics. By 
making DP 2 transversal to all the DPs we can enable the understanding of how 
configuration of social, physical contexts and rules perform in different SES. The design 
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principles components can become a checklist of variables to reference (similar to a 
framework, but organized for theory building), that can enable the construction of nested 
typologies of biophysical, social and governance arrangements that with empirical 
evidence prove to be relevant for increasing the likelihood of achieving a determined 
clearly defined outcome, as proposed by Ostrom (2007). 
References 
Abdo, A. (2014). Understanding Farmers’ Adaptation to Water Scarcity. IWMI Research 
Report (Report No. 160). DOI:  http://horizon.documentation.ird.fr/exl-
doc/pleins_textes/divers16-03/010066458.pdf 
Agrawal, A. (2002). Common resources and institutional sustainability. The drama of the 
commons, 41-85. 
Agrawal, A. (2014). Studying the commons, governing common-pool resource outcomes: 
Some concluding thoughts. Environmental Science & Policy, 36, 86-91. 
Anderies, J., Janssen, M., & Ostrom, E. (2004). A framework to analyze the robustness of 
social-ecological systems from an institutional perspective. Ecology and 
society, 9(1). 
Anderies, J. M., & Janssen, M. A. (2011). The fragility of robust social-ecological 
systems. Global Environmental Change, 21(4), 1153-1156. 
DOI: 10.1016/j.gloenvcha.2011.07.004 
Anderies, J. M. (2015). Understanding the dynamics of sustainable social-ecological 
systems: human behavior, institutions, and regulatory feedback networks. Bulletin 
of mathematical biology, 77(2), 259-280. 
Araral, E. (2013). What makes socio-ecological systems robust? An institutional analysis 
of the 2,000 year-old Ifugao society. Human Ecology, 41(6), 859-870. 
Araral, E. (2014). Ostrom, Hardin and the commons: A critical appreciation and a 
revisionist view. Environmental Science & Policy, 36, 11-23. 
Baland, J. M., & Platteau, J. P. (1996). Halting degradation of natural resources: is there a 
role for rural communities?. Food & Agriculture Org.. 
Baggio, J., Barnett, A., Perez-Ibarra, I., Brady, U., Ratajczyk, E., Rollins, N., ... & 
Anderies, J. (2016). Explaining success and failure in the commons: the 
   42 
configural nature of Ostrom's institutional design principles. International Journal 
of the Commons, 10(2). 
Bardhan, P. (2000). Irrigation and cooperation: An empirical analysis of 48 irrigation 
communities in South India. Economic Development and cultural change, 48(4), 
847-865. 
Berkes, F. (2002). Cross-scale institutional linkages: perspectives from the bottom 
up. The drama of the commons, 293-321. 
Berkes, F. (2005). Commons theory for marine resource management in a complex 
world. Senri Ethnological Studies, 67, 13-31. 
Berkes, F. (2006). From community-based resource management to complex systems: the 
scale issue and marine commons. Ecology and Society, 11(1). 
Berry, S. (1993). No condition is permanent: The social dynamics of agrarian change in 
sub-Saharan Africa. University of Wisconsin Pres. 
Berry, S. (1994). Resource access and management as historical processes-conceptual 
and methodological issues. Occasional Paper, (13). International Development 
Studies, Roskide University, Roskilde, 24-45. 
Boyer, M., Speelman, S., & Van Huylenbroeck, G. (2011). Institutional analysis of 
irrigation management in Haiti: a case study of three farmer managed schemes. 
Water Policy, 13(4), 555-570. 
Brewer, J. D., Sakthivadivel, R., & Raju, K. V. (1997). Water distribution rules and water 
distribution performance: a case study in the Tambraparani irrigation system (Vol. 
12). IWMI. 
Carlson, J. M., & Doyle, J. (2002). Complexity and robustness. Proceedings of the 
national academy of sciences, 99(suppl 1), 2538-2545. 
Chakraborty, R. N. (2004). Sharing rules and the commons: Evidence from Ha'apai, 
Tonga. Environment and Development Economics, 9(4), 455-472. 
Cinner, J., & McClanahan, T. R. (2006). Socioeconomic factors that lead to overfishing 
in small-scale coral reef fisheries of Papua New Guinea. Environmental 
Conservation, 33(1), 73-80. 
Cleaver, F. D., & Franks, T. R. (2005). How institutions elude design: river basin 
management and sustainable livelihoods. 
   43 
Cousins, B. (2000). Tenure and common property resources in Africa. Evolving land 
rights, policy and tenure in Africa., 151-180. 
Cox, M., Arnold, G., & Tomás, S. V. (2010). A review of design principles for 
community-based natural resource management. Ecology and Society, 15(4), 38. 
Cox, M., & Ross, J. M. (2011). Robustness and vulnerability of community irrigation 
systems: The case of the Taos valley acequias. Journal of Environmental 
Economics and Management, 61(3), 254-266. 
Cox, M., Villamayor-Tomas, S., & Arnold, G. (2016). Design principles in commons 
science: A response to “Ostrom, Hardin and the commons”(Araral). 
Environmental Science & Policy, 61, 238-242. 
Deribe, R. (2008). Institutional Analysis Of Water Management On Communal Irrigation 
Systems: The Case Of Atsbi Wemberta District In Tigray Region And Ada’a 
District In Oromiya Region, Ethiopia (Doctoral dissertation, Addis Ababa 
University). 
Dietz, T., Ostrom, E., & Stern, P. C. (2003). The struggle to govern the commons. 
science, 302(5652), 1907-1912. 
Downing, T. E. (1974). Irrigation and moisture-sensitive periods: A Zapotec case. 
University of Arizona Press,Tucson, AZ, USA. Chapter 10: 113-122. 
Epstein, G., Pérez, I., Schoon, M., & Meek, C. (2014). Governing the invisible commons: 
Ozone regulation and the Montreal Protocol. International Journal of the 
Commons, 8(2). 
Fleischman, F.D. et al., (2014). Governing large-scale social-ecological systems: Lessons 
from five cases. International Journal of the Commons. 8(2), pp.428–456. 
DOI: http://doi.org/10.18352/ijc.416 
Forster, M. R. (2000). Hard problems in the philosophy of science: Idealisation and 
commensurability. In After Popper, Kuhn and Feyerabend (pp. 231-250). 
Springer Netherlands. 
Garrido, S. (2011). Las instituciones de riego en la España del este. Una reflexión a la luz 
de la obra de Elinor Ostrom. 
Gautam, A. P., & Shivakoti, G. P. (2005). Conditions for successful local collective 
action in forestry: some evidence from the hills of Nepal. Society and Natural 
Resources, 18(2), 153-171. 
   44 
Gibson, C. C. (2001). Forest resources: Institutions for local governance in 
Guatemala. Protecting the commons: A framework for resource management in 
the Americas, 71-89. 
Gibson, C. C., Williams, J. T., & Ostrom, E. (2005). Local enforcement and better 
forests. World Development, 33(2), 273-284. 
Gonzalez-Aubone, F., Miranda, O., Montenegro, F., & Andrieu, J. (2014). Analizando la 
modernizacion en regadios tradicionales del oeste argentino. / Gestion del agua 
para riego de uso comun (RUC): la busqueda de un desempeno eficiente y 
sostenible a traves de un enfoque institucinoal. El caso de la provincia de San 
Juan, Argentina. DOI: 
http://www.aaea.com.ar/_upload/files/publicaciones/188_20170116124703_C7.p
df 
Hardin, G. (1968). The Tragedy of the Commons'(1968) 162. Science, 1243. 
Hayes, T., & Ostrom, E. (2005). Conserving the world's forests: Are protected areas the 
only way. Ind. L. Rev., 38, 595. 
Huntjens, P., Lebel, L., Pahl-Wostl, C., Camkin, J., Schulze, R., & Kranz, N. (2012). 
Institutional design propositions for the governance of adaptation to climate 
change in the water sector. Global Environmental Change, 22(1), 67-81. 
Janssen, M. A., & Anderies, J. M. (2007). Robustness trade-offs in social-ecological 
systems. International journal of the commons, 1(1), 43-66. 
Keohane, R. O., & Ostrom, E. (Eds.). (1994). Local commons and global 
interdependence. Sage. 
Lam, W. F. (1996). Institutional design of public agencies and coproduction: a study of 
irrigation associations in Taiwan. World development, 24(6), 1039-1054. 
Lam, W. F. (1998). Governing irrigation systems in Nepal: institutions, infrastructure, 
and collective action. Institute for Contemporary Studies. 
Libecap, G. D. (1994). 7. The Conditions for Successful Collective Action. Journal of 
Theoretical Politics, 6(4), 563-592. 
López Gunn, E., & Hernández, N. (2001). La gestión colectiva de las aguas subterráneas 
en La Mancha: análisis comparativo. La economía del agua subterránea y su 
gestión colectiva, 405-473. 
   45 
Lorenzen, S., & Lorenzen, R. P. (2005, August). A case study of Balinese irrigation 
management: institutional dynamics and challenges. In Second Southeast Asia 
Water Forum. Nusa Dua, Bali. 
Majule, A. E. (2010). Towards sustainable management of natural resources in the Mara 
river basin in Northeast Tanzania. Journal of Ecology and the Natural 
Environment, 2(10), 213-224. 
Manor, S & Hagali, Z. (2002). Case Study from Israel. Survey on Irrigation 
Modernization. The Hefer Valley Water Users Association. Food and Agriculture 
Organization. 
Margolis, H. (1983). Selfishness, Altruism, and Rationality: A Theory of Social Choice. 
American Political Science Review, 77(4), 1130-1131. 
Marwell, G., & Ames, R. E. (1981). Economists free ride, does anyone else?: 
Experiments on the provision of public goods, IV. Journal of public 
economics, 15(3), 295-310. 
Marshall, K. (2008). The World Bank: From reconstruction to development to equity. 
Routledge. 
McPartlon, E. (2016). Testing Ostrom: an Analysis of Water User Committees in 
Uganda.Master's Theses. Paper 180. 
Mitchell, W. P. (1977). Irrigation farming in the Andes: Evolutionary 
implications. Peasant livelihood: studies in economic anthropology and cultural 
ecology, 36-59. 
Morrow, C. E., & Hull, R. W. (1996). Donor-initiated common pool resource institutions: 
the case of the Yanesha forestry cooperative. World Development, 24(10), 1641-
1657. 
Nilsson, T. (2001). Management of communal grazing land: a case study on institutions 
for collective action in Endabeg village, Tanzania. Tekniska högskolan i 
Stockholm. 
Ostrom, E (1990). . Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for 
Collective Action. New York, USA: Cambridge University Press. 
Ostrom, E. (2005). Understanding institutional diversity (Vol. 241). Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton University Press. 
Ostrom, E. (2007). A diagnostic approach for going beyond panaceas. Proceedings of the 
national Academy of sciences, 104(39), 15181-15187. 
   46 
Ostrom, E. (2009). Design principles of robust property-rights institutions: what have we 
learned?. Property Rights And Land Policies, K. Gregory Ingram, Yu-Hung 
Hong, eds., Cambridge, MA: Lincoln Institute of Land Policy. 
Ostrom, E. (2010). Revising theory in light of experimental findings. Journal of 
Economic Behavior & Organization, 73(1), 68-72. 
Ostrom, E. (2011). Background on the institutional analysis and development 
framework. Policy Studies Journal, 39(1), 7-27. 
Ostrom, E. (2012). Nested externalities and polycentric institutions: must we wait for 
global solutions to climate change before taking actions at other 
scales?. Economic theory, 49(2), 353-369. 
Ostrom, E., Agrawal, A., Blomquist, W., Schlager, E., & Tang, S. Y. (1989). CPR coding 
manual. Unpublished manuscript. Available at: https://seslibrary. 
asu.edu/sites/default/files/cprcodingmanual-fullwcovercopytoc. pdf. 
Ostrom, E., & Nagendra, H. (2006). Insights on linking forests, trees, and people from the 
air, on the ground, and in the laboratory. Proceedings of the national Academy of 
sciences, 103(51), 19224-19231. 
Peters, P. E. (1994). Dividing the commons: politics, policy, and culture in Botswana. 
Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia. 
Pinkerton, E., & Weinstein, M. (1995). Fisheries that work: sustainability through 
community-based management. David Suzuki Foundation, Vancouver, BC. 
Pomeroy, R. S., Katon, B. M., & Harkes, I. (2001). Conditions affecting the success of 
fisheries co-management: lessons from Asia. Marine policy, 25(3), 197-208. 
Popper, K. R. (1963). Science: Problems, Aims, Responsibilities. In Federation 
proceedings (Vol. 22, pp. 961-972). 
Poteete, A (2012). Levels, scales, linkages, and other ‘multiples’ affecting natural 
resources. International Journal of the Commons 6(2) 
Quinn, C. H., Huby, M., Kiwasila, H., & Lovett, J. C. (2007). Design principles and 
common pool resource management: An institutional approach to evaluating 
community management in semi-arid Tanzania. Journal of environmental 
management, 84(1), 100-113. 
Rodriguez, S. (2007). Acequia: Water Sharing. Sanctity, and Place, School for Advanced 
Research Press, Santa Fe, NM. 
   47 
Romana, P., & los Reyes, D. (1980). Managing Communal Gravity Systems: Formers' 
Approaches and Implications for Program Planning: Final Report Submitted to 
the National Irrigation Administration by the Institute of Philippine Culture in 
March 1980. Institute of Philippine Culture, Ateneo de Manila University. 
Ross, A., & Martinez-Santos, P. (2008) The challenge of collaborative groundwater 
governance: four case studies from Spain and Australia. DOI: 
http://www.newater.uni-
osnabrueck.de/caiwa/data/papers%20session/F4/ARPMSCAIWA.pdf 
Rubinos, C. (2013). Institutional Analysis of Water Management for Agriculture in the 
Chancay-Lambayeque Basin, Peru. Master Thesis. Arizona State University. DOI: 
https://seslibrary.asu.edu/node/270 
Said, S. (2006). Irrigation in Africa: Water conflicts between large-scale and small-scale 
farmers in Tanzania, Kiru Valley. 
Sarker, A., & Itoh, T. (2001). Design principles in long-enduring institutions of Japanese 
irrigation common-pool resources. Agricultural Water Management, 48(2), 89-
102. 
Schlager, E., & Ostrom, E. (1992). Property-rights regimes and natural resources: a 
conceptual analysis. Land economics, 249-262. 
Schlager, E., Blomquist, W., & Tang, S. Y. (1994). Mobile flows, storage, and self-
organized institutions for governing common-pool resources. Land Economics, 
294-317. 
Schlager, E, Blomquist, W and Tang, S. Y (1994). Mobile Flows, Storage, and Self-
Organized Institutions for Governing Common-Pool Resources. Land 
Economics 70: 294–317.http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/3146531.  
Schweik, C. M. (2000). Optimal foraging, institutions and forest change: A case from 
Nepal. Environmental Monitoring and Assessment, 62(3), 231-260. 
Sekher, M. (2000). Local organisations and participatory CRP management: Some 
reflections. Banglore, India: Institute for Social and Economic Change 
Shepsle, K. A. (1989). Studying institutions: Some lessons from the rational choice 
approach. Journal of theoretical politics, 1(2), 131-147. 
Stamm, C., & Aliste, E. (2014). El aporte de un enfoque territorial al estudio de los 
conflictos socio-ambientales The contribution of a territorial approach to the study 
of socio-environmental conflicts pp. 66-78. Revista F@ ro, 2(20). 
   48 
Steins, N. A and Edwards, V. M (1999). Collective Action in Common-Pool Resource 
Management: The Contribution of a Social Constructivist Perspective to Existing 
Theory. Society and Natural Resources 12(6): 539–557.   
Stern, P. (2011). Design principles for global commons: Natural resources and emerging 
technologies. International Journal of the Commons, 5(2). 
Sundberg, J. (1998). NGO landscapes in the Maya biosphere reserve, 
Guatemala. Geographical review, 88(3), 388-412. 
Tang, S. Y. (1992). Institutions and collective action: Self-governance in irrigation. ICS 
press. 
Trawick, P. B. (2001). Successfully governing the commons: Principles of social 
organization in an Andean irrigation system. Human ecology, 29(1), 1-25. 
Tucker, C. M. (1999). Private versus common property forests: forest conditions and 
tenure in a Honduran community. Human Ecology, 27(2), 201-230. 
Tucker, C. M., Randolph, J. C., & Castellanos, E. J. (2007). Institutions, biophysical 
factors and history: an integrative analysis of private and common property 
forests in Guatemala and Honduras. Human Ecology, 35(3), 259-274. 
Vandersypen, K., Verbist, B., Keita, A. C., Raes, D., & Jamin, J. Y. (2009). Linking 
performance and collective action—the case of the Office du Niger Irrigation 
Scheme in Mali. Water resources management, 23(1), 153-168. 
Vogt, N. D., Banana, A., Gombya-Ssembajjwe, W., & Bahati, J. (2005). Understanding 
the long-term stability of West Mengo forest reserve boundaries. ACCEPTANCE 
PAGE, 47. 
Wade, R. (1988). The management of irrigation systems: How to evoke trust and avoid 
prisoner's dilemma. World Development, 16(4), 489-500. 
Wang, X., Otto, I. M., & Yu, L. (2013). How physical and social factors affect village-
level irrigation: An institutional analysis of water governance in northern China. 
Agricultural water management, 119, 10-18. 
Young, O. R., & Underdal, A. (1997). Institutional dimensions of global change. IHDP 
Scoping Report. Bonn: International Human Dimensions Programme. 
Young, O. R. (1999). Governance in world affairs. Cornell University Press 
Young, O. R. (2002). The institutional dimensions of environmental change: fit, 
interplay, and scale. MIT press.
   49 
CHAPTER 3 
ROADMAP FOR POLICY MAKING: DESIGN PRINCIPLES ACCORDING TO 
IRRIGATION SYSTEM TYPE 
Introduction 
 
In 2009, Elinor Ostrom received the Nobel Prize for her contribution to our 
understanding of commons governance.  She challenged the conventional wisdom and 
demonstrated with empirical evidence how commons users can successfully manage 
common-pool resources without privatization or regulation by central authorities. Ostrom 
(1990) used a meta-analysis (analysis of analyses) of 14 cases to discover that eight 
institutional characteristics were common to successful cases; she called these 
characteristics “design principles.” The design principles are: 
• clearly defined boundaries 
• congruence between appropriation and provision rules and local conditions 
• collective-choice arrangements 
• accountable monitoring 
• graduated sanctions 
• conflict-resolution mechanisms 
• minimal recognition of rights to organize 
• nested enterprises 
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Subsequent research has found that the design principles are correlated with 
successfully8 managed Couple Infrastructure Systems (CISs), but it has not shown that all 
of the eight are always present in successful cases: sometimes a subset of the eight design 
principles is present, and the subset does not always consist of the same principles (Cox 
et al., 2010; Baggio et al., 2016). Moreover, they show that these results are idiosyncratic, 
and that they depend on how specific biophysical and ethnographic characteristics may 
impact in the performance of CIS governance. Some other case studies like Quinn et al. 
(2007) and Morrow and Hull (1996) corroborate the need to find context specific 
variables that may affect CIS management. I hypothesize that the set of design principles 
that are necessary and/or sufficient for successful management depends on the social and 
biophysical characteristics of the system.  
Although Ostrom, in her work on the design principles, focused mainly on 
institutional features combined with other social components associated with success, she 
did acknowledge that it is the interaction among social, institutional, and biophysical 
components that determines success (Ostrom, 1990). Ostrom explicitly stated that further 
research should examine all of these components together (Ostrom, 2000); however, she 
did not have the time to do that research herself. My study responds to her call. For this 
paper, my research question is: For given biophysical and ethnographic characteristics 
(typologies) of a CIS, which institutional design principles are necessary and/or sufficient 
                                                
8 The authors considered cases as “successful” differently: for Cox et al. (2010) it was left 
to the original authors reports on long-term environmental management; and for Baggio 
et al. (2015) it is defined as cases “that have not displayed ecological deterioration (i.e. 
resource sustainability), nor conflict and trust issues according to the secondary data 
sources at our disposal” (Baggio et al. 2015, p.3) 
   51 
to avoid over-appropriation, poverty and critical conflicts among users of an irrigation 
system9? 
 
In the following section, I describe the method that was used in detail. Since 
meta-analysis is a relatively new method for the study of CISs, I describe the steps I 
follow in order to contribute to the development of meta-analysis as a method. 37 
conditions (i.e. causal variables) were selected for the analysis, and 4 as outcome 
variables that were later combined into a fuzzy variable labeled as “fuzzySuccess”. I 
describe the procedure that helped to narrow down the 37 variables to 8 conditions in 
order to be able to proceed with the analysis. With the help of the fs/QCA software the 
information of coded cases are processed to find the shortest possible logical expression 
and study necessity and sufficiency. I found that particular combinations of those 
variables related to population size, countries corruption, the condition of water storage, 
monitoring of users behavior, and involving users in the decision making process for 
commons governance, were sufficient to obtain the desired outcomes.  
Method: Meta-analysis of 28 Irrigation Systems around the world 
Meta-analysis is the analysis of analyses (Poteete et al., 2010). Meta-analysis 
codes data from many different studies to reveal patterns so that generalizations can be 
derived from a group of discrete studies (Rudel, 2008). Meta-analysis can advance 
understanding of collective action in Coupled Infrastructure Systems (CISs) by 
identifying commonalities and patterns of collective action in different systems.  With 
                                                
9 For this analysis I have differentiated the design principle components described in the 
previous chapter. 
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this information, we can then hypothesize about sources of variation in system outcomes 
(Rudel, 2008; Poteete et al., 2010). Meta-analysis complements the case-study method, 
which collects and analyzes primary data within narrow boundaries of space and time.  
A limitation of meta-analysis is that it relies on secondary data, so the validity of 
the analysis depends on the quantity and quality of the studies chosen for analysis. This 
limitation becomes especially problematic when the studies available for analysis have 
looked at different variables and/or do not include all of the variables that the researcher 
wants to test (Rudel, 2008; Poteete et al., 2010). For this reason I have selected among 
cases that used in their research variables included in the Institutional Analysis and 
Development Framework (IAD) (Ostrom, 1990), or the Socio-Ecological Systems 
Framework (SES) (Ostrom, 2009). These two frameworks were designed to (among other 
purposes) organize data in a way that makes meta-analysis possible (Ostrom, 2011).  For 
those cases that are missing data in the original source, I have used other studies of the 
same cases as proposed by Poteete et al. (2010).  
Meta-analysis is a relatively new method for the study of CISs; the way it is used 
needs further refinement.  Therefore, my meta-analysis will be neither definitive (Poteete 
et al., 2010), nor representative of all irrigation systems. But it will contribute to our 
knowledge of patterns of interaction between the biophysical and social components of 
Coupled Infrastructure Systems and how those patterns may affect system sustainability. 
In the following section, I describe the steps I follow in order to contribute to the 
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development of meta-analysis as a method, as well as to make the research replicable10.  
Meta-Analysis procedure. To be credible, a meta-analysis must meet the 
challenges that arise in variable selection, case-study selection, coding procedures, and 
conjoint causation (Rudel, 2008).  
Variable selection. In this study, information was processed from the case studies 
according to a set of selected variables. This type of meta-analysis is known as Model 
Centered Meta-Analysis, were patterns according to conceptual models that are 
developed from previous studies were targeted (Rudel, 2008). The first group comprises 
four outcome variables. Outcome variables whether the resource was over-appropriated 
in the system, where there was environmental degradation in the system (e.g. water 
pollution, or deforestation caused by agriculture activity), if there are critical conflicts 
among water users, and whether or not users agricultural activities have productive 
outcomes (absence of poverty).  
The variables that were expected to influence the outcome variables were divided 
in two categories: remote and proximate factors, as suggested by Schneider and 
Wageman (2006). Both types of variables are expected to be causal in relation to the 
analyzed outcomes, but remote factors are relatively stable over time. These factors are 
what are referred to in the commons literature as “contextual” factors that are labeled as 
“biophysical” and “attributes of the community” in the IAD framework Ostrom (1990, 
2005, 2011). The proximate factors vary more often over time, do not originate far in the 
past, and are the result of actions of human agency (including actors’ actions). Thus, the 
                                                
10 Replicability makes it possible for other researchers to corroborate or falsify the 
research findings, which is an important condition for progress in scientific knowledge 
(Popper, 2014). 
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components of the design principles (institutional variables) are included in this analysis 
as proximate factors. I believe that this distinction is important not only for the procedure 
of analysis that I explain later, but also for the differentiation of variables that are easier 
than others to influence for policymaking. 
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Table 3.1 shows the remote or contextual variables selected, and the authors of the 
studies that suggest them as variables related to successfully managed CISs. Table 3.2 
shows the components of the design principles identified in the previous chapter.  
It is important to reiterate that I analyze how these variables, in conjunction with 
one another, affect collective action (as suggested by Agrawal 2002). A variable can 
affect collective action in various ways depending on the other contextual variables that 
are present in the system. For example, consider the variable “size of the resource 
system”. One can assume that the smaller the system, the easier it is to monitor farmers’ 
water use (Janssen & Anderies, 2013) and to come to an agreement for collective action 
(Wade, 1987). However, the size effect may be offset by the degree of heterogeneity or 
asymmetry of user conditions, as in CISs with upstream-downstream users, different crop 
water demands, different individual plot sizes, etc. (Ostrom et al., 1994; Adger 2003). 
The variable listed were selected and modified in an iterative fashion. I started 
with a high number of variables to systematically capture cases knowledge, however this 
can cause a problem of uniqueness (too many variables that make the case one of a kind) 
with high complexity and no parsimony, and a low number of variables can generate 
more data contradictions (Rudel, 2008). The number of variables to be analyzed was 
lated reduced, as I exaplain explained below.  
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Table 3.1 
Contextual Variables 
 
Variable	Name	 Variable	Description	 Source	
Gwater	 Type	of	Water	Source	 Schlager	et	al.	(1994),	Ostrom	et	al.	(1994)	
Asymm	 Asymmetry		 Ostrom	et	al.	(1994)	
NGOs	 Presence	of	NGOs	 McGinis	&	Ostrom	(2014)	
Perturbation	 Perturbations	in	the	CIS	 Glance	&	Huberman	(1994)	
Envpert		
Environmental		
Perturbations	in	the	CIS	 Glance	&	Huberman(1994)	
freqpert	
Frequency	of		
Environmental	Perturbations	 Glance	&	Huberman(1994)	
Wpredic	 Weather	Predictibility	 Wade	(1988)	
corrup	
Country	Level	of		
Corruption	 	Berkes	(2002);	Young	(2002)	
Visib	 System's	Visibility	 Trawick	(2001)	
pdinfo	
Rule	Compliance		
Information	 Schlager,	Blomquist,	and	Tang	(1994)	
SelfSust	 Self-Sufficient	 Ostrom	(1990)	
Subs	 Governmental	Help	 McGinis	&	Ostrom	(2014)	
Irrigdep	
Irrigation	Dependance	
	(complemented	with	rain)	 Gibson	(2001)	
commond	
Type	of	Crop	grown	(commodity	or	
not)	
Pinkerton	&	Weinstein	(1995),	Gibson	(2001),	
Wade(	1988)	,	McCarthy	et	al.	(2001)	
Agdepend	
Farming	for	Susbsitance		
or	for	Commercial	purposes	
Gibson	(2001),	Pinkerton	&	Weinstein	(1995),	
Gibson	(2001)		
Mktintg	 Market	Integration	
Tucker	(1999),	Tucker	et	al.	(2007),	Bardhan	
(2000)	,	Klooster	(2000)	,	Cinner	&	McClanahan	
(2006)		
cropwdem	 Crop	Water	Demand	 Wade	(1988)	
Tech	 Irrigation	Technique	 Wade	(1988)	
exppubinf	
Public	Infrastructure	Maintenance	
Fee	 McCarthy	et	al.	(2001),	Abbot	&	Wilen	(2010)	
Fair	 Sense	of	Fairness	 Wade	(1988)	
Popsize	 Population	Size		 Agrawal	(2002),	Baland	&	Platteau		(1996)	
Homog	 Homogeinity	 Baland	&	Platteau	(1996),	Adger	(2003)	
sizephys	 System	Physical	Size	 Agrawal	(2002),	Baland	&	Platteau		(1996)	
DistCond	
Distribution	Infrastructure	
	Condition	 Ostrom	et	al.	(1994)	
ProdCond	
Production	Infrastructure	
	Condition	 Schlager	et	al.	(1994),	Ostrom	et	al.	(1994)	
trustothers	 Trust	in	Other	Users	 Wade	(1988)	
Trustlead	 Trust	on	Leaders	 Wade	(1988)	
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Table 3.2 
Design Principle Components Variables 
 
Variable  Design Principle Component 
  DP1: Clear Distribution Rules 
DP1USERS	 Clearly defined physical boundaries  
DP1Borders	 Clearly defined user boundary rules 
CManager	
(Not	included	because	
of	Limited	Variability)	
Clearly defined manager 
Cexclude 
(Not	included	because	
of	Missing	Information) 
Clearly defined who can exclude others from the system 
Bccongr	 Clearly defined appropriation rules 
Bccongr	 Clearly defined provisioning rules 
Bccongr	 Conrguence between appropriation and provisioning rules 
  DP2: Congruence with Situated Conditions 
  This is Partially Captured by the Context Variables 
  DP3: Stakeholder Effective Participation 
Elect	  Users point of view are effectively taken into account 
Knowledge	
(Not	included	because	
of	Limited	Variability)	
    Other relevant non-users’ point of view are effectively taken into account.  
  DP 4: Monitoring 
Monitoring	 Presence of a monitoring mechanism of rule compliance  
Maccount	     Monitoring mechanisms are accountable 
pdinfo    Users know the level of rule compliance 
RecCondSES    Monitoring of the ecological condition 
RecCondSES    Monitoring of the human-made hard infrastructure 
  DP5: Sanctions 
SanctEnff 
There is a negative consequence for users that do not comply with rules by 
receiving a type of sanction. 2) 
Gradsanc	
Graduated sanctions depending on type of infraction, the degree and the 
frequency. 
SanctEnff Sanctions are effectively enforced  
SanctionsKnow 
(Not	included	because	
of	Missing	Information) 
Users know when sanctions are imposed 
  DP 6: Conflict Resolution Mechanisms 
confres	
Different opinions and situations are exposed and considered in order to 
solve conflicts, which may imply or not, rules modification.  
  DP7 Rights to Organize 
ColAct	 Users have the rights to organize 
confres	
Users effectively are part of a formal or informal organization that is not 
undermine by other instance of governance.  
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DP8: Proposed modification: Appropriate relations with other tiers of rule-
making authority (polycentric governance) 
Polycent	              Polycentricity 
 
The variables “defined managers”, “presence of appropriation rules”, Presence 
of provision rules”, “non users presence”, “users are part of an organization”, had 
limited variability and were not included in the analysis because of this reason. We could 
infer that these variables are necessary – though not sufficient- for a desired outcome, but 
this conclusion may be trivial given that I did not find cases (or too few cases) that show 
what happens if these variables are not present. It is, however, worth noting this finding 
for future research. Also, to reduce concept misinterpretation for coding understanding, it 
is preferable to have precise definitions of variables, which is more likely to happen when 
the concepts of the variables are refined after coding a smaller sample of cases (Glaser & 
Strauss, 1967). 
Case-study selection. Even though there is no agreement among researchers about 
which is the best strategy for selecting cases, any good strategy must control bias, ensure 
compatibility, and maximize variation (Rudel, 2008). Bias can be caused by differences 
in study quality, closely correlated studies (interdependent), and publication bias (Poteete 
et al., 2010). To minimize bias: 
• Only cases in which place names and dates of fieldwork are mentioned 
were included, and duplication of analysis of the same observation was avoided in order 
to recognize interdependence 
• Unpublished case studies, studies published in prominent journals, and 
studies published in less-prominent journals were selected to reduce publication bias 
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Even with these controls, sample bias is only reduced, not eliminated entirely. 
Appendix A shows the list of cases that were studied and the references as secondary 
data. I have chosen cases that have a CIS as a unit of analysis and that have similar 
research questions to the question: “What are the factors that influence the outcome of 
irrigation-system governance?” By using these two filters, I ensure comparability among 
the cases as suggested by Rudel (2008).  To ensure variability of cases, I have chosen 
cases from different regions of the world as shown in Rihoux & Ragin (2008) 
 It is critical that comparable cases possess diversity with regard to the variables 
that will be included in the model. The studies have enough variability (at least one third 
of possible results) with respect to the variables and outcomes defined for the research as 
suggested by Rihoux (2006) and Rihoux & Ragin (2008) 
 
Figure 3.1: Countries of Cases Included in the Analysis. List of Countries of Case 
Studies: Argentina,  Australia (2),  China (3),  Egypt,  Ethiopia (2),  Haiti,  India,  
Indonesia,  Israel,  Japan,  Mali,  Mexico,  Peru (3),  Philippines,  Spain (2),  Taiwan,  
Tanzania (3),  Uganda,  USA.  
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Coding procedures. I used the coding scheme shown in Appendix B. Case studies 
and their variable scores are listed in Appendix C to give credibility to the research 
(Rudel, 2008). As mentioned earlier, the concepts of the variables were refined after 
coding 10 cases to have as precise as possible definitions of variables and reduce concept 
misinterpretation for coding understanding. 
Conjoint causation. Meta-analysis for CISs does not have an average effect as it 
does in medical, biological, or psychology studies (the pioneer sciences in meta-analysis), 
because it analyzes a synthesis of findings instead of numerical values (Rudel, 2008). 
Because CISs present complex relationships among their variables, we need to use a 
method of analysis that allows for causal heterogeneity and conjuncture relationships 
(various conditions at the same time). For these purposes, Qualitative Comparative 
Analysis (QCA) is a recommended method of data analysis (Rudel, 2008). QCA is a 
method that reconciles qualitative and quantitative analysis. It systematically sorts the in-
depth information from case studies into the smallest sets of factors that, in combination, 
are consistently associated with a particular condition, thus making it possible to derive 
generalizations (Ragin, 1987). QCA analyzes patterns to reveal conjoint causal effects 
directly, which is what is needed to understand what happens in coupled infrastructure 
systems. Thus, I have chosen to use QCA to analyze the data from the case studies I will 
use in my research.  
QCA uses Boolean algebra11 to produce a model with logical and holistic 
representations (Rohwer, 2008). Variables that are not evaluated outcomes are called 
causal conditions (Rihoux & Ragin, 2008). Some of the selected conditions, as well as 
                                                
11 See Ragin (1987) for a detailed explanation of Boolean logic and operations. 
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the outcomes, were coded as crisp values (dichotomous variables of 0 and 1 of 
membership of a given case in the variable), and others where coded as fuzzy values 
(values between 0 and 1 that shows degree of membership instead).  Tables 3.3, 3.4 and 
3.5 show the calibration used for the fuzzy values12 and crisp values.  
Table 3.3 
Outcome Calibration 
 
Table 3.4 
DPs Components Calibration 
 
 
                                                
12For calibration I follow the suggestions on good practices for calibrating described by 
Rihoux & Ragin (2008) 
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Table 3.5  
Contextual Conditions Calibration 
 
With the processed data, it is possible to develop truth tables, which helps to 
identify whether a propositional expression is logically valid (i.e. if the expression is true 
for all input values).  
QCA reveals regularities in the data by processing the truth table and finding the 
shortest possible expression (Boolean minimization (Rudel, 2008)). The shortest possible 
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expression reveals the variables that are necessary and/or sufficient for the “success” 
outcome. QCA makes qualitative data easy to read by expressing it quantitatively. Data 
expressed numerically can be processed more consistently than data expressed in words.  
It is possible to process large datasets when it is expressed as numbers and, at the same 
time, quantitative data is easily manually processed.  
Unlike other quantitative approaches, QCA captures information from deviant 
cases by considering contrafactuals, and allows for an iterative process of analysis that 
helps the researcher explore the reasons for apparently contradictory outcomes (Rudel, 
2008). Moreover, several researchers have concluded that QCA yields more knowledge 
from the same data than other kinds of analysis (e.g. discriminant analysis, multiple 
regressions, factor analysis) when more than one condition is in play (Berg-Schlosser & 
De Meur, 1997; Berg-Schlosser & Cronqvist, 2005; Amenta & Poulsen, 1996; 
Ebbinghaus & Visser, 1998; Nelson et al., 2005; Amoroso & Ragin, 1999; Ragin & 
Bradshaw, 1991) 
Results  
The data along with the cases coded shown in Appendix C was imported to the 
fsQCA software13 (for descriptive statistics of the coded variables see Appendix D14). 
Because fsQCA is not exempted from the “too many variables and too few data” problem 
                                                
13 April 2017 version (www.fsqca.com)  
14 From the coded data I found that the variables that were more neglected in the studies 
are: rule compliance (21%), if users pay water fees (21%), transparency of management 
(32%), visibility of appropriation 25%, type of technology used to irrigate (30%), 
predictability of the weather (25%), environmental perturbations (43%), land condition 
(61%), homogeneity of users (25%), if the population is growing (39%), education level 
(79%), users knowledge of farming practices (71%), Information shared with users about 
public infrastructure provisioning (32%) and market integration (25%).  
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faced by any other methods, I follow the strategy suggested by Schneider and Wagemann 
(2006) to include in the analysis the variables that are shown to have more impact on the 
outcome.  
First, using coincidence analysis15, I look separately at the relationship between 
each contextual variable and DP components with the outcome variable “successfz” (see 
tables 7 and 8).  From this analysis I ranked the variables that had more coincidence with 
the outcome and select them (highlighted with “*” in the table) for the next step of the 
analysis. I also made sure to check for the coincidence with a low membership of each 
variable with the outcome to see the relationship when inversed. As we can see in table 8 
for example, the number of users in a system coincides with successful outcomes when it 
is small, but not when it has a higher value. Notice that the condition NGO was not 
selected. This decision was made based on case studies knowledge. It seems that NGOs 
are present in a system (e.g. NGOs decide to work in a specific system because there is a 
sustainability problem perceived) when there are environmental or social problems, thus 
it is not accurate to assume that the presence of NGOs are causal conditions. 
  
                                                
15 Coincidence analysis shows the percentage of cases on which the outcome is present 
and a condition is also present. 
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Table 3.6  
Coincidence Analysis: Success and 
Contextual Conditions 
Table 3.7 
 Coincidence Analysis: Success and DPs 
Components 
 
 
 
 
However, since “Cashcrop”, and “Mktintg” are theoretically similar, and the 
coincidence between them is 0.83. It is possible to use only one of them. Therefore, for 
the next analysis I drop “chascrop” and leave “Mktintg” since this last has less missing 
values. Also, although “pdinfo” has a high level of coincidence with successful cases, it 
has a 35% incidence of missing data. Its inclusion in the analysis so far had the purpose 
of showing that this variable is not considered in the literature of the commons and yet, it 
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seems that it might have an important role to play for generating desired outcomes. 
However, the high number of missing values of “pdinfo” can be problematic for the next 
steps of the analysis. Hence, I drop this variable from the analysis.  
Also, it is important to mention that the exclusion of the analysis of these 
variables is not because these variables are not relevant to the outcome. As we can see in 
tables 6 and 7, for many of the variables analyzed there is more coincidence with the 
outcome when they are present than when they are not present, which is consistent with 
the literature. I just proceed to analyze the ones that show a stronger relationship with the 
outcome for the feasibility of the analysis, but there are always some limitations resulting 
from not including in the analysis every potential variable theoretically based. This is not 
however possible with any available method, yet.   
As a second step, I analyzed separately how the contextual variables and the DPs 
components, in conjunction, relate to the outcome variable “Successfz”. 
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Table 3.8 shows all possible combinations of contextual variables that present a level of 
consistency above 0.8. For the next step of analysis, I chose those variables that are 
included in the recipes that have the highest coverage. Coverage expresses how much of 
the outcome is covered or explained by the conjoint causal conditions, or as called by 
Ragin (2008) “recipes”. The variables that were selected according to these criteria are: 
“corrupFz”, “ProdCond”, “Agdepend”, and “~popsize”16  
                                                
16 ~popsizefz is the negation of big size population. Then it can be interpreted as the membership of a case in the 
criteria “small size population” 
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Table 3.8.  
Subset / Superset Analysis: Success and Contextual Variables 
 
Table 3.9 shows different recipes when considering only DPs components, and it 
is ranked from better fit to less. Following the same criteria of the contextual variables 
analysis, the selected DPs components to be analyzed on the next step are: “Monitoring”, 
“confres”, “Elect”, and “Polycent” 
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Table 3.9.   
Subset / Superset Analysis: Success and DPs Components 
 
With only 8 conditions (256 potential configurations), the problem of limited 
diversity is not solved with only 28 cases, but at least it has been reduced. The next step 
is to do a subset – superset analysis but this time with the two types of conditions (remote 
and proximate) together. The combination of variables that show a higher consistency of 
at least 0.8 and that explain the outcome to a greater extent  are (see table 10): Confres, 
Prodcond, ~popsizefz, Monitoring and Corrupfz.  
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Table 3.10.  
Subset / Superset Analysis: Success and Selected Conditions 
 
With only 5 conditions, it is possible now to analyze a truth table. Because we are 
including fuzzy sets, I used the fuzzy set algorithm developed by Ragin (2008). Table 11 
shows the truth table using the selected conditions. In column “Consistency” it is shown 
the consistency value running from 0 to 1 (where values higher tan 0.8 are considered 
consistent). In column “N”, we can see the number of cases that have a membership in 
the respective causal combination higher than 0.5. The column “SuccesFz” indicates for 
each causal combination whether it passes the test criteria for ‘very often sufficient’17 and 
whether it contains enough cases18. If these two conditions are fulfilled, the conjunction 
passes the test, meaning that it is a sufficient condition for “SuccessFz”. In essence, the 
column “SuccessFz” indicates which of the causal combinations produce the outcome (1, 
                                                
17 I chose a threshold of 0.8 of consistency, which implies that at least 80% of the cases’ membership scores in the 
combination must be consistent.  
18 I chose a threshold of at least 1 case with higher membership 0f 0.5 
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rows 1–6, 13 cases), and which ones do not (0, rows 7–14, 14 cases), as well as which 
combinations have no empirical instances (rows 15–64). 
Table 3.11 
Truth Table 
 
Table 11 shows the truth table in a dichotomous (crisp set) fashion. However, the 
more fine-grained fuzzy information on the 28 cases is not lost and it is used in the 
following analytical steps. The 28 cases are organized into 14, but there were 64 logically 
possible combinations. This implies that there are 36 logical remainders (combinations 
for which empirical evidence is lacking (rows 15–64)). This is called limited diversity 
(Ragin, 2008), and it is common in comparative social science (Schneider and 
Wagemann, 2006). However, with QCA it is possible to make it transparent, and treat it, 
which other methods seem to  fail at doing (Ragin, 2008). In fs/QCA, the researcher is 
forced to make conscious simplifying assumptions based on case and theoretical 
knowledge. 
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I use the Quine-McClusky algorithm for dichotomous data (Ragin 1987) in which 
the rows with the outcome value 1 are set to ‘true’ and the 0 outcomes are set to ‘false’ 
and the logical remainders are set to the theoretical expectation: we expect to have more 
cases successful when the design principle components “Confres” (Users participate in 
decision making and conflict resolution mechanism), and “Monitoring” (The 
appropriation of the resource is monitored) are present, and when the population is small. 
For CorruptionFz (membership in low corruption country) and ProdCond (Reservoir 
Condition) I set “do not care” because we do not have consistent evidence to assume 
either relation. These assumptions help to identify the intermediate solution, which 
considers in the logical reminder only those combinations that are coupled with the 
assumption. In the parsimonious solution, we can see what happens if we let the 
computer induce all possible (even thsoe not coupled with theory), and in the complex 
solution, we find recipes that only use empirical data (Ragin 2008).  
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Table 3.12:  
Complex, Intermediate and Parsimonious Solutions 
 
Table 3.12 provides a summary of all sufficient conjunctions between context 
conditions and institutional configurations (recipes) that lead to SuccessFz, for the 
complex, the intermediate and the parsimonious solutions. As we can see, the 
intermediate solution is bounded by the parsimonious and complex solutions. In this case, 
the parsimonious solution is preferred because it includes simulations for all possible 
configurations, including for the logical reminders, and its results do not contradict 
theoretical and case based knowledge. Moreover, in this case the parsimonious is just a 
simplified version of the complex solution, which means, that it is well coupled with the 
empirical data.     
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 All 3 paths (4 paths in the complex solution) display a consistency value higher 
than 0.8 and in all of them at least one case has a membership higher than 0.5. Thus, the 
results obtained fulfill the sufficiency criteria established at the outset of the analysis. The 
parsimonious solution can be read as follow: 
In order to achieve a more successful outcome when managing a CIS, the design 
principle component that is more critical depends mainly on two characteristics of the 
system:  
1) If the population size of the CIS is bigger, and the corruption level of the 
country on which the CIS is located is high, then users need to be part of the decision 
making process for the commons governance with well enforced conflict mechanisms.  
2) If the reservoir and/or other water storage of the CIS is in good condition, 
but the corruption levels of the country on which the CIS is located is high, then users 
need to be part of the decision making process for the commons governance with well 
enforced conflict mechanisms. 
3) If the reservoir and/or other water storage of the CIS is in good condition 
and the corruption level of the country on which the CIS is located is low, then with only 
monitoring is sufficient in other to get desired outcomes.  
Discussion and Conclusion  
It is not possible to generalize the results of this study given the limitations 
mentioned above (number of case studies analyzed with respect total real CIS, number of 
contextual conditions and institutional aspects to consider, some selection bias impossible 
to eliminate, the need of coding revision by other coders to reduce coding mistakes, 
presence of missing data, among others). However, this work is one small step forward 
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for theory building of the commons.  
We have learned from this study which are the variables that were neglected in 
the selected case studies. Most of them are ethnographic characteristics like education 
level, or rule compliance. Some others are more related to farming practices such as the 
technology used to irrigate, farming knowledge, while others related to biophysical 
characteristics such as land conditions, and weather predictability.   
With the coincidence analysis we learned that there are variables that, when 
present, enhance the chances that governance will be more successful than when absent. 
For the design principles this was true for all but graduated sanctions and sanction 
enforcement. It might be because of the poor fit between sanction rules and users payoffs. 
In the Japanese irrigation system for example, there was no need to enforce sanctions 
because, for them, non-compliance was an embarrassment that was very difficult to deal 
with; hence no one wanted to get caught no matter what the sanction was. In this case the 
real sanction is “embarrassment”. For contextual conditions, the most notable ones are 
(positive relation): low level of corruption, dependence on agriculture, weather 
predictability, no suppor from the government, high market integration, presence of 
environmental perturbation, among others.  
I show here also how QCA can be a powerful method for theory building. It 
overcomes the limitations of oversimplification related to correlational methods, and it 
makes evident and treats limited diversity found in complex systems as irrigation 
systems. Moreover, it is based on theoretical knowledge and deep understanding of the 
cases. The outcome of the fs/QCA analysis corresponds to the widely shared common 
view that we should design institutions for commons governance based on the context, 
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and that the contextual factor influences the outcomes of commons governance. It also 
shows how these factor matters in conjunction with other conditions. This means that 
combinations of factors jointly produce the success of the governance in a CIS, not single 
variables in isolation. This supports the principle of equifinality: in open systems, as CIS, 
different conjunctions can lead to the same outcome (Von Bertalanffy, 1968), or put in 
other words “there are no panaceas” Ostrom (2007).    
The results are neither definitive nor generalizable, but nonetheless can be useful 
for policymakers when financial resources for managing a CIS are scarce and decisions 
have to me made among many intervention options–as is generally the case. Future 
research can explore this method with different cases to compare the results using similar 
variables and similar outcome definitions. It can also be used for different types of CIS 
such as fisheries, forests, etc. or with other sets of irrigation systems.  
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CHAPTER 4 
INTEGRATING COLLAPSE THEORIES TO UNDERSTAND ROBUST DESIGNS 
FOR COUPLED INFRASTRUCTURE-SYSTEMS GOVERNANCE 
Introduction 
If we look at history, we find that civilizations are built around water sources and 
land resources that make agriculture is possible. Mesopotamia, Egypt, China, the Indus 
Valley, Andean South America, and central Mexico are some examples (Lucero, 2002). 
This is not surprising, since it was agriculture that made placed-based societies possible. 
It seems though that ever since then – and most likely even before that –  solutions to 
problems generate new challenges. Following this line of thought, we can imagine our 
ancestors when they discovered agriculture asking themselves how to increase water 
availability and stability to feed the growing population that was a product of the now 
stable food source, and so on in a vicious cycle (Tainter, 1988). From this example we 
can easily perceive the robustness-fragility tradeoffs inherent in securing the most basic 
needs of societies: food and water. History reflects how, in different cultures, human 
curiosity, intelligence, and imagination have been enough to overcome these challenges 
and build different irrigation infrastructures and the rules to govern them, not only to 
manage the valuable resource, but also for the larger population to avoid destructive 
internal conflict.  
However, we have also observed that many civilizations that  were unable to 
overcome challenges, and collapsed. Something clearly went wrong in the cases of Easter 
Island and the Mayan civilization, and more recently in the Peruvian town “Santiago 
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Miraflores de Saña,” when a disastrous flood forced survivors to abandon everything in 
1728 (Negro and Amorós, 2015). But what happened? Many scholars have studied these 
and other past civilizations, trying to explain what caused their collapse, and many 
theories have been proposed. Tainter (1988), for example, suggests that as societies 
mature, institutions and hard infrastructure become so complex and rigid that they 
become extremely vulnerable to shocks. When a civilization reaches that point, it 
becomes unable to withstand a disturbance of any type (environmental, social, 
institutional, etc.), and the population either disappears or migrates out of the system. 
Brunk (2002) agrees with Tainter’s theory, and argues that in societies that are more and 
more interconnected, cascade effects of collapses may occur. Tainter and Brunk may be 
right, but since this theory is somehow pessimistic, leaving us with little else than to just 
try to delay the collapse of systems, it is worth exploring other possible explanations.  
Another group of scholars (Culbert 1973, 1988; Redman 2004, 2005) argues that 
a major cause of collapse, is as Malthus theorized, the “overshoot effect,” in which case a 
large population demands more than the available resources in a system. As a result, 
people either migrate to another system, or perish. The overshoot effect is also considered 
in the “release” phase of adaptive-cycle explanations (Holling, 2001) from resilience 
theory. Combined with the overshoot effect, Pezzey and Anderies (2003) propose that 
culturally defined subsistence needs affect the process of collapse due to the overshoot 
effect . They argue that it is not only the population-resources ratio, but also, and most 
importantly, how many resources the population thinks it needs to consume (and thus 
does consume) that determines the “release” or “overshoot” point. Marxist scholars (Gray 
2008, Woods 2009), on the other hand, stress the relevance of societies’ perceptions of 
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equity, arguing that class conflicts can create internal disturbances that weaken the 
system as a whole. Diamond (2005) looked at 15 systems that collapsed and some others 
that did not. He found some commonalities in the cases that collapsed, and brought to the 
conversation more proposed causes of collapse: failure to anticipate or perceive the 
problem, elites that were benefiting most from the system opposed change at the expense 
of society, attachment to values that were detrimental to the ecological environment, and 
physical (technological or ecological) constraints on people adaptation to a new 
circumstance.  
But why is it important to talk about causes of collapse? The world is facing new 
environmental challenges that may trigger the collapse of some CIS (Young et al., 2006). 
The IPCC (2014) has forecasted that more extreme weather events, like heat waves, 
droughts, floods, and violent storms, may be much more common in the decades to come 
due to climate change. Although we have an idea of what climatic events to expect in 
each region, we know less about how CIS can cope with these challenges (Field et al., 
2014). The aim of this study is to leverage collapse theories to analyze the robustness of 
CIS to environmental disturbances, using a case study of the Peruvian Piura Basin, which 
has been exposed to harsh environmental events associated with the El Niño Southern 
Oscillation (ENSO). I address here the research questions: how did the Piura Basin react 
to El Niño disturbances of 1982/1983 and 1997/1998, why did it react the way it did, and 
how are actors in the system preparing themselves for future events.  
I consider a CIS to be robust if “it prevents the ecological systems upon which it 
relies from moving into a new domain of attraction that cannot support a human 
population, or that will induce a transition that causes long-term human suffering” 
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(Anderies et al., 2004 p. 18). A robust system does not necessarily perform at its 
maximum potential (Csete & Doyle, 2002), but it does remain functional despite internal 
(e.g., population growth) or external (e.g., droughts) perturbations. For robustness 
analysis, we need to be explicit about specific perturbations, because systems face 
tradeoffs between robustness to particular expected disturbances and uncertain fragilities 
to others (Janssen & Anderies, 2013).  Because robustness incorporates a normative 
component (e.g., the sustainability of a system) related to strategies to achieve an 
outcome, it is a useful concept to keep in mind when designing institutions. Resilience, a 
concept related to robustness, also considers the reaction of a system to perturbations, but 
in terms of endogenous processes within a CIS only, and does not address the question of 
conscious design (Janssen & Anderies, 2013, Anderies et al. 2004).  
The challenge of CIS robustness research is the absence of a developed related 
theory. Even though, from a logical standpoint, it is not possible to guarantee the 
robustness of a system by only considering the absence of the causes of collapse, there is 
an overlap between both outcomes that is worth exploring. In this sense, although the 
questions I pose are related to the robustness of a CIS to future environmental events, 
they imply the aim to avoid CIS collapse, and thus collapse theories can provide helpful 
guidance.  
Before going into detail about the Piura Basin, I explain in the next section how I 
followed the guidelines for carrying out rigorous case-study research. My findings show 
how, by using the robustness framework and different collapse theories together, we can 
analyze the robustness or fragility of a CIS to specific shocks, in this case to El Niño 
events. As I explain in the analysis in section IV, it seems that the Piura basin is very 
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fragile based on  almost all of the predictions of collapse theories, but the biggest strength 
is its growing stock of social capital. In small steps, user associations have been 
collectively working towards solutions for water conservation and public-infrastructure 
maintenance. There is a long way to go  yet to be entirely robust, but with the right 
policies to encourage the strengthening of these associations, the Piura basin could 
become more robust to future El Niño events.  
Method 
As mentioned before, key variables and their relationship for developing CIS 
robustness theory are still being explored. Case-study methods seek to study phenomena 
in depth and in their context, and it is thus a very appropriate tool for early phases in the 
development of theories (Yin, 1994; Eisenhardt, 1989). Case studies describe a social 
construction of reality (Searle, 1995), which can be sensitive to subjectivity, but if 
properly managed, can enable the researcher to better understand participants’ views of 
reality, and their decisions and actions (Crabtree & Miller, 1999).  
For internal validity, and to facilitate logical reasoning that is powerful and 
compelling enough to defend a research conclusion, Yin (1994) and Miles & Huberman 
(1994) recommend the use of a clear research framework. The Robustness Framework 
(Anderies et al., 2004) was created to systematically develop a theory of CIS robustness. 
This framework, which was later adapted by Anderies to apply to system relationships 
among the different types of infrastructure, social, human, natural, hard, soft, private, and 
public (Anderies, 2016), helps to identify key components (infrastructures) and the 
relationships among them, and to foresee potential perturbations and the system outcomes 
they might produce.  
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I used the Robustness Framework in this research to explore how the variables 
that it proposes might be connected to produce robust or not responses in the Piura Basin 
CIS when confronted with El Niño events in 1982/1983 and 1997/1998. For building 
validity, I follow the analysis of propositions as recommended by Yin (2003) and Miles 
& Huberman (1994) that comes from theories or hypotheses proposed in previous 
research of robustness, collapse, and disaster management. Figure 4.1 shows how the 
proposition and the robustness framework were used together to guide data collection and 
data analysis.  
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N Proposition (causes of fragilities) Reference Framework 
[1] The system is too complex and rigid Tainter (1988) D and Link 3 
[2] Overshoot (large number of users with respect to the resource system) 
Culbert (1973, 1988); 
Redman (2004, 2005); 
Holling (2001) 
A, B and link 9 
[3] Physical constraints to adapt to new circumstances Diamond (2005) 
A, D, E and link 
4 
[4] Selfish elites Diamond (2005) C 
[5] Centralized governance in a main productive resource Lucero (2002) Link 4 
[6] The fragility is transmitted by the interconnection of systems Brunk (2002) Link 7 and 8 
[7] Attachments to values that are detrimental to the environment Diamond (2005) B and C 
[8] High definition of "subsistence" Pezzey and Anderies (2003) B and link 1 
[9] Class conflicts Gray 2008, Woods 2009 B, C and link 2 
[10] Poor anticipation capacity Diamond (2005) D 
 
Figure 4.1: Robustness framework and propositions for the analysis. 
I used secondary (journal articles, situation reports, newspaper columns, internet 
articles) and primary data, as recommended by Patton (1990) and Yin (2003), to 
supplement and compensate for the limitations of each other. I collected primary data 
from fieldwork in Lima (for national governance information) and Piura during the 
month of July, 2016. I performed semi-structured interviews (protocol shown in 
Appendix E for transparency and replicability). Different kinds of actors were 
interviewed: five farmers, three members of the Local Water Authority (ALA), two 
members of the National Water Authority (ANA), the Vice-minister of Environmental 
Disasters Prevention (Ministry of Agriculture), three members of academia, four major 
infrastructure managers, two minor infrastructure managers, and one archeological expert 
on the Mochica civilization  that flourished in the Piura Basin from about [100–300 to 
500–800 AD] and was erased from the map after a series of El Niño events. Secondary 
data provided the guidelines for primary data gathering and for cross-validation in an 
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iterative fashion.  Finally, I created a database (see Appendix F for the summarized 
database) to organize collected data as suggested by Yin (2003) and Stake (1995), and 
which shows the results prior to analysis. I present in the following section a summary of 
the results; however, a much more detailed results description of results and how they 
connect to the robustness framework is presented in Appendix F. 
Case Study: El Niño in the Lower and Middle Piura Basin  
El Niño. El Niño is a climatic phenomenon related to the warming of the east 
equatorial Pacific Ocean, which happens cyclically but erratically. The cycle takes 
between three and eight years, but with the impacts of climate change, we expect it to be 
more frequent (Bustamante, 2010). El Niño is the warm phase of the three phases of the 
El Niño Southern Oscillation (ENSO). The cold phase is called La Niña, and the third 
phase is the “normal” phase from which El Niño and La Niña deviate (Andrus et al., 
2008). El Niño, in its most intense manifestation, causes catastrophic floods in the 
equatorial zone, and especially affects the southern coast of Ecuador and northern coast 
of Peru. El Niño is rated from “moderate” to “very strong,” depending on the sea-
temperature change and its intensity. When El Niño is moderate, it can bring more 
benefits than damage as, for example, the regeneration of dry forests, and even the 
creation of new water sources (Woodman, 1998; Brack & Mendiola, 2000). In the 20th 
century, the two El Niño events rated as very strong were those of 1982-1983 and 1997-
1998, the latter being the strongest episode ever recorded. During the El Niño of 1997-
1998, the precipitation in Piura was 260 times the average of normal years.  The excess 
precipitation flooded the city and surrounding agricultural fields, destroyed crops, 
irrigation infrastructure, and roads, and took dozens of lives (CAF, 2000).  
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There is evidence that the Peruvian north coast has been affected by El Niño for 
centuries, and that even an ancient civilization that was located in the north coast of Peru, 
including the Piura basin, the Mochica, collapsed after a very strong El Niño event 
(Fagan, 2010). The effects of El Niño have been recorded and analyzed as discrete 
incidents in windows of time and economic sector. They have not been analyzed 
longitudinally or using a systems-thinking approach, as I propose to do in my analysis. 
The Piura Basin is threatened with more frequent and more intense episodes of El Niño 
than the episodes that Piura has experience so far, which makes an urgent case for 
studying past vulnerability and robustness in order to direct current policies and to avoid 
potential catastrophic events.  
The Lower and Middle Piura Basin (“Medio y Bajo Piura”): A Picture of the 
Current CIS. The Piura River is 280 kilometers long, and the basin surface is 12,216 
km2 (see Figure 4.2). The basin is divided into two irrigation systems, “Alto Piura” on its 
right margin in the highlands, and “Medio y Bajo Piura” on its left margin on the coast. I 
focus my analysis on the Medio y Bajo Piura sub-basin, because this area is more 
exposed to El Niño flood events than the Alto Piura sub-basin. Water from the Piura 
River is almost completely used before reaching Medio y Bajo Piura, but the sub-basin 
receives water from the Poechos Dam (on the Chira River) through the “Daniel Escobar” 
canal that was built in the 1970s (GRP, ANA & GTZ; 2009). 
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Figure	4.2.	Map	of	the	Piura	Basin.	
 
The Piura River’s flow is normally low, but in El Niño events the river grows to a 
point that it becomes dangerous. For example, in the station of the river that is called 
“Sanchez Cerro,” river flow in a normal year is no more than 140m3/s at its highest, but 
in 1983 it increased to 3,200m3/s, and in 1998 to almost 4,500m3/s, damaging irrigation 
and road infrastructure (GRP et al., 2009). 
Agriculture is an important activity in the basin, involving about one-third of the 
population (INEI, 2012). 48,534 ha are used for agriculture, of which 84% is irrigated. 
There are 75,176 farmers with small parcels averaging 0.65 ha. By 2016, the main crops 
in the Medio y Bajo sub-basin were rice (67%), corn (23%), and cotton (7%), all of 
which have a safe market, with their growers having access to credit and technical 
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assistance.  There is a small but growing group of farmers who are starting to grow 
mango, peppers, grapes, and other fruits (GRP et al., 2009).  
To be eligible for irrigation, farmers must be members of the non-governmental 
and non-profit National Irrigation Association, Junta Nacional de Usuarios de los 
Distritos de Riego del Perú (JNUDRP), which is subdivided by valleys, and to be 
registered in the Local Water Authority of the Region (ALA). For the Lower and Middle 
Piura, there are three irrigation associations: Lower and Middle Piura, Sechura, and 
Huancabamba. Farmers elect association leaders, and although the participation in 
elections is low (less than 50% of attendance), farmers feel that they are well represented. 
This may be a result of a well-articulated network of sub-associations. The three main 
associations are divided into users’ commissions, which are subdivided into canal 
committees, which at the same time have 10 delegates that are elected by and represent 
200 farmers. The main role of the association is to operate and maintain the minor public 
irrigation infrastructure (secondary canals and drainage systems), distribute water, collect 
and manage fees for water use, determine water tariffs, cut water services to non-
compliant farmers, represent water users in meetings with other associations and 
governmental authorities (e.g., National Water National Authority, Regional Government 
of Piura, Agriculture and Environmental Ministries, and major infrastructure operators 
called “Proyecto Especial Chira Piura”), and to generate activities for the economic, 
social, and institutional development of agriculture in the area (Gallo & Oft, 2011). 
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The Piura basin still has high poverty rates19 (80%), which combine with poor 
territorial planning, negative impacts from mining activities, deficient road networks, and 
climate hazards to create a vicious circle and high obstacles to development (GRP, 2007). 
This situations persists in spite of all the efforts from governmental, non-governmental, 
and international organizations that have together worked for years on developing 
environmental and social management plans, capacity building, and implementation of 
sensitization programs due to their awareness of the vulnerability of the region, given the 
current ecological and social conditions, to climate change (see Appendix F). 
The Piura Basin presents attractive features for agriculture and trade: good 
weather conditions with different ecological zones that allow for a diversity of crops, 
forest on the highlands of the basin, sea life on the ocean, significant rivers running from 
the Andes to the Pacific Ocean, and a central geographic location that is excellent for 
trade in the region. However, at the same time, the basin presents a fragile ecosystem 
with major challenges for human settlement. This is not only due to cycles of droughts 
and floods from El Niño. It is also because the basin’s proximity to the ocean makes the 
land subject to salt intrusion; its flat slope in the lower basin makes the land prone to 
salinization and vulnerable to floods; its proximity to very steep mountains in the east 
means that rivers run strong in flood events and create mud-slides; and, finally, the basin 
is prone to desertification because of it characteristics as an arid region with low 
precipitation.  
                                                
19 Poverty defined as the percentage of the population that has at least one unsatisfied 
basic need. See table in Appendix F. 
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Ancient civilizations in the Piura Basin: Learning from the past. The Piura 
Basin has attracted multiple settlements and supported societies dating from 9,000 B.C., 
according to available information (Huertas, 1996). The Mochica society (or Moches) is 
one of the most famous civilizations that  settled in the Piura Basin for approximately 700 
years, (from around 100–300 AD to around 500–800 AD). The Moches were 
agriculturally based, with a well-developed and large network of irrigation canals and 
reservoirs (around 816 km) to divert and store river water to supply their crops in desert 
areas. Archeologists (Larco, Uhle & Kroeber, 1945; Butters & Castillo, 2008) think that 
the reason why the Moche society was much wealthier than other societies of the same 
period was their irrigation capacity. Their main agricultural products were corn, peanuts, 
cotton, fruits, and, in the highland areas, different types of potatoes (Velásquez, 2015), 
which they traded with other societies (Butters & Castillo, 2008), especially in the 
highlands to the east.  
The society collapsed after being affected by El Niño, but that climatic disaster 
was not the sole cause of collapse. Obviously, the Moche would have experienced 
hundreds of El Niño events over their history.  Thus, other factors must have been 
involved that led to the end of Moche civilization (Diamond 2005; Butters & Castillo, 
2008). There are different hypotheses about the factors that could have contributed to the 
collapse. One relates to the centralized and very hierarchical political system, with a caste 
of religious and military leaders dominating farmers (Bouden, 1996). Societies that have 
a centralized governance structure over a main resource for the community, as is the case 
for many irrigation systems, tend to become trapped in a downward spiral of social crisis 
when rulers lose control of the main resource as a consequence of climatic changes. The 
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crisis starts with the collapse of power of rulers as they lose credibility and their capacity 
to collect tribute, which at the same time potentiates the disruption of the hard (e.g., the 
reservoir) and soft (e.g., rule enforcement) public infrastructures, which in one way or 
another ends up decreasing the population’s wealth. The decrease in wealth causes 
internal conflicts, population migration, or population loss due to decreasing health. The 
Maya civilization is a well-studied example that is similar to the Moches in this sense 
(Lucero, 2002).   
The collapse of the Moche civilization resulted in the death of many of its 
citizens.  Those who survived migrated to the highlands, where they later merged with 
other civilizations. It seems that after the collapse of the Moches, the communities that 
arose were well aware of the risks of settling in the coastal area of the Valley, and for 
centuries the population remained in the higher areas of the basin. Another hypothesis is 
that they maintained their location in the highlands because of its proximity with the most 
developed civilization of the time, the Inca Empire, which was mainly established in the 
highlands of the region.  
The beginning of the current CIS in the Piura Basin. When Spanish conquerors 
arrived in South America, in 1532 A.D. they founded the first Spanish city in what is now 
the Peruvian territory of Piura (San Miguel of Tangaraná). When the leading conqueror, 
Francisco Pizarro, and his army arrived in Piura, they found an organized society settled 
only in the Andes (Huertas, 1996). Some speculate that this was one of the reasons why 
the Spanish decided to found a city in Piura, but also because of its proximity to the 
biggest port of the Americas (Paita), combined with the presence of the Chira and Piura 
Rivers which they probably imagined would make agriculture possible (Bonilla & 
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Hünefeldt, 1986). The Spanish were not aware of the ecological dangers of the lower 
region of the Piura Basin, nor were the later independent Peruvians, who developed a 
bigger city in the Valley by 1821.  
Agriculture in the area changed after the arrival of the Spanish conquerors. It was 
monopolized by a few owners who possessed large pieces of land (haciendas), and 
cultivated only a few types of crops (monocropping, especially of sugar cane and cotton), 
following market incentives. In the 1970s, to increase the region’s capacity  to cope with 
drought seasons, the government planned and built the biggest reservoir in Latin 
America: Poechos Reservoir. The Peruvian president by then was General Velasco, who 
is remembered mainly for being the last president to date to take power after a 
coups d'état, and for being the author of the Agrarian Reform of the 1970s. The Agrarian 
Reform aimed to return the agricultural land owned by hacendados to the people who had 
worked it for decades and who, during the reform, were organized in cooperatives. To 
strengthen the reform process, the first water law20 was formulated, initiating a series of 
water policies that, in one way or another, place agricultural activity at the center of the 
articulation of water law. It was in this context that the Poecho Reservoir and its related 
infrastructure were built. With the execution of the project, water from the Chira River 
(which flowed through land with less agricultural potential that the land in the Piura 
Basin) was diverted to the reservoir, and then released into the Piura River, favoring 
farmers of the Lower and Middle Piura.  
Thanks to this project, water availability became stable, and agricultural activity 
started to grow. In only 10 years, agricultural land area grew by 10% (from 84 000ha in 
                                                
20 Decreto Ley Nº 17752 of July 24th of 1969 (a month later of the promulgation of the agrarian reform law) 
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1976 to 93 000ha in 1986), and population grew as well (3% per year in the same period, 
as shown in Appendix F). Now, Piura produces 7% of all agricultural output in Peru 
(INEI, 2016), and is the second most-populated region of the country21. However, even 
though currently the Lower and Middle Piura is robust to droughts, the other effect of El 
Niño phenomena, floods, is still a problem. In 1997/1998, flood episodes affected 
120,637 people in Piura, destroyed 10,255 houses, took around 200 lives, and were 
responsible for  40 million USD of crop loss (Indeci, 1999).  
Robustness – Fragility Analysis of the Lower and Middle Piura sub-Basin to 
flood events  
The Moche society was well known for its engineered irrigation system, with big 
reservoirs and long canals. But even with this human-made hard infrastructure, the 
Moches were unable to cope with the severe droughts and floods from El Niño events. In 
the end, the remaining population decided to migrate to the high areas of the basin. After 
many decades of the collapse of the Moches, in the 1970s, policymakers unaware of the 
dangers of El Niño, attracted and incentivized population growth in a region highly 
exposed to strong floods, by  building hard public infrastructure (e.g., reservoir, canals, 
roads, bridges) and soft public infrastructure (e.g., water law, agrarian reform). 
According to Tainter’s (1988) theory of collapse, this complexity puts at risk the 
robustness of the system, and it is now more difficult to mobilize a big population to 
relocate to another region less exposed to environmental perturbations.  
                                                
21 Note that the Piura capital, also called Piura, is located in the lower basin of the Piura River.  
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In this sense, a “path dependence”22 of community development with economic 
incentives has already been built in the lower region of the Piura Basin, anchoring the 
settled society to the basin. This is of special importance because the poverty level is still 
high, with many basic needs unfulfilled for a big part of the population, and the 
population has low education levels (see Appendix F). This population has limited 
options for migrating. 
Another theory of collapse that is related to the size of the population is the 
overshoot theory (see Table 4.1).  As mentioned before, Piura is ranked second among 
regions of Peru in terms of population size (6% of total population), and the total amount 
of water available in this region is less than 1% of the total available in the country 
(CERPRAR, 2016). This is a common problem along the whole Peruvian coast, where 
more than 60% of the population share 2.2% of the available water (Crovetto, 2013). 
There are clearly resource-distribution issues in Peru that need to be addressed. This is 
not a problem that directly relates to the robustness of the system to flood events, but if 
the population continues to grow and water becomes scarcer, it will eventually become a 
related problem because it is linked to the wealth of the population. Traditionally, 
governmental policies have favored the coast more than the highlands and the Amazon; 
combined with the harsh topography of these last two regions, the government’s lack of 
investment has left behind the highlands and the Amazon. Perhaps, a path to avoid the 
overshooting effect on the coast may be to create incentives for people to migrate from 
the coast to the other two regions, since according to Laguna (2011), the main migratory 
flows are to metropolitan areas and their relatively abundant economic opportunities.  
                                                
22 I use here the term “path dependence” as the phenomenon in which a set of decisions are constrained by earlier 
decisions, even though the circumstances in which they were taken are not relevant anymore (Westley et al., 2011). 
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Which infrastructures need to be enhanced or modified to increase the robustness 
of the Piura Basin’s CIS system to floods? The most recurrent answer to this question has 
been the hard human-made infrastructure, namely canals, the reservoir, the drainage 
system, or even a modification of the river’s capacity to contain water runoff. There are 
many projects that make this answer more specific, but the results are always the same: 
investment is insufficient. The Poecho Reservoir now has only 50% of its initial capacity 
(885 mmc), major canals are being maintained but not as much as needed (water 
distribution loss is around 15%), and drainage-system maintenance is almost completely 
ignored, leaving a significant part of the Valley with salinization problems (CERPRAR, 
2016).  
In this sense, the assessment of the Piura Basin with respect to theory 3 from 
Table 4.1, “Physical Constraints to Adapt to New Circumstances,” reveals a degree of 
fragility. If we dig into the potential causes of this fragility, using the robustness 
framework, we then shift our attention to what affects the public infrastructure: public-
infrastructure providers. The costs of public infrastructure to prevent the negative effects 
of El Niño costs are borne by the regional government, the central government, 
international aid, and water user associations.  
Of all the public-infrastructure providers, it is the regional government that has 
the main responsibility of allocating part of its budget for disaster prevention on an 
annual basis. My interviewees mentioned that the regional government is more concerned 
about re-election and public visibility than in the effects of El Niño, which are not a 
constant concern, it prefers to invest in parks or other types of infrastructure that can be 
appreciated in the short term by the population. However, after an unexpected Niño in the 
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beginning of 2017, in the media we could see how an angry population was complaining 
about how little the government had spent in prevention programs23. When we assess this 
aspect of the CIS with respect to collapse theories, this fragility is revealed by the theory 
of “Selfish elites” listed as number 4 in Table 4.1 
But there are other aspects of regional governance performance to explore. Peru 
had centralized the nation’s governance until 1990. Then in  1988 with the “Law of Basis 
for Decentralization”, the central government transferred responsibilities and resources to 
the by then recently-created regional governments for the enforcement of their regional 
governance rights. This transfer was abrupt and was not accompanied with adequate local 
capacity-building for the new governance regime to handle responsibilities and meet 
challenges (La Contraloria, 2014). There are no indicators for assessing the performance 
of the decentralization process, but even though there is an awareness that resources are 
limiting factors for economic growth and development in Peru, the regional governments 
do not spend their allotted budget entirely. For the 2005-2012 period, they executed less 
than 60% (La Contraloria, 2014), and although expenditures have been increasing 
progressively to 78 % in 2014 and to 81% in 2015, the underuse of financial resources 
has created a tension among the central government, the regional governments, and the 
population (GRP, 2016).  
Further, it seems that the central government, rather than investing in regional-
government capacity building, is reducing the regional budget. Between 2013 and 2016, 
the percentage of the initial yearly budget for the national executive branch has increased 
from 63% to 75%, leaving proportionally less to the regional and local governments 
                                                
23 See March 25th 2017 peru21 newspaper as an example, url: https://peru21.pe/lima/peru-funciona-prevencion-
desastres-infografia-70325  
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(GRP, 2016). This indicates that a phenomenon termed recentralization24 is occurring  
(GRP, 2016). Recentralization is another threat that is highlighted by the collapse theory 
listed as number 5 in Table 4.1: “Centralized Governance,” and is one of the suspected 
causes of the Moche collapse.  
It is not only that regional governments’ share of Peru’s national budget  is 
decreasing, but also that the national government bureaucracy limits the planned 
expenditures of regional agencies.  Moreover, the fit between sectorial policies that come 
from the executive branch and the regional conditions in which the local governments 
operate is poor (La Contraloria, 2014). None of the collapse theories suggest failures in 
polycentric governance as a potential cause of CIS collapse, though the empirical 
evidence of this study suggests the critical importance of a good working relationship 
between different centers of decision-making. 
The interconnection theory (number 6 in Table 4.1) is relevant to El Niño’s effect 
on many regions at the same time. In Peru, the impact is even more notable than 
elsewhere because El Niño affects almost the entire country. The degree of help that any 
one system can receive depends on the impact that other regions experience concurrently. 
International programs have played an important role in recovery after El Niño events, 
and even for post-disaster prevention programs (e.g., USAID, UE, GIZ). Governmental 
aid has played an important role also but it has not been forthcoming as quickly as it 
could have been. By 1983, Peru had a centralized government, and in 1997 the 
decentralization process was still weak. This limited reaction strategies, especially 
                                                
24  Recentralization is defined as the non-officially manifested action of the central government where the 
decentralization process is reverted, manifested by the return of some of the resources allocated to regional 
governments to the central government (Cook, 1990). 
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because the disaster was happening simultaneously in different regions of the country. 
After the El Niño of 1983, with the help of the international community, Peru was able to 
monitor and predict future El Niño events. For the El Niño that started in 1997, it was 
possible to know six months in advance that threatening floods were likely to happen. 
The government, led by President Alberto Fujimori, undertook a massive damage-
prevention campaign, but it was not enough to prevent disastrous events. In Piura, the 
government proposed to construct a drain to reduce the volume of water in the Piura 
River by diverting it to the ocean, but because of limited resources, the plan never 
materialized. As a result, 374 people lost their lives, another 412 were injured, and close 
to 600,000 were affected by the disaster (PREDESS, 1998).  
Table 4.1Robustness Fragility Assessment According to Collapse Theories 
N Proposition  (Causes of fragilities) Robustness – Fragility Assessment 
[1] The system’s complexity and rigidity 
Medium 
Because of government policies for agricultural development 
(including the construction of a big reservoir), among other 
reasons, population has grown at a fast pace for the past 
decades in the Lower and Middle Sub-basin. Population 
migration to safer regions is unlikely.  
[2] 
Overshoot (large 
number of users with 
respect to the resource 
system) 
Fragile 
Piura is the second biggest region of the country and has 
limited water available.  
Agricultural expansion is one of the causes of deforestation 
and land degradation upstream of the Piura River, where the 
runoff during flood events increases. 
[3] 
Physical constraints on 
adapting to new 
circumstances 
Fragile 
The Poechos Reservoir helps to capture water from floods. It 
has, however, lost its 50% of capacity.  
The Poecho project (canals, reservoir, and drainage system) 
has a high cost of maintenance due to its size, and its water-
retention performance in flood events is low. 
The Lower and Middle Sub-basin is located in an area of flat 
slope, right next to regions with steep slopes. This makes the 
river runoff in flood times dangerous.    
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[4] Selfish elites Fragile Corruption is still a problem in Peru.  
[5] 
Centralized 
governance in a main 
productive resource 
Fragile 
The decentralization of power has not worked as expected. 
Central government has to make decisions for investment in 
disasters prevention for many regions of the country at the 
same time.  
[6] Systems interconnection  
Fragile 
El Niño is a global phenomenon that impacts Peru in different 
regions at the same time. The causes and consequences that 
are strongly connected for making the event a disaster are 
place based in different regions. 
[7] 
Attachments to values 
that are detrimental to 
the environment 
Robust 
After sensitivity programs, the awareness in Piura of the 
environmental threats in the Basin has increased. This has 
encouraged users in Lower and Middle Piura to be more 
involved in promoting collective action in water management 
and disaster prevention 
[8] Subsistence 
Fragile 
High poverty levels. Population in poverty conditions is 
fragile to environmental disturbances because of their 
dependence and relationship with resources.  
[9] Class conflicts 
Medium 
There are some disparities, but there are no problems related 
to inequity. 
  
[10] Poor anticipation capacity 
Fragile 
There is awareness of climate change and how it will affect 
the intensity and frequency of El Niño events. But it is still 
difficult to anticipate well in advance when a Niño will occur. 
The 1997/1998 event was anticipated 6 months in advance, 
but the 2017 event was not noticed in advance. 
 
The last relevant group of public-infrastructure providers is the water-users 
association. Fortunately, the institutionalization of the water-users association of the 
Lower and Middle Piura shows encouraging results. Farmers seem to understand the 
importance of improving water management and the role of the water fee in its success. 
The multi-level organization that they have crafted, from delegates of each 200 farmers, 
to a sub-basin water association of 75,176 members, is time efficient, enables fluent 
coordination, effective monitoring, and increases efficiency in communicating concerns 
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or claims and even in solving conflicts in different instances. The water associations still 
have to reduce the default rate of water-fee payments, and to agree on a higher price that 
reflects the real cost (public and social) of water. However, they have made an 
improvement from 2014 to 2015: fees collected increased from S/4 million (around USD 
1.2 million) to S/6 million (around USD 1.8 millions). Different actors that have 
responsaiblities as managers (e.g., National Local Water Authority, Mayor Operation 
Managers), revealed their satisfaction with the progress that the Lower and Middle Piura 
Water Users Association has achieved. They have improved by themselves the minor 
canals that they are in charge of maintaining and have collected their own funds for 
emergency events. As we can see in Table 4.1, the assessment with respect to the theory 
listed as number 7 “Attachments to values that are detrimental to the environment” 
indicates a degree of robustness to flood in the basin, given that farmers’ behaviors are 
showing more engagement in contributing to the public infrastructure provisioning.  
However, farmers’ technical knowledge in the basin is limited, and farmers’ 
agricultural practices and water management capabilities are still developing 
(CERPRAR, 2016) which makes their individual economic development slow. Poverty 
conditions are also linked to environmental degradation. Poor farming practices (e.g. 
excessive watering, pesticide and fertilizer use, no crop rotation) degrade the soil and, at 
the same time, lock farmers into low economic returns on land and labor. Farmers with 
low profits cannot contribute enough to maintain irrigation infrastructure, especially 
because of the size of the population (high transaction costs), and because of the large 
scale of the infrastructure (high maintenance costs). Moreover, Lower and Middle Piura 
share the irrigation infrastructure of the Poecho Project, including the reservoir (see 
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Figure 4.2), with the Chira Basin. This fact makes the transaction cost of coordinating to 
collect enough resources for infrastructure maintenance even higher, especially because 
the Chira Basin has less-developed collective action than Lower and Middle Piura. 
The government has now unofficially announced that it will progressively reduce 
its financial assistance for major infrastructure maintenance. User associations will 
therefore need to grow even stronger to ensure public provisioning, in this case through 
water tariffs. Moreover, self-financed systems are becoming more and more necessary 
because of the reduction in support from international aid sources. Since Peru has 
improved its human development in literacy and GDP per capita, it is now a country that 
is less prioritized for international aid (GRP, 2016) 
One of the explanations that farmers in the Lower and Middle sub-basin give for 
avoiding water fees is that they have low returns on their water use for farming. It may 
be, then, that investment in soft infrastructure (e.g., capacity building for farming 
practices) should be a priority, or at least as important as hard-infrastructure investment. 
One current project aims to build a reservoir for Upper Piura, but has not yet solved the 
problem of funding for resource maintenance. Farmers and managers could learn from 
past experience with Lower and Middle Piura, and plan for investment in soft 
infrastructure at the same time. Another option for governance improvement is to 
encourage labor work on public infrastructure in lieu of water fees, given the high 
poverty rates.  
When farmers ensure that their efforts are not in vain and that they actually fulfill 
a need, they are more likely to participate in collective action (Wade, 1988). In this sense, 
the high level of corruption is a problem (“selfish elites” theory listed as number 4 in 
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Table 4.1). If regional and national authorities do not convince farmers’–and water users 
in general–that their own efforts in provisioning (or paying tariffs, taxes, etc.) have a high 
expected return in terms of improving their welfare, their incentive for collective action 
will decrease, as described in Chapter 3. El Niño events revealed hard and soft 
infrastructure weakness: poor emergency response, recently built bridges that were 
destroyed, and projects on hold because of bureaucracy, for example. These are 
discouraging feedbacks for the population, but they may strengthen the argument for 
promoting local, self-organizing, problem-solving associations. In this sense, governance 
transparency or users’ project involvement may be some valid options. 
It seems that everyone in Piura is well aware of the importance of increasing the 
capacity to prevent damage from El Niño events. However, most of the time the policy 
focus is on hard infrastructure and less on improvement of governance infrastructure. 
Information about hard infrastructure, e.g., reservoirs, canal maintenance, dams, and 
drainages, is available and well understood, but the source of funding for hard 
infrastructure maintenance is barely considered (generally it is assumed that it should 
come from the central government). From the analysis summarized in Table 4.1, we can 
see that the most robust aspect of the system is the way both individual, and networks of, 
users’ associations are developed. It is, however, still far from being ideal, and the 
analysis shows that it can make a significant difference if the associations get support to 
build their capacity and to become more knowledgeable about how authorities can 
support them, how to get out of poverty traps, how to better manage their resources, and 
how to prepare better for future threatening events. Since poverty and developing 
agricultural practices are aspects that are identified as root causes that show fragilities in 
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the system, by underpinning this strength there might be a positive effect on other aspects 
of the system.  
Concluding Thoughts  
By reviewing the Lower and Middle Piura sub-basin while addressing a research 
question that presumes causal links from a set of conditions drawn from past research on 
collapse theories along with variables and links in the Robustness Framework, it was 
possible to assess the aspects of which a CIS is robust or fragile to a disturbance, in this 
case El Niño events. It seems that, in general, the CIS of the Lower and Middle Piura 
sub-basin is fragile to future drought and flooding events but has demonstrated a solid 
strength, significant capacity for collective action, which is an important social 
infrastructure to build on to prevent damage from future Niños and to develop 
sustainably.  
As shown in this study, public infrastructure is an essential feature of functioning 
societies within CIS, and for CIS robustness.  However, too much attention has been paid 
to physical infrastructure, with the result that opportunities to strengthen CIS have been 
overlooked. If we pay more attention to the soft public infrastructure, we may find some 
more effective potential solutions for increasing the robustness of the system to floods. In 
addition to strengthening water-users association as discussed earlier, attention to how to 
improve the coordination among different levels of governance seems to be necessary. 
This is the story of the Piura basin CIS. There are many other similar cases in 
Peru, and around the world, that will be exposed to future climate change events. Because 
this was only one case study, I cannot draw any general theoretical conclusions.  
However, this research provides methodological and theoretical insights that can 
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contribute to theory building for robust CIS, which is an urgent endeavor. Future research 
can use the same methodological approach to analyze more cases and refine the theory.  
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CHAPTER 5 
TOOLS FOR DESIGNING ROBUST SYSTEMS TO ENVIRONMENTAL SHOCKS: 
THE NORTH PERUVIAN COAST CASE  
Introduction 
An important characteristic of Coupled Infrastructure Systems (CIS) - such as 
irrigation systems, forests and fisheries – is that they are constantly changing (Berkes & 
Folke 1998, Scheffer et al. 2009).  The dynamic of CIS is created by the interaction 
among the different types of infrastructures that constitute the system itself: users (social 
and human infrastructure), watershed (natural infrastructure), reservoirs, (human-made 
hard infrastructure), and institutions (human-made soft infrastructure) (Anderies, 2015). 
This dynamic can be temporarily or permanently affected by internal or external 
disturbances that impact one or more infrastructures (e.g., population growth that affects 
social infrastructure, droughts that affect natural infrastructure). Thus, the sustainability 
of a system depends on both the dynamics among its infrastructures and on how those 
dynamics influence the system’s capacity to cope with potential catastrophic shocks 
(Schlüter, Hinkel, Bots & Arlinghaus; 2014, Carpenter et al., 2009). 
Because time-series data on CIS are scarce and experiments on CIS are difficult 
to perform, dynamic modeling and longitudinal case studies are perhaps the most feasible 
methods for understanding CIS dynamics (Carpenter & Brock 2004), and they can be 
used to complement one another (Janssen & Anderies, 2013). Dynamic models are 
simplified formal representations of the structure and processes of real-world cases. They 
incorporate those theoretically or empirically identified components, and the relationships 
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among them, that are relevant to answering a specific question about the behavior of a 
system over time (Schlüter et al., 2014). Dynamic models are also useful for exploring 
robustness theory because they make it possible to analyze system feedbacks under 
potential disturbances (Janssen & Anderies 2013). When they are empirically tested, they 
can be useful tools for CIS management (Baumgärtner et al., 2008).   
A dynamic model was developed to answer the research question, “What 
interventions can policymakers implement to make CIS robust to the shocks expected 
from climate change?” Because the answer to this question is complex and context 
specific (Ostrom, Janssen & Anderies; 2007), I partly address this question by studying 
an irrigation system from the northern Peruvian coast: the Bajo y Medio Piura sub-basin. 
The north coast is now threated by disastrous flood events followed by acute droughts 
caused by climate change, but it has also been affected by these extreme events in past 
centuries. The effect of past environmental shocks in this region is analyzed in Chapter 4, 
and the results of the analysis has contributed to the design and testing of the dynamic 
model.  
Extreme flood events damage human-made hard infrastructure through which, for 
example, farmers are able to appropriate water to irrigate their crops (Anderies, 2015). In 
arid regions like the north coast of Peru, the characteristics of the public, human-made 
hard infrastructure are critically important because agricultural activity depends entirely 
on that infrastructure. Dams and reservoirs capture runoff from the mountains, smoothing 
flow variations and saving surplus water for later use (Ostrom et al., 1994). It is crucial to 
understand the interactions between hard infrastructure and the other components of an 
irrigation system because water is distributed through a river or canal network which, in 
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turn, creates asymmetries that affect the structure of the social dilemmas in irrigation 
systems (Ostrom et al., 1994). Hard infrastructure is also affected by how it is maintained 
(that is, by how much users collectively invest in it; see Figure 1), and maintenance is 
affected by how appropriation and provisioning dilemmas are solved.25 In commons 
dilemmas there is always the temptation of non-compliance, so how users monitor and 
sanction non-compliance is a key component that affects system outcomes (Ostrom, 
1990). This is especially relevant when, as on Peru’s north coast, users are settled along a 
canal or river, which decreases the visibility of their actions.  
 
 
Figure	5.1.A	Feedback	Control	Loop	of	the	Characterized	Irrigation	System	
 
The research problem to be addressed in this chapter has two parts: 
• To	understand	the	core	dynamics	of	the	systems	I	ask:	How	does	public-infrastructure	(hard	and	soft)	performance	affect	collective	action	in	
                                                
25  The provisioning dilemma is created by the incentive of increasing one’s own net 
benefits in the short term by not contributing to public infrastructure provisioning, 
because the user will benefit from the provisioning anyway. The appropriation dilemma 
happens because farmers are temped to use more water than allowed to increase their 
profits, but by doing so they will prevent other farmers from increasing their own profits 
because there is not enough water available for all users to maximize their profits (Dietz 
et al. 2003). The two dilemmas are interrelated since the public infrastructure is necessary 
to appropriate water, and a user’s decision to invest in the public infrastructure depends 
on their perceived benefits from appropriating water.  
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the	asymmetric	irrigation	systems	of	the	Peruvian	north	coast?	Hard	infrastructure	is	represented	by	reservoirs,	dams,	and	canals;	and	soft	infrastructure	by	monitoring	and	sanctioning.		
• To	analyze	how	the	systems	respond	to	environmental	shocks	I	ask:	
o How	robust	are	irrigation	systems	on	the	Peruvian	north	coast	to	natural,	extreme	flood	events?	
o What	interventions	can	increase	the	robustness	of	these	systems	to	extreme	flood	events?			
To address these questions I propose an evolutionary game theoretical model, as 
Yu et al. (2015) used in order to study the impact of infrastructure on collective action 
and system stability in irrigation systems. The replicator dynamics of the model is a 
modified version of the one proposed by Taylor & Jonker (1978). I represent the structure 
of the social dilemma based on the model developed by Rubinos (2013), and the effects 
of sanctioning and modeling in users payoffs on the proposed equations by Sethi and 
Somanathan (1996). I calibrated the model using evidence from the Peruvian irrigation 
system “Bajo y Medio Piura” that presents general characteristics and threats of the north 
Peruvian coast irrigation systems.  
I used Matlab to simulate past events, users and biophysical reactions, and 
outcomes in order to verify model outputs for consistency with evidence in the sub-basin. 
The first part of the research problem was addressed with a sensitivity analysis that shows 
how the relationship of the human-made hard infrastructure (also called engineered 
infrastructure) with collective action is not always positive and thus, one-time investment 
in this type of infrastructure is not always effective. On the contrary, the model shows 
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that by increasing enforcement mechanisms of sanctions to non-cooperative behavior can 
make a significant difference, specially if farmers perceive that it is likely that non-
cooperator will be sanctioned for their behavior.  
The second question is addressed with the analysis of equilibria in section 5.III. 
Constant investment in the maintenance of the engineered constructed infrastructure is 
needed, it seems that there is a threshold of investment that considerably increase the 
robustness of the system to floods. Additional strategies to increase the investment in the 
engineered infrastructure and thus the robustness of the system are later explored.  The 
three strategies: increase of awareness (or change social norms), increase of water tariffs, 
and increase farming productivity, were simulated as effective, though some more than 
others. Finally, section 5.IV summarizes the results and analysis. 
The Model: Evolutionary Game Theoretical Model  
The Peruvian north coast is characterized by its low precipitation, and by its good 
sunlight conditions for agricultural productivity. Currently, 21% of Peruvian agriculture 
is produced in this region (INEI, 2015), but in order for cultivation to be viable, farmers 
have to capture and store water in a reservoir. In the model, I represent the water captured 
as “𝑞,” which depends on (1) naturally availability, “𝑞 S,” and (2) performance of the 
engineered construction (reservoir, canals and drainage system), “E.”  𝑞 = 𝐸𝑞! −
!!! !!!! . “E” is bounded between 0 and 1, where 1 is the perfect performance that can 
never be achieved. The performance of the engineered construction captures the capacity 
to store and deliver available water, but also its capacity to contain water from rain 
through the reservoir, canals, rivers and drains. The quadratic shape captures the problem 
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of flooding events divided by the parameter “𝜔” that indicates the threshold of 
precipitation to affect water availability. When the infrastructure is not well maintained 
or prepared for these events, water availability q is negatively affected.  
To use and manage an irrigation system in Peru, farmers must create an 
association, which is supervised by the both the regional government and the national 
water authority (ANA). I assume that there are “N” farmers (a well–enforced, finite 
number affected by a boundary rule) who choose their leaders (managers). Irrigation 
association managers operate and maintain the public irrigation infrastructure (dam and 
canals), water distribution, collect and manage fees for water use, decide water tariffs, cut 
water services to non-compliant farmers, and represent water users at inter-institutional 
meetings (Gallo & Oft, 2011). For the purposes of the model, I assume that managers 
provide only the following public soft infrastructure (orange boxes of figure 5.1): 
• Rules:	Managers	determine	water	tariff,	“m*,”	based	on	the	comparison	between	the	maximization	of	social	welfare		(explained	below),	the	government	support	(explained	below),	and	farmers	ability	to	pay.	Farmers	have	to	pay	this	tariff	before	the	allocation	of	water	occurs.	Based	on	
Q,	managers	determine	the	maximum	individual	water	withdrawal	allowed:		
u*	
• The	total	contribution	from	water	tariffs	“m”	(which	is	calculated	by	multiplying	the	number	of	cooperators	“Nc”	and	the	water	tariff	“m*	”)	is	used	to	improve	the	performance	of	the	engineered	construction	“E”,	which	depends	also	on	its	past	performance	(Et-1)	because	the	infrastructure	is	not	entirely	rebuilt	each	year,	and	it	is	also	affected	by	depreciation	𝛩.	Also,	
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because	in	the	Medio	y	Bajo	Piura	sub-basin	the	engineered	irrigation	construction	is	very	costly	to	maintain,	the	government	plays	an	important	role	for	its	maintenance	by	contributing	a	fixed	amount	“𝜓”.	The	total	investment	for	the	engineered	constructed	maintenance	and	improvement	is	then;	v	=		m	+	 𝜓,	and	affects	the	performance	as	described	by	the	following	expression:		
𝐸! !!! ,!:	If	𝑣(!) > 0,	  𝐸! = 𝐸!!! + 𝑒!!! 𝐸!!! 1− 𝐸!!! −  𝛩𝐸!!!;		If	v(m)	= 0,	𝐸! = 𝐸(!!!) −  𝛩𝐸(!!!)		In	strong	flood	events,	the	engineered	construction	can	also	be	damaged,	as		happened	in	the	El	Nino	events	of	1982/1983	and	1997/1998.	The	effect	of	strong	flood	in	the	performance	of	the	engineered	construction	will	depend	on	how	much	the	amount	invested	in	the	infrastructure	performance	offset	the	physical	damage	in	the	system.	Then,	in	flood	events,	
v	can	be	expressed	by	the	following	equation:			 𝑣 =  𝑚 + 𝜓 −  𝜆(𝑞! − 𝜔)		
where “𝜆” is the coefficient that express the effect on the engineered 
constructed performance of the excess of precipitation in the system. Normally, 
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when the government knows that a Niño event is approaching, then their 
investment in prevention increases for that period (𝜓). Then if the increase in 𝜓 
offsets the impacts of El Niño (expressed through 𝜆 (𝑞! − 𝜔), then, the impact is 
reduced.  
• Monitoring and sanctioning: Users in irrigation systems, as in other 
CIS, face the social dilemma of cooperating with the system by following the 
rules or not. Users base this decision on their payoffs, which can be pecuniary and 
otherwise, and which is explained later. Cooperators will assume a cost of 
monitoring (𝛿) to persuade users to cooperate and to impose a sanction (𝛾 with a 
probability of enforcement (𝜎) to those who do not cooperate (Nnc). The expected 
cost of not cooperating is then 𝜎𝛾, and farmers that do not cooperate assume this 
cost. 
In most systems on the north coast of Peru, farmers withdraw water from a 
surface water source (river or canal), and users have access to the resource sequentially, 
generating an asymmetry among users where upstream users are clearly favored by 
having earlier access to water withdrawals than downstream users. To find out how this 
asymmetry plays a role in irrigation systems outcomes, I differentiate upstream users (N1) 
and downstream users (N2), with N1 + N2 = N. Upstream users have to decide how much 
water to appropriate of the total water available q(v,qs), and downstream users (group 2) 
have a different amount of water available 𝑞!!, which will depend on q, and how much 
water is appropriated by all upstream users (u1*N1), but also by the length of the canal 
“𝜁” and its performance (which is also captured by E). 
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𝑞!! = 𝑞 − 𝑢!𝑁! − 𝛼𝑞 1− 𝐸 ζ 
 
I assume that all users have the same information, same amount of land, grow the 
same crops, and have the same expertise in farming. These assumptions make the focused 
analysis possible because every farmer has the same production function, which depends 
on water units individually appropriated “ui.” When the production function f(ui) is 
multiplied by the price of the crop p, we have farmer’s income, I=p f(ui). The costs of 
farming is assumed to be proportional to water use such that C = 𝜍ui. For managers to 
find the optimal water tariff (m), they maximize the total payoffs of the system, assuming 
that all will cooperate: 
𝛱 = 𝐼 ! − 𝐶 ! 𝑁 −𝑚   
s.t  𝑢𝑁 ≤ qA(m) 
However, the tariff imposed will depend on farmers’ income. Farmers need to 
save some of their income for basic needs. Thus managers (that are also farmers) decide 
that the water tariff should not exceed a percentage “ζ” of their income. The payoff for a 
farmer will be also affected by the decision to cooperate (adding monitoring costs 𝛿) or 
not (adding expected sanctions 𝛾𝑃). Then the payoffs (𝜋!of the two groups of users are: 
𝜋! = 𝑝𝑓 − 𝑐𝑢! −𝑚! − 𝛿 𝜋!" = 𝑝𝑓 − 𝑐𝑢!" − 𝛾𝑃 
Note that cooperators pay the water tariff that managers impose, m*, and 
appropriate water according to the rule 𝑢∗, where individual appropriation 𝑢!! is decided 
by maximizing cooperators’ pecuniary payoff 𝜋! with maximum amount of water they 
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can appropriate 𝑢∗, such that 𝑢!! ≤ 𝑢∗. Also, cooperators payment of the water tariff 
depends on their capacity to pay constrained by I(u). Non-cooperators do not pay water 
tariffs (mnc=0) and appropriate the amount of water that maximizes their pecuniary 
payoffs, 𝜋!". Both maximizations are also subject to q(m,S) and 𝑞(!,!!)!  depending on 
whether the farmer is an upstream or a downstream user, respectively.  
Table 5.1 
Definitions of Variables and Relevant Parameters 
Symbol Definition 𝑞 Produced water 𝑞!! Water available for group “i” i=1 upstream, i=2 downstream 𝑞! Naturally produced water 𝐸! Performance of the physical engineered construction in time t 𝑁!! Number of users j=c (cooperators), j=nc (non-cooperators) of the groups i=1 upstream, i=2 downstream. 𝑆!!  Fraction of cooperators in group i i=1 upstream, i=2 downstream 𝑚∗ Water tariff 
m Total water tariff collected by managers 𝑢! Water appropriated i=group 1,2 𝑢 Total water appropriated 𝑢∗ Maximum water allocated to farmers that paid the water tariff 𝛱!  Cooperators payoffs 𝛱!"  Cooperators payoffs Π Average payoffs of the system 𝛱 Total payoffs of the system 𝜌 Relative speed of conversion from cooperator to non-cooperator 𝜂 Parameter giving the monetary value of the additional output 
generated by the first unit of irrigation water 𝛽 Parameter that determines how the marginal value changes as the 
amount of appropriated water changes 𝜍 Marginal cost of water appropriation 𝜁 Length of the canal for group i 𝛼 Coefficient of water loss 𝜃 Depreciation 
 
Last, I assume that users are boundedly rational, and take a modified evolutionary 
approach to represent the decision-making process of farmers about cooperating or not. Si 
is the fraction of cooperators, such that Si=Nic/N, i = {1,2}, and Nc1 + Nc2 = Nc. In every 
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period, which famers have to make a decision about cooperating, they compare the 
average income of all users 𝜋 with their pecuniary payoff 𝜋! (j = {c, nc}). If they end up 
losing in this comparison, they will consider switching to the other group (from 
cooperators (j = c) to non-cooperators (j = nc) and vice versa). Only some of the farmers 
will change strategy, as expressed in the following equation:  
 𝑆!" = 𝑆!"!! + 𝑆!"!![max (𝜋! − 𝜋)/𝜋, 0 − 𝜌max (𝜋 − 𝜋!)/𝜋, 0 ] 
 
This is a modified version of the replicator dynamics used by Taylor & Jonker 
(1978). I assume that the speed of conversion from non-cooperator to cooperator (𝛽!"" is 
different from the speed of conversion from cooperator to non-cooperator (𝛽!"! , and that 𝜌 = 𝛽!"! 𝛽!"" . By differentiating between the speeds of conversion, I assume that 
users have more considerations than pecuniary payoffs alone (Van Lange, 1999), and that 
there might be a moral inertia that affects the decision to change from cooperation to non-
cooperation. In this situation, 𝛽!"! < 𝛽!"". 
If the speeds of conversion are equal, then 𝜌 = 1, then the replicator dynamics 
will be the same as those used by Taylor & Jonker (1978)26: 𝑆!" = 𝑆!"!! + S!"!!(𝜋! −𝜋)/𝜋. As it can be seen, the traditional replicator dynamics is a subset of the proposed 
replicator for this research.   
The equations for each function and the model summary are shown in Table 5.2, 
and an explanation diagram in Figure 5.1.B. The equations have been modified or 
                                                
26 Taylor & Jonker (1978) replicator dynamic was not specific to benefits but to strategies fitness of a strategy. 
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validated according to the findings about the interactions between the hard, human-made 
public infrastructure and water availability in the Medio y Bajo Piura sub-basin.  
Table 5.2 
Model Summary 
	
	
Figure	5.1.B	Feedback	Control	Loop	of	the	Characterized	Irrigation	System	Linked	to	the	Equations	
Results and Analysis 
Calibration. The calibrated simulation of the last 37 years after the construction 
Main Equations Rationale 
Modified Replicator Dynamic 𝑆!" = 𝑆!(!!!) + 𝑆!(!!!)[max 𝜋! − 𝜋, 0 − 𝜌max 𝜋 − 𝜋! , 0 ] for i={1,2} (1)  
Users decide if they 
cooperate. 
Payoffs Π! = 𝛼𝑢 − 0.5𝛽𝑢! − 𝜍𝑢 −𝑚 (2.A)  
A cooperator’s net 
benefit Π!" = 𝛼𝑢 − 0.5𝛽𝑢! − 𝜍𝑢 − 𝛾 σ 
 
(2.B)  
A non-cooperator’s 
net benefit 
Water Availability 𝑞 = 𝐸𝑞! − !!! !!!! . (3.A)  Upstream (i=1) 𝑞!! = 𝑞 − 𝑢!𝑁! − 𝑎𝑞(1 − 𝐸)(𝜁) (3.B)  
Downstream (i=2) 
Engineered Performance 
If 𝑣(!) > 0,  𝐸! = 𝐸!!! + 𝑒!!! 𝐸!!! 1 − 𝐸!!! −  𝛩𝐸!!! 
(4.A) 
Engineered 
Constructed 
performance as a 
function of its 
maintenance 
investment 
If 𝑣(!) = 0, 𝐸! = 𝐸(!!!) −  𝛩𝐸(!!!) (4.B) 
Same as 4.A when 
v=0 
Production Function 𝐹(!) = 𝛼𝑝 𝑢 − 𝛽𝑝 𝑢! (5) Production as a 
function of water 
use 
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of the main engineered system included the two main flood disturbances of very strong El 
Nino events (in 1983 and 1998). For parameter calibration details as well as for 
designated values as initial conditions of the state variables see Appendix 5.2. The 
simulated evolution of the cooperation fraction, and the engineered infrastructure 
performance during the period 1980 – 2016 are shown in figures 5.1.A and 5.1.B. The 
engineered infrastructure consists of the biggest reservoir in South America with an 
initial capacity of 789 MCUM, big canals and drainage systems, which was entirely 
financed by the government for the development of agriculture in the region. The project 
was planned to be partly self-financed by farmers contributions when stronger capacities 
and benefits were developed, thus the government has been patient by financing most of 
the maintenance fee, which is as significant as the size of the engineered project. 
Farmers’ contributions have become progressively more significant, as the fraction of 
cooperation has increased as shown in figure 5.1.A. Farmers cooperation was affected by 
the El Nino event of 1998, on which observation from secondary data (ANA 2009, 
Leonidas 2008) also agrees with the model. Note that in El Niño events cooperation is 
affected not for moral reasons, but rather for capacity to contribute to the public good, 
given that most of the farmers lose their production and other goods.   
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Figure	5.1.A:	Simulated	cooperation	fraction	(Si)	for	upstream	and	downstream	farmers	for	year	1980	–	2016.	 Figure	5.1.B:	Simulated	engineered	constructed	performance	(E)	for	years	1980	–	2016.	
 
Another interesting thing to note is that the cooperation fraction of upstream and 
downstream farmers are exactly the same. An explanation of these results is that with the 
construction of the reservoir, the system became robust to droughts in the Medio and 
Bajo Piura sub-basin to the point that in the absence of extreme flood events that damage 
the infrastructure, there are only few events in which water is scarce (Leonidas, 2008). 
The decision to keep the equations for differentiating upstream and downstream farmers 
is based on the interest in providing a model for further analysis on effects on: (1) 
stronger drought events on this sub-basin (which is beyond the scope of this study), and 
(2) for analyzing other systems that share the main characteristics proposed in the model 
for the Peruvian north coast case, such as the Chancay-Lambayeque Basin (Rubinos, 
2013), or the San Lorenzo (INRENA, 2008), Chira (ANA, 2009), Motupe, Olmos, La 
Leche (Garcés-Restrepo, & Guerra-Tovar, 1999), and Jequetepeque (Gómez, L. I., et al., 
2007), and to other potential systems regardless of their location.  
Figure 5.1.B illustrates the evolution of the past 37 years of the engineered 
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constructed performance. As we can observe, the performance value for 1980 is close but 
different to 1 given that the full project was not finished. Some secondary canals and 
drainage infrastructure were left for its future development. Congruent with the 
limitations of the system to collect the necessary investment to bring the engineered 
infrastructure performance to its best possible level, we see how the original performance 
decreases at a relatively high speed. However, the increase in cooperation, and thus 
farmers provisioning during the 80s and the early 90s positively affected the engineered 
constructed performance (slowed the rate of decline), just until the next strong flood 
event occurred in 1998 to bring down the performance once again. Though, while 
farmers slowly recuperated from the impact of El Nino, their cooperation increased 
accordingly and they invested more in the engineered infrastructure, which brought up 
the performance measure.  
Sensitivity Analysis. To address my first research question: “How does public-
infrastructure (hard and soft) performance affect collective action in the asymmetric 
irrigation systems of the Peruvian north coast?” I performed a sensitivity analysis for 
different initial conditions of “E” the engineered infrastructure, and for different values 
of the parameter “P” the probability of enforcing sanctioning mechanisms, to analyze the 
effects on the cooperation fraction in the system (Si). 
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Figure	5.2.A	Simulated	cooperation	fraction	(S)	for	different	levels	of	initial	conditions	of	the	engineered	constructed	performance	(Eo)	
 
 
Figure 5.2.B Simulated	cooperation	fraction	(S)	for	different	levels	of	probability	of	being	sanctioned	(𝜎)	
Figure 5.2.A illustrates that there is a minimum of engineered performance that is 
needed to trigger cooperation. It also illustrates the importance path dependency through 
the impact of initial conditions on long-term outcomes. The relationship between the 
initial condition of the engineered performance and the results of cooperation is not 
always positive. As we can see in figure 5.2.A an increase in Eo from 0.2 to 0.3, generates 
a positive impact in the evolution of cooperation in the system. An increase in Eo from 
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0.3 to 0.4 however, generates a negative impact in the evolution of cooperation. 
However, at very high levels of initial conditions of E (from 0.8 and above), since water 
is less scarce, users have less incentive to cooperate in the system, plus users that do not 
pay the water fee can equally withdraw water from the system and get as good payoffs as 
those who cooperate and have priority on water access.  
On the other hand, the impact of soft public infrastructure, in this case, sanction 
enforcement, has a clear direction. Figure 5.2.B clearly shows how when the probability 
of enforcement increases users are more likely to cooperate. Another interesting thing to 
note from this graph is the shift of the effect after el Nino event of 1998 when 𝜎 moves 
from 0.5 to 0.6. According to this result when the probability of being sactioned is higher 
than 0.5 (most likely that a non cooperator will be sanctioned), the cooperation level 
increases. 
Robustness – Fragility Analysis. The second research question refers to the 
robustness of the system with respect to flood events. I consider a CIS to be robust if “it 
prevents the ecological systems upon which it relies from moving into a new domain of 
attraction that cannot support a human population, or that will induce a transition that 
causes long-term human suffering” (Anderies et al., 2004 p. 18). A robust system does 
not necessarily perform at its maximum potential (Csete & Doyle, 2002), but it does 
remain functional despite internal (e.g., population growth) or external perturbations 
(e.g., droughts).  
 To address this question, I performed an equilibrium and stability analysis of the 
state variable E (engineered constructed performance) with and without flood events with 
respect to the investment on the maintenance of this infrastructure as a result of the level 
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of cooperation in the system. The analysis is based on the assumption that bigger 
negative impact of flood events on the performance of the human made hard 
infrastructure, cause bigger negative impact on society as a whole. In flood events, the 
reservoir, rivers and canal play an important role to keep water away from the fields and 
the city. If any of these pieces of infrastructure is washed out, then some water from flood 
and the river runoff become out of control.  
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                      (a)              (b) 
                                                                       (c) 
Figure 5.3: Investment	in	engineered	constructed	maintenance	(m)	and	its	performance	(E). Blue continued curve shows the long-term equilibrium for 
infrastructure performance in the absence of flood events (highlighted in figure (a)), and 
the purple doted line in the presence of flood events (highlighted in figure (b)).  The 
difference between both curves then, indicates the degree of fragility or robustness of the 
system to flood events from El Nino phenomenon.   
 
Figure 5.3 shows the required level of annual investment for achieving a stable 
level (equilibrium) of the public engineered infrastructure in the absence of flood events 
(each point of the continue blue curve). The blue dot indicates that at the current modeled 
level of investment even though the infrastructure achieves a level of performance of 
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0.44, eventually it could achieve a stable equilibrium of 0.6 in the absence of El Nino 
event. However, since the system is exposed cyclically (though erratically) to flood 
events, this equilibrium will be eventually disrupted. The purple dashed curve on figure 
5.3 shows the required investment for achieving a stable equilibrium under the presence 
of El Nino events. At a determined level of investment without any El Nino event, the 
infrastructure performance could reach its maximum level determined by the blue line, 
but when flood events occur the infrastructure performance is affected proportionally to 
the difference between its state and the purple dashed curve. Thus in the current situation 
of investment, el Nino has bigger effects on the infrastructure performance than if  the 
level of investment would be, for example, S/.5 millions. According to this analysis, the 
model shows that in the current state of the system, the Medio y Bajo Piura is fragile to 
flood events.  
To illustrate the dynamic that figure 5.3 predicts, I performed an analysis of the 
system under 4 different potential scenarios. Since it is very likely that Piura will be 
affected by stronger and more frequent El Nino events (Hendriks, 2009) I simulated 
scenario 1: same intensity of disturbance (17,000 MMC), same frequency (every 15 
years); scenario 2: same intensity of disturbance, but more frequent (every 10 years); 
scenario 3: stronger intensity (18,000 MMC) of disturbance, 15-year frequency; scenario 
4: same intensity of disturbance (17,000 MMC), and more frequent (every 10 years). 
Figures 5.4.A – 5.4.E show how in all four scenarios the system presents similar 
responses in terms of robustness and in cooperation fraction. Figures 5.4.A and 5.4.B 
illustrate farmers’ net benefits, how they are affected during flood event and how at 
different speeds, they return to the path of equilibrium. The effect on farmers’ net 
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benefits has repercussions in the fraction of cooperation (shown in figure 5.4.C) and in 
the public infrastructure maintenance investment (shown in figure 5.4.D). As a result, the 
engineered constructed performance fluctuates below its potential equilibrium (figure 
5.4.E). According to these results, the current status of the infrastructures of the systems 
make the system robust enough to avoid a collapse, but it does not make the system 
robust enough to prevent human suffering and public infrastructure (hard and soft) 
relapse when flood events occur.  
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Figure	5.4.A:	Farmers projected benefits in two different 
scenarios (scenarios 1 and 3, see bellow).	
Figure	5.4.B:	Farmers projected benefits in 
two different scenarios (scenarios 2 and 4, 
see bellow). 
Figure	5.4.C:	Projected fraction of cooperation in four 
different scenarios, see bellow 
 
		Figure	5.4.D:	Projected annual 
provisioning to the infrastructure 
maintenance in four different scenarios, 
see bellow 
 
Figure 5.4.E: Projected Infrastructure performance under four different scenarios. 
 
Figure 5.4: Scenario 1: same intensity of disturbance than past events (17,000 MMC), same 
frequency than past events (every 15 years). Scenario 2: same intensity of disturbance (17,000 MMC), 
but more frequent (every 10 years). Scenario 3: stronger intensity (18,000 MMC) of disturbance, same 
frequency (every 15 years). Scenario 4: same intensity of disturbance (17,000 MMC), (more frequent) 
every 10 years. 
 
Policy Intervention Analysis. In light of the findings of this research so far, the 
third and last question of this study “What interventions can increase the robustness of 
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the system to extreme flood events?”, can become more specific to: how to increase the 
investment in the public infrastructure to achieve a state where the system is more robust 
to flood events? The government has stated its intention to withdraw its support in the 
system progressively. Moreover, since many Peruvian regions are exposed to El Nino and 
other environmental problems due to climate change, the government presents serious 
resources limitations whether there is or not, political will to increase its support to a 
specific system. If the government and users are to work together for a joint intervention 
to increase the system robustness to flood events, they may want to explore a 
combination of different policies that affect the long-term self-managing component of 
the system. For the sake of clarity, I explore the question of potential intervention in an 
isolated fashion. The option of investing one time only in the engineered constructed 
system (changing initial condition of this infrastructure) was analyzed previously, and we 
learnt that it is not very effective given that current state. Investing in soft infrastructure, 
specifically in enhancing the probability of sanctioning non-cooperative behavior, was on 
the contrary more effective according to figure 5.2.B. I explore the performance of three 
different additional strategies to consider. 
 Increase of users’ awareness of the importance of cooperation for water 
and flood management. Users in the Medio and Bajo Piura have been encouraged to 
participate in different workshop and seminars where they have learned about the benefits 
of cooperation. It is difficult to isolate the effect of this policy, however if effective its 
effect can be translated in the model as if users increase their moral inertia when 
considering evading water tariff. In this case, 𝜌 the parameter of relative speeds of 
conversion from cooperator to non-cooperator with respect to the opposite will take 
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different values than 1. Figures 5.5 show how when the value of 𝜌 gets closer to 0, the 
fraction of cooperators and the impact of the infrastructure performance are more robust 
to flood events.  
 
 
Figure 5.5.A: Projected cooperation fraction under 
the scenario of similar El Nino events in frequency 
and intensity as the historical evidence for different 
levels of moral inertia.  
 
Figure 5.5.B: Projected infrastructure performance 
trend under the scenario of similar El Nino events in 
frequency and intensity as the historical evidence for 
different levels of moral inertia. 
 
Increase in water tariffs. The Water tariff for Bajo and Medio Piura was of 0.003 
S/. per m3 in 2016, which is considered  as very low by all the reviewed sources 
(PECHP, 2016, ANA 2009, Leonidas 2008). According to the model, the water tariff 
would need to increase to around 0.012 to increase the fraction of cooperators to become 
robust to flood events.  
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Figure	5.6.A:	Projected cooperation fraction 
under the scenario of similar El Nino events 
in frequency and intensity as the historical 
evidence for different levels of water tariffs.	
 
Figure 5.6.B: Projected infrastructure 
performance trend under the scenario of 
similar El Nino events in frequency and 
intensity as the historical evidence for 
different levels of water tariffs. 
 
Farmers’ capacity building with respect to efficient water and other inputs use. 
According to a report of the ministery of agricutlure, farmers in the Medio y Bajo Piura 
sub-basin have an irrigation efficiency of only 35% which, combined with other 
agricultural practices such as the overuse of fertilizer, or the deficit in drainage processes 
for soil preservation, causes a low productivity in the sub-basin. According to the model, 
if farmers improve their farming productivity (e.g. though capacity building), they may 
become more robust to flood events. Even so, the model shows that it would be  
necessary to double their productivity (form 1.45 to 3).  
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Figure 5.7.A: Projected cooperation 
fraction under the scenario of similar El Nino 
events in frequency and intensity as the 
historical evidence for different levels of rice 
growing productivity 
Figure 5.7.B: Projected infrastructure 
performance trend under the scenario of similar El 
Nino events in frequency and intensity as the 
historical evidence for different levels of rice 
growing productivity 
  
Conclusion 
Environmental disasters have shaped society around the world, sometimes at a 
very high cost. Given the effects of globalization, especially those related to climate 
change, many CISs need to be better prepared for natural, and thus unavoidable, 
disasters. Although the Peruvian north coast has always been exposed to disastrous flood 
and drought events from El Nino phenomena, it has been predicted that these events will 
be more intense and more frequent in the future. Understanding the core dynamics of 
irrigation systems that are critical to protect from damage through flood prevention is one 
of the aims of this research. To that end, I developed a dynamic model that characterizes 
the main infrastructures based on field observations of one of the Peruvian north coast 
systems: Medio y Bajo Piura sub-basin.  The model revealed that one-time investments in 
hard infrastructure may not be the most effective solution since by making a system more 
robust to a particular disturbance (in this case the reservoir helped prevent the system 
from suffering from droughts), it increases the fragility of the system to other 
disturbances (in this case floods).  These results are illustrated in figure 5.2.A, which 
clearly shows how a change in the initial condition of the infrastructure performance 
from 0.4 (current state) to 0.8 as an example, the system becomes less robust to floods in 
time. Thus, when the government or other public infrastructure provider invests only one 
time to increase the hard infrastructure performance (Eo), it does not necessary have a 
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positive effect in the cooperation fraction.  
On the other hand, it seems that investing in soft infrastructure (sanctions 
enforcement in this case) may be more effective. Figure 5.2.B. shows how by increasing 
the expected sanction to 0.6, which qualitatively can be interpreted as “it is more likely 
that a farmer will get sanctioned” the system shifts to a sharp increase in collective 
action. Collective action is very much needed to increase the maintenance of the 
engineered infrastructure, and thus increase the system’s robustness to flood events as 
shown in Figure 5.3. The model also reveals that an increase to a constant level of 
investment for the engineered infrastructure maintenance can increase the robustness of 
the system to floods. Figure 5.3 displays the long run equilibria and Figures 5.4 its 
simulated dynamics. In any potential scenario, the proposition to increase the robustness 
of the system is the same: It is necessary to increase the investment in a regular 
maintenance of the engineered infrastructure. The easy solution is to ask to the 
government an increase in the budget for this system, but reality shows that   limited 
resources can offset political will. Different other strategies, namely stablishing a strong 
social norm for participating in prevention infrastructure (soft and hard), increase of 
water tariffs and farming productivity, for increasing the investment in the engineered 
infrastructure were explored. A combination of all or some of them can be targeted to 
increase the robustness of the system.  
The model is based on some assumptions such as a fixed number of users and a 
constant water flow in the absence of flood events. A relaxation of one or both of those 
assumptions may reveal problems of water scarcity that most likely will change the 
dynamics of the system. This was not the scope of this research, though future research 
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could focus on how the relaxation of these assumptions affects the system to inform for 
policy makers to increase the robustness of the system to droughts. Another assumption 
of the model is the homogeneity of users and crops. I used the most grown crop in the 
basin (rice) for the model calibration, though there are studies (such as Loyola & 
Orihuela (2010)) that show how the agriculture activity can be affected also by changes 
in temperature, which is also another threat from climate change. Rice is a low sensitive 
crop to changes in temperature and flood events. However, other crops that are grown in 
the system may be more sensitive to high temperatures and floods. Future research can 
also explore the effect of temperature in crop productivity.  
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CHAPTER 6 
RESEARCH FINDINGS SYNTHESIS 
In this dissertation I address two related issues of particular concern for the 
sustainability of Coupled Infrastructure Systems (CIS): how to overcome social dilemmas 
to avoid over-appropriation incentives, poverty traps and critical conflicts; and how to 
design robust system to environmental shocks. How these two issues are connected is still 
unclear, and more research is needed to identify if one is necessary and/or sufficient for 
the other. However, my findings show that collective action might be needed for 
improving levels of robustness of CIS to potential shocks.  
I started this dissertation with a critical literature review of Elinor Ostrom’s 
institutional design principles for successful collective action. I performed an analytical 
literature review of 64 studies that analyzed Ostrom’s design principles in real world case 
studies, and others that did not explicitly mentioned the design principle but that included 
an institutional analysis on their study. I looked for clarity of each DP, on desired 
outcomes intended by each DP, and for circumstances found in the field or in research 
that suggest a direction for the refinement of the DPs. I recommend referring to the DPs 
in a more specific approach by subdividing them in components.  
Later, in Chapter 3, I used the identified DPs components to code 28 irrigation 
systems that were previously studied by other authors. I also coded for contextual 
variables (biophysical and ethnographic) to look for conjoint causation of a desired 
outcome (an indicator of levels of over-appropriation, poverty and conflicts in the 
system). After carrying out this meta-analysis, I found that particular combinations of the 
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variables related to population size, countries corruption, the condition of water storage, 
monitoring of users behavior, and involving users in the decision making process for the 
commons governance, were sufficient to obtain the desired outcomes.  
In the two last studies of this dissertation, I switched my focus to Robustness 
analysis of CIS to environmental threats. I studied, with the use of two different methods, 
the Peruvian Piura Basin: a CIS that has been exposed to environmental shocks for 
decades. First, I used secondary and primary data to carry out a longitudinal study using 
as guidance the robustness framework, and different hypothesis from prominent collapse 
theories to draw potential explanations. Collapse theories revealed many fragilities in the 
Piura Basin, and one particular strength: farmers have shown an increase in their 
awareness and capacities to collectively work on prevention savings and public 
infrastructure provisioning. The effort is recognized, but it is still not enough to avoid 
being negatively affected by floods from El Niño events. Since it is the public 
infrastructure what buffers the impact from flood events in the Piura Basin, it is likely 
that by investing in developing the farmers collective action capacities, policymakers can 
help to increase the robustness of the system to flood events.  
In Chapter 5, I developed a dynamic model to 1) understand the core dynamics of 
the systems with respect to the relationship between public-infrastructure and collective 
action, 2) to understand how robust is the irrigation systems to extreme flood events, and 
3) to explore potential interventions to increase the robustness of these systems to flood 
events. I calibrated the model to predict behaviors and results in the Piura Basin. The 
model revealed that for the Piura Basin, collective action is very much needed to increase 
their robustness to flood events. Given the limitations of the governmental capacity to 
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make high and regular investment in the system, the hard and public infrastructure is 
damaged in El Niño episodes, and significant human suffering is experiences in the basin. 
An improvement of farmers; collective action can change those results. The model 
shows, how at the current situation it is more effective to invest, if only investing one 
isolated time instead of in a regular basis, in rules enforcement, than in the improvement 
of the physical infrastructure (e.g. reservoir).  
With the use of different method I was able to study CIS from different angles 
while addressing different, but related questions. From the review of the findings of 
individual chapters, I highlight first, the need for theoretical clarity and specificity to 
move forward on theory build of collective action. In this dissertation I have made some 
suggestions about the direction of the specificity for the DPs, but most important that 
those suggestions. In second place, it is easy to visualize the large research agenda, when 
we understand the need to find the potential recipes for given contextual factors. 
Policymakers, especially in developing countries, face limited resource for governance. 
Science can enormously contribute to governance challenges by enhancing the 
understanding of which rules and principles are more effective for a given type of CIS. 
The last remark is with respect to the robustness and collective action theoretical and 
practical interconnection. According to the findings in this dissertation, collective action 
is needed to increase the robustness of the Piura Basin to flood events. However, whether 
if this is true for other CIS, or not, is still unclear. Further research is needed to explore 
the interconnection between robustness and collective action. I conclude this dissertation 
with the satisfaction of having addressed relevant questions for sustainability science, but 
with and increased curiosity about the commons governance puzzle.  
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Country Case 
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Reference 
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2 China S - Zhuolu Wang, X., Otto, I. M., & Yu, L. (2013). How physical and social 
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Wang, X., Otto, I. M., & Yu, L. (2013). How physical and social 
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water governance in northern China. Agricultural water management, 
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6 Ethiopia Atsbi 
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https://seslibrary.asu.edu/node/68 
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Diaz Ordaz 
Downing, T. E. 1974. Irrigation and Moisture Sensitive Periods: A 
Zapotec Case. University of Arizona Press,Tucson, AZ, USA. 
Chapter 10: 113-122. DOI https://seslibrary.asu.edu/node/37 
11 Philippine
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Agcuyo de los Reyes, R. P. 1980. Agcuyo Irrigation System. Institute of 
Philippine Culture, Quezon City, Philippines. Chapter 6: 42-48. DOI 
https://seslibrary.asu.edu/node/36 
12 Argentina San Juan 
Canal 9 
Gonzalez-Aubone, F., Miranda, O., Montenegro, F., & Andrieu, J. 
(2014). Analizando la modernizacion en regadios tradicionales del 
oeste argentino. / Gestion del agua para riego de uso comun (RUC): 
la busqueda de un desempeno eficiente y sostenible a traves de un 
enfoque institucinoal. El caso de la provincia de San Juan, Argentina 
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Rubinos, C. (2013). Institutional Analysis of Water Management for 
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Basin 
Majule, A. E. (2010). Towards sustainable management of natural 
resources in the Mara river basin in Northeast Tanzania. Journal of 
Ecology and the Natural Environment, 2(10), 213-224. 
15 Mali The Office 
Du Niger 
Vandersypen, K., Verbist, B., Keita, A. C., Raes, D., & Jamin, J. Y. 
(2009). Linking performance and collective action—the case of the 
Office du Niger Irrigation Scheme in Mali. Water resources 
management, 23(1), 153-168. 
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r source 
Ross, A., & Martinez-Santos, P. The challenge of collaborative 
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Murray 
Groundwat
er Source 
Ross, A., & Martinez-Santos, P. The challenge of collaborative 
groundwater governance: four case studies from Spain and Australia. 
18 Spain The 
Mancha 
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Ross, A., & Martinez-Santos, P. The challenge of collaborative 
groundwater governance: four case studies from Spain and Australia. 
19 Spain The Campo 
de Montiel 
Aquifer 
Ross, A., & Martinez-Santos, P. The challenge of collaborative 
groundwater governance: four case studies from Spain and Australia. 
20 Egypt Al-Bayda Abdo, A. Understanding Farmers’ Adaptation to Water Scarcity. 
IWMI Research Report 
21 Indonesia Bali Lorenzen, S., & Lorenzen, R. P. (2005, August). A case study of 
Balinese irrigation management: institutional dynamics and 
challenges. In Second Southeast Asia Water Forum. Nusa Dua, Bali. 
22 Israel Hefer 
valley 
Manor, S & Hagali, Z. (2002). Case Study from Israel. Survey on 
Irrigation Modernization. The Hefer Valley Water Users Association. 
FAO 
23 Tanzania Kiru Valley Said, S. (2006). Irrigation in Africa: Water conflicts between large-
scale and small-scale farmers in Tanzania, Kiru Valley. 
24 India Tambrapar
ani 
Brewer, J. D., Sakthivadivel, R., & Raju, K. V. (1997). Water 
distribution rules and water distribution performance: a case study in 
the Tambraparani irrigation system (Vol. 12). IWMI. 
25 Tanzania Usangu 
Basin 
Cleaver, F. D., & Franks, T. R. (2005). How institutions elude 
design: river basin management and sustainable livelihoods. 
26 USA Taos 
Valley 
Cox, M., & Ross, J. M. (2011). Robustness and vulnerability of 
community irrigation systems: The case of the Taos valley acequias. 
Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, 61(3), 254-
266. 
ISO 690  
27 Uganda Ruhaama 
County 
McPartlon, Emily, "Testing Ostrom: an Analysis of Water User 
Commi;ees in Uganda" (2016). Master's eses. Paper 180. 
28 Peru Piura Rubinos, Cathy (working paper) "Robustnes - Fragility Trade-offs: 
The  Lower and Middle Piura Basin and El Niño Events" 
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Coding Form 
Coder's Name 
  
Your answer 
Country 
  
Your answer 
Case Name 
  
Your answer 
1. Type of Irrigation System (users withdraw waters from...) 
River or Canal 
Groundwater 
Mixed 
Notes 1 
Your answer 
  
Outcome Variables 
2. Are there conflicts in the system? 
Yes, significant conflicts 
Yes, but nothing to worry about 
No 
There is not enough information to answer 
Notes 2 
Your answer 
  
3. If YES. Are these conflicts among the community or with other users outside the 
community? 
Among the community 
With other users 
NA (Question 2 was" NO") 
There is not enough information to answer 
Notes 3 
Your answer 
  
4. Are rules equal for every users? 
   164 
Yes 
NO 
There is not enough information to answer 
Notes 4 
Your answer 
  
5. Rule compliance: appropriation rules 
Everyone or almost everyone follows appropriation rules 
Around half of users follow appropriation rules 
Few people follow appropriation rules 
There is not enough information to answer 
Notes 5 
Your answer 
  
6. Rule compliance: provisioning rules (e.g pay tariffs, canal maintenance work, etc.) 
Everyone or almost everyone follows provisioning rules 
Around half of users follow provisioning rules 
Few people follow provisioning rules (significant presence of theft) 
There is not enough information to answer 
Notes 6 
Your answer 
  
7. Distribution Infrastructure Condition (e.g. Canal) 
Well maintained (e.g. level of efficiency more than 60%) 
Somehow maintained, (e.g. level of efficiency higher than 50% but less than 60%) 
Poorly maintained (e.g. level of efficiency 50% or less) 
There is not enough information to answer 
Notes 7 
Your answer 
  
8. Production Infrastructure Condition (e.g. Reservoir) 
Well maintained (e.g. level of efficiency more than 60%) 
Somehow maintained, (e.g. level of efficiency higher than 50% but less than 60%) 
Poorly maintained (e.g. level of efficiency 50% or less) 
NA (e.g. no reservoir) 
There is not enough information to answer 
Notes 8 
Your answer 
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9. Environtmental Degradation (e.g. contamination / salinity, forest reduction) 
The text mentions that there are no degradation problem 
Some degradation problem is present 
Big degradation problems 
No degradation issues are mentioned in the text 
Notes 9 
Your answer 
  
10. Over appropriation of the community as a whole (there must be a minimum of water 
in the system) 
Overused 
Balanced 
The system use less water of the maximum total water allowed for sustainability reasons 
There is not enough information to answer 
Notes 10 
Your answer 
  
46. Is there a perception of scarcity for most users? 
Yes 
No 
There is not enough information to answer 
Notes 46 
Your answer 
  
11. Is a group’s payoffs being negatively affected by others? 
Yes 
No 
There is not enough information to answer 
Notes 11 
Your answer 
  
33. Do users have governmental support (e.g. subsidies) or Donors? 
1) Yes, farming subsidies 
2) Subsidies for water use 
3) Donors 
a combination of 1, 2 or 3 
No 
There is not enough information to answer 
Notes 33 
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Your answer 
  
12. Is the system self-sustained? (If there is an external entity -e.g gov, NGO- that gives 
significant help, then NO) 
Yes 
No 
There is not enough information to answer 
Notes 12 
Your answer 
  
13. Do you think this case is successful ? (Success: No over appropriation, AND no 
critical conflicts, AND Self-sustained systems, AND poverty is not a problem) 
Yes 
No 
Notes 13 
Your answer 
  
Institutions 
14. Is it clear who are the users of the resource and their rights are recognized? 
Yes 
No 
There is not enough information to answer 
Notes 14 
Your answer 
  
15. Are the borders and water sources that the community can use clearly defined? 
Yes 
No 
There is not enough information to answer 
Notes 15 
Your answer 
  
16. Do operational rules (not necessary rules in use) consider a proportional equivalence 
between benefits and costs? 
Yes 
No 
There is not enough information to answer 
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Notes 16 
Your answer 
  
17. Are appropriation rules flexible to fit local conditions (ecology and culture)? 
Yes 
No 
There is not enough information to answer 
Notes 17 
Your answer 
  
18. Do Appropriators think rules are fair? 
Yes 
No 
There is not enough information to answer 
Notes 18 
Your answer 
  
19. Is there a space (physical or not) to express users’ needs and concerns to the ones that 
make decision and these are actually taken into account? 
Yes 
No 
There is not enough information to answer 
Notes 19 
Your answer 
  
20. Do users participate to elect their leaders? 
Yes 
No 
There is not enough information to answer 
Notes 20 
Your answer 
  
21. Has there been collective action to change rules? 
Yes 
No 
There is not enough information to answer 
Notes 21 
Your answer 
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22. Does someone monitor the resource appropriation? 
Yes 
No 
There is not enough information to answer 
Notes 22 
Your answer 
  
23. Are monitors of water appropriation accountable? Is it well-enforced (users actually 
believe that they can get caught when getting more of their share)? 
Yes 
No 
There is not enough information to answer 
Notes 23 
Your answer 
  
24. Do users pay water fees 
Everyone or almost everyone 
Around half of users 
Few users pay water fees 
There is not enough information to answer 
Notes 24 
Your answer 
  
25. Do they keep records of the water level in the river, reservoir or groundwater? 
Yes 
No 
There is not enough information to answer 
Notes 25 
Your answer 
  
26. Do they register the conditions of the hard human made public infrastructure (canals, 
reservoir, etc.)? 
Yes 
No 
There is not enough information to answer 
Notes 26 
Your answer 
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27. Do they have graduated sanctions and this are known by users? 
Yes 
No 
There is not enough information to answer 
Notes 27 
Your answer 
  
28. can you infer that users believe that they can get caught and be fairly sanctioned if 
they do not cooperate? 
Yes 
No 
There is not enough information to answer 
Notes 28 
Your answer 
  
29. Is there at least one shared space/area for conflict resolution that it is being used? 
Yes 
No 
There is not enough information to answer 
Notes 29 
Your answer 
  
30. Is it true that: Appropriation, provision, monitoring, enforcement, conflict resolution, 
and governance activities are well organized in multiple layers of nested enterprises and 
they don't conflict with each other? 
True 
False 
There is not enough information to answer 
Notes 30 
Your answer 
  
31. Transparency of management. Do users know management details? 
Yes 
No 
There is not enough information to answer 
Notes 31 
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Your answer 
  
32. Are Non-Governamental Organizations involved? 
Yes 
No 
There is not enough information to answer 
Notes 32 
Your answer 
  
34. When was the association created? 
  
Your answer 
35. If there was a perturbation are they still in the process of adjusting? 
There are no perturbations mentioned 
They overcame all perturbations 
They did not overcome at least one perturbation (still in process of finding a solution) 
There is not enough information to answer 
Notes 35 
Your answer 
  
36. Type of governance 
Top Down 
Co-managed (it was before top-down) 
Co-manged (it was before self-managed) 
Self managed 
Notes 36 
Your answer 
  
37. year of research / field work 
  
Your answer 
38. Which is the Country indicator of Corruption for the year researched? (Indicator) 
  
Your answer 
Biophysical Variables 
39. Can users see most of other users water appropriation 
Yes 
No 
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There is not enough information to answer 
Notes 39 
Your answer 
  
40. Are crops also watered with rain? 
Yes 
No 
There is not enough information to answer 
Notes 40 
Your answer 
  
41. Are users growing commodities? (rice, maize, corn, sugar, cotton, grains, Coffee, 
etc.) – low prices) 
Yes, Only commodities 
Yes, but also other crops (e.g. vegetables) 
No 
There is not enough information to answer 
Notes 41 
Your answer 
  
42. Are they growing high water demanding crops? (rice, sugar cane, nuts, corn, cotton, 
tomato, alfalfa, almond) 
Yes 
No 
There is not enough information to answer 
Notes 42 
Your answer 
  
43. Technology to irrigate fields 
Drip Irrigation 
Sprinklers 
Furrow 
There is not enough information to answer 
Notes 43 
Your answer 
  
44. Is the human made hard infrastructure very technical and expensive to maintain? 
Yes 
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No 
There is not enough information to answer 
Notes 44 
Your answer 
  
45. Do they store water in a way? (Reservoir, dam, tanks, wells) 
Yes 
No 
There is not enough information to answer 
Notes 45 
Your answer 
  
47. Is the system asymmetric because of biophysical characteristics? (Upstream – 
downstream) 
Yes 
No 
There is not enough information to answer 
Notes 47 
Your answer 
  
48. Is the weather predictable? 
Very predictable 
Not too much 
Unpredictable 
There is not enough information to answer 
Notes 48 
Your answer 
  
49. Is the system exposed to natural disaster? 
Yes, very often 
Yes, not often 
No 
There is not enough information to answer 
Notes 49 
Your answer 
  
50. Land condition 
Fertile 
   173 
low levels of - Fertile (e.g salinization problems) 
some problems but it´s ok 
There is not enough information to answer 
Notes 50 
Your answer 
  
51. How big in Km or Ha (total and irrigated) is the total area of the system? 
  
Your answer 
Ethnographics and others 
52. Is there trust among users? 
Yes 
No 
There is not enough information to answer 
Notes 52 
Your answer 
  
53. Do users trust their leaders? 
Yes 
No 
There is not enough information to answer 
Notes 53 
Your answer 
  
54. Are users homogenous? 
Yes 
No 
There is not enough information to answer 
Notes 54 
Your answer 
  
55. Is the number of users changing (significantly)? 
Yes, growing 
Yes, decreasing 
No 
There is not enough information to answer 
Notes 55 
Your answer 
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56. Level of education of most of users 
Primary school 
High school 
Technical career 
Professional 
There is not enough information to answer 
Notes 56 
Your answer 
  
57. Is it mostly subsistance agriculture or cash crops? 
Mostly Subsistance 
Mostly Cash Crops 
An even combination 
There is not enough information to answer 
Notes 57 
Your answer 
  
58. User's knowledge of Farming Practices 
low 
moderate 
high 
There is not enough information to answer 
Notes 58 
Your answer 
  
59. Farmers dependence on Agriculture 
high (e.g. more than 60%) 
medium (e.g. between 40% and 60%) 
low (e.g. less than 40%) 
There is not enough information to answer 
Notes 59 
Your answer 
  
60. Do they have information about the behavior of other users with regards to public 
infrastructure provision (if users contributed or not)? 
Yes 
No 
There is not enough information to answer 
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Notes 60 
Your answer 
  
61. do they have a good level of market integration? 
Yes (e.g they trade their products outside the community?) 
No (e.g. roads are bad, high transportation costs) 
There is not enough information to answer 
Notes 61 
Your answer 
  
62. How many users are there in the system? 
  
Your answer 
SUBMIT 
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APPENDIX C  
CODED CASES FOR CHAPTER 3 
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Interviews Protocol 
 
Actors 
How many farmers are there in the basin? How many upstream and downstream the river? for 
the main crops production and of those of high value added? How are they organized? Are all of 
them regulated? Has the number of farmers being increasing? What do farmers need to do to 
have the right to use water of the system? 
 
Actors Roles 
Who are the water managers? How is the Irrigation Association constituted? How they take 
decision? Do they coordinate with other stakeholders? How? What is the role of the local and 
national authorities for water management?  
What role has the Irrigation District / Local Authorities/ National Water Authority / others 
played in agricultural policy that affects agricultural production?  What role have they played in 
water policies? What role have they played in El Niño related events? 
 
Crop choice 
In the last several decades, what has been the primary driver(s) of change in crop production in 
the basin? 
Crop prices and input prices: how they drive decision? 
How does this change in El Niño events? 
 
Rules 
Can you tell me about Governmental policies about water management and agricultural policies. 
How the law is implemented? 
Can you tell me about the Governmental support for agriculture? Is there special support for El 
Niño events investments or decisions?  
What is the process to change rules? 
What policy changes could be made to increase the adoption of innovative and best management 
practices?   
What other changes would need to occur; for instance with agricultural finance or government 
incentive programs? 
What are the most relevant policy changes affecting the type of crop production in the basin over 
the past few decades?  
How does the new water law affect current water management in the basin? 
 
 
Water Resource and Water Storage 
What is the main human made hard infrastructure? Does it help in times of water shortage? Does 
it help in times of flood events? How is this type of infrastructure affected in El Niño Events? 
How has it change in the past 10 years? Is the climate changing? Is it affecting water availability 
or demand?  
How do farmers respond to water scarcity, e.g. drought conditions?  Do they respond?  Are they 
sensitive to changes in water availability more generally? Who are more sensitive to it? 
Have droughts or floods affected your decision-making?  
How do water managers decide or not to build/ maintain new human made hard infrastructure? 
How does this change in el Niño years?  
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Water Allocation 
How water is delivered? How is it treated? How the water allocation is decided? Which is the 
dynamic for getting water? How are water prices determined?  
 
Irrigation Technique and water use 
How is soil quality? How does the irrigation technique affect it? 
What irrigation technique do you use for farming? 
Can you describe your typical irrigation regiment over the course of the season? 
How do you initiate an irrigation event? Is it planned before the season, or do you decide when 
you want to irrigate and the district responds? 
What influences your water use decisions? 
Does the irrigation district limit/regulate your water allocation? If so, how?   
Does irrigation district pricing/deliveries/policy affect farmers? How?  
How do farmers decide the amount of water they apply to their fields? Is there heterogeneity 
among farmers for these decisions? 
How does these changes in El Niño events? 
 
Agricultural Practices 
Who would you consider the most innovative farmer in the basin with regard to water 
conservation practices?  What technologies or practices has she/he adopted?  Why did he/she 
make these changes? 
How long have you been a farmer?  
Have you made changes on your farm? Why? How?  
Do you rotate crops? If so, what spurs a rotation, how often do you rotate, and what crops do you 
rotate into? 
What are the labor demands for your farm? Is labor available? 
What are the most important issues facing the agricultural industry?   
Do El Niño events have changed your decision with respect to farming? 
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Table F.2  
(A) Population in Piura According to  Census of the indicated Years 
 
 
Source: Instituto Nacional de Estadística e Informática (INEI) – Censos Nacionales de Población 
y Vivienda 
 
(B) Human Development Index (HDI) and its components. Piura Region in the National Ranking 
2007 
 
 
Source: Instituto Nacional de Estadística e Informática (INEI) – Encuesta Nacional de Hogares 
(ENAHO) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table F.3  
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Public Infrastructure Providers 
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Table F.6  
Private Infrastructure 
 
 
 
Table F.7 
 Link 1: Resource Users and Resource 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table F.8 
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Main Crops Production in Piura (1950 – 2015) 
	
Source: Ministry of Agriculture  
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Table F.9 
 Main Crops Production in hectares in Piura (1950 – 2015) 
	
 
Source: Ministry of Agriculture 
 
 
 
 
 
Table F.10  
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Yields of Main Crops produced in Piura (1950 – 2015)  
 
	
Source: Ministry of Agriculture 
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Table F.11  
Link 2: Resource Users and Public Infrastructure Providers 
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Table F.12 
Link 3: Public Infrastructure Providers and Public Infrastructure 
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Table F.13 
 Link 4: Public Infrastructure and Resource
 
 
 
Table F.14  
Link 5: Public Infrastructure and Appropriation Dynamic
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Table F.15  
 
Link 6: Resource Users and Public Infrastructure 
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Table F.17   
 
Piura: Monthly Comparative Mass Flow of the Piura and Chira Rivers, 1982 - 83 and 1997 – 98 
 
 
 
Source: Executive Direction of the Special Project Chira - Piura 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table F.18 
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Link 7: External Forces on Public Infrastructure 
 
 
 
 
Table F.19  
 
Link 8: External forces on Resource Users 
 
 
Source: Instituto Nacional de Defensa Civil – (INDECI) – Instituto Geofísico del Perú – (IGP)  
 
Table F.20  
 
Piura: Number of Natural Events, Houses Affected, Destroyed, Number of Deaths, Damnified, 
and Ha Affected (1999 - 2010) 
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Table F.21  
 
Link 8:External forces on public infrastructure providers 
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CALIBRATION FOR CHAPTER 5 
  
   229 
 
State Variables Initial Condition Reference 𝐸! = Performance of the 
physical engineered 
construction in time t 
0.85 
Leonidas (2009). The model starts in 
1980 when the current irrigation 
infrastructure was built.  𝑆!!=Fraction of cooperators in 
group i. 0.26 Leonidas (2009), ANA (2008) 
 
 
Parameter Value Source 
𝑄!= Naturally produced water 4,000 in normal years, 17,000 in el Nino events, and 
18,000 for future scenarios 
when specified. 
Leonidas (2009)average of 
normal water availability, real 
data from el NINO, and 
projected for potential future 
events. 
N1=Number of users upstream 9,170 
ANA (2009) Number of has to 
assume average farmer = 1ha 
N2=Number of users 
downstream 31,516 
ANA (2009) Number of has to 
assume average farmer = 1ha 𝑙= Length of the canal for 
group 30 
Proyecto Especial Chira-Piura 
(2016). 𝑎= Coefficient of water loss 0.01 ANA (2008) 
Θ= Depreciation 0.2 
Proyecto Especial Chira-Piura 
(2016). Responds to a higher 
rate of depreciation because of 
the sediments that the river 
brings from upstream 
deforestation. 𝑞= monetary value of the 
additional output generated by 
the first unit of irrigation water 
1.45 S/. per  m3 
(unless other value is 
specified) 
Rice production function from 
(Jalote et al., 2007), adapted 
for yield and price from 
statistics of MINAGRI (2017) 𝑟=   determines how the 
marginal value changes as the 
amount of appropriated water 
changes 
0.000075 S/. per  m9 
 
Rice production function from 
(Jalote et al., 2007) 
𝑐= Marginal cost of water 
appropriation 
0.46 S/. per  m3 
 
Rice production function from 
(Jalote et al., 2007), adapted 
for cost in Piura from DGIA 
(2008) 𝛿=The cost of monitoring 100 S/. ANA (2009) 
𝛾 = Sanction 1750 S/. D. Ley 17752 Ley general de Agua (2010) 50% of 1UIT. UIT = 3,500 in 2008 retrieved 
from and SUNAT (2017) 
P = probability of getting 
caught P 
0.2 (unless other value is 
specified) ANA (2009) 
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d = threshold of precipitation 
coefficient that the system 
supports 
13,000 MMC 
 ANA (2009) 
b = government support 700,000 S/. Proyecto Especial Chira-Piura (2016). 
w = water tariff 
0.003  (unless other value is 
specified) 
 
Proyecto Especial Chira-Piura 
(2016). 𝜌 = speed of conversion from 
cooperator to non-cooperator 
1 (unless other value is 
specified) For sensitive analysis 
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clear; 
  
%set steps number for calibration = 37, for Robustness analysis = 80 
steps = 37; 
  
% Set the parameters: 
%a is the coefficient of water loss in the canal or river 
a = 0.01; 
%l is the length of the canal or river 
l = 30; 
% delta is the parameter of cost of monitoring in soles 
delta = 100;  
% gamma = sanction 
gamma = 1750; 
%Infrastructure depreciation (tetta) 
tetta = 0.2; 
%Prob = probability of getting caught 
Prob = 0.2; 
%rho is the moral inertia for the replicator dynamic 
rho = 1; 
%Define the Damage impact of floods 
damage = 13000; 
%NINO Disturbance 
Nino = 17000000000/1000000; 
SNino = 18000000000/1000000; 
% Amount in millions of Peruvian Soles of the government spend in 
% infrastructure maintenance 
gov = 0.7; 
% Coeeficient of reaction (government expenditure) in el Nino events.  
gov_react = 1.5; 
%Define population upstream N1. In Piura Population Upstream is 2502, 
but 
%not all have rice fields and the total irrigated rice surface for 2016 
is 
%9170 ha. The production function is for one ha. Then for this effect I 
%assume the grown ha instead of population.  
N1 = 9170; 
%Define population downstream N2. Population in 2016 is 14178 and ha is 
%31,516 
N2 = 31516; 
%Calculate total population 
N  = N1 + N2; 
%In this case, users share water supply with other system. They take 
50% of 
%it 
chira=0.5; 
%The natural damage of el NINO  coefficient 
perf_ef=20000; 
%Economic Parameters q=water value in terms of crop profit, c = cost of 
ag, 
%r =  
q=1.45*1000000; 
c=0.46*1000000; 
r=0.000075*1000000^2; 
%Monetary units of provisioning in the solved 
Munit = 1000000; 
%Water tarif as a proportion of farmers income. This is the 
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provisioning 
%proportion of income of  cooperators 
water_t = 0.003; 
  
%----------------Attention 1----------------------------------- 
%------------------------------------------------------------ 
  
%Activate the j loop for bifurcation analysis, remember to activate end 
%of the loop too 
for j=(1:11) 
      
%for rho (the moral inertia) bifurcation  
%rho = (j-1)/10;    
  
%for Prob = probability of getting caught bifurcation  
%Prob = (j-1)/10; 
  
%for gov support bifurcation  
%gov = (j*3)/10; 
  
%for water_t bifurcation 
%water_t = (j*3-3)/1000;    
  
%for crop profitability bifurcation 
%q = ((j*10-10)/10)*1000000;   
  
%for E initial condition sensitivity 
E = (j-1)/10; 
  
%------------------------End of Attention 1----------------------- 
  
%-------------------------Attention 2 ------------------------------- 
%Activate the following when no bifurcation analysis is been done 
%j=1; 
%----------------------------------------------------- 
% Set the initial conditions:  
  
%for E (public infrastructure performance) 
%E = 0.85; 
%  QS (water coming from nature) 
QS_normal = 4000000000/1000000; 
% fraction of cooperators upstream the system S1 
S1 = 0.26; 
% fraction of cooperators downstream the system S2 
S2 = 0.26; 
  
  
%----------------------------------------------- 
  
for i = (1:steps) 
  
%Choose your El NINO perturbations:     
     
% Activate the following for Analysis of current state 
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if i==4 || i==19  
% Activate the following for Analysis of Shocks every 15 years 
%if i==4 || i==19 || i==34 ||  i==49 ||  i==64 ||   i==79   
% Activate the following for Analysis of Shocks every 10 years    
%if i==4 || i==19 || i==29 ||  i==39 ||  i==49  || i==59 || i==69 || 
i==79 
       
%Activate the following for Historical Ninos  
QS= Nino; 
%Activate the following for Stronger Ninos  
%QS= SNino; 
  
else 
    QS = QS_normal; 
end 
  
  
% To know how much water is there from rain and public infrastructure 
(e.g. 
% reservoir) 
  
Q = max((E*QS-(1-E)*(QS^2)/damage)*chira,0); 
  
% But there will be some water losses in the canal. Then the total 
water 
% available for all users (including downstream)  considers the 
parameter 
% of water loss "a", the lenght of the canal or river "l" and the 
% performance of the public infrastructure (it is all lumped in E) 
  
QAll = Q*(1-a*(1-E)*l); 
  
%Managers determine the max possible individual appropriation (ul).  
  
ustar = (q-c)/r; 
  
%(q-c)/r is the level of water appropriation that maximize users payoff 
thus users, if rational,  
% wont ask more than that. ul is considered the appropriation rule 
"Users 
% should not appropriate more that ul" 
  
ul = min(QAll/N,ustar); 
  
% Users will decide how much to appropriate based on their group first 
(if they are 
% cooperative or not) and on their incentives second.  
  
%We findout how many cooperator and non-cooperators are there in both 
%groups (upstream - 1- and downstrem - 2- ) 
  
N_c_1 = N1*S1; 
N_c_2 = N2*S2; 
N_nc_1 = N1*(1-S1); 
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N_nc_2 = N2*(1-S2); 
N_c = N_c_1 + N_c_2; 
N_nc = N_nc_1 + N_nc_2; 
  
% I define how much the loss will be:  
  
  loss = a * l * (1 - E) * Q; 
  
%If there is enough water for everyone, then everyone just maximize 
their 
%profits. But if not, we have to check wether if they are upstream 
(group 1) or  
% downstream (group 2), how much water available is there for them, and 
if 
% they are cooperation ( c ) or not (nc ).  
  
  
  
if ustar <= ul   
    utotal = ustar*N; 
    u_c_1=ustar; 
    u_nc_1 = ustar; 
    u_c_2 = ustar; 
    u_nc_2 = ustar; 
else 
     
    u_c_1 = ul;   
    if ustar * N_nc_1 <= Q - u_c_1 * N_c_1; 
        u_nc_1 = ustar; 
        if ul * N_c_2 <= Q - u_c_1 * N_c_1 - u_nc_1 * N_nc_1 - loss; 
            u_c_2 = ul; 
            if ustar * N_nc_2 <= Q - u_c_1 * N_c_1 - u_nc_1 * N_nc_1 - 
u_c_2 * N_c_2 - loss; 
                u_nc_2 = ustar; 
            else u_nc_2 = max((Q - u_c_1 * N_c_1 - u_nc_1 * N_nc_1 - 
u_c_2 * N_c_2 - loss)/N_nc_2,0); 
            end 
             
        else u_c_2 = max((Q - u_c_1 * N_c_1 - u_nc_1 * N_nc_1 - loss)/ 
N_c_2, 0); 
            u_nc_2 = 0; 
        end    
    else u_nc_1 = (Q - u_c_1 * N_c_1 ) / N_nc_1; 
         
        u_c_2 = 0; 
        u_nc_2 = 0 ; 
    end 
             
end 
  
%Managers decide how much users should pay based on social profit 
%maximization. For that, first we make use of some variables grouping 
for 
%the ease of calculation 
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Help_A = a*l*QS + a*l/damage; 
Help_B = QS - a*l*QS + (QS^2)/damage - 2*a*l/damage;  
Help_D = E * (1- E);  
Help_F = E*(1-tetta); 
Help_G = Help_D^2 * Help_A; 
Help_H = 2 * Help_F* Help_D * Help_A + Help_D * Help_B;  
  
syms x positive 
eqn = (q-r*ustar)*(((2*exp(-2/x))*Help_G)/(x^2)+(Help_H/(x^2))*exp(-
1/x))-1 == 0; 
solx = solve(eqn,x); 
  
Mt = double(solx)* Munit; 
  
%that means that individually, they have to give mi 
mi = Mt/N; 
  
%but  cooperators will only pay if they had possitive income (before M) 
and not more 
%than half of it 
  
income_c = (q*(u_c_1)-0.5*r*(u_c_1)^2-c*(u_c_1))* N_c_1 + (q*(u_c_2)-
0.5*r*(u_c_2)^2-c*(u_c_2))*N_c_2; 
%if income_c > mi*N_c 
%   Mr = mi*N_c; 
  
%else 
    Mr = max(income_c* water_t,0) ; 
%end 
  
%We can now calculate individual payoffs for each group 
if N_c_1 ==0 
pi_c_1 = 0; 
else 
 pi_c_1 = q*(u_c_1)-0.5*r*(u_c_1)^2-c*(u_c_1)-Mr/N_c-delta; 
end  
  
if N_c_2 ==0 
pi_c_2 = 0; 
else 
    pi_c_2 = q*(u_c_2)-0.5*r*(u_c_2)^2-c*(u_c_2)-Mr/N_c-delta; 
end 
  
if N_nc_1 == 0 
pi_nc_1 = 0; 
else 
 pi_nc_1 = q*(u_nc_1)-0.5*r*(u_nc_1)^2-c*(u_nc_1)- gamma*Prob; 
end  
  
if N_nc_2 == 0 
  
    pi_nc_2 = 0; 
else 
pi_nc_2 = q*(u_nc_2)-0.5*r*(u_nc_2)^2-c*(u_nc_2)- gamma*Prob; 
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end 
  
pi_c = pi_c_1*N_c_1 + pi_c_2*N_c_2; 
pi_nc = pi_nc_1*N_nc_1 + pi_nc_2*N_nc_2; 
pi_avg = (pi_c + pi_nc)/N; 
  
%Now we activate the replicator dynamics 
S1 = max(min(S1+S1*(max((pi_c_1 - pi_avg)/pi_avg,0)-rho*max((pi_avg - 
pi_c_1)/pi_avg,0)),1),0); 
S2 = max(min(S2+S2*(max((pi_c_2 - pi_avg)/pi_avg,0)-rho*max((pi_avg - 
pi_c_2)/pi_avg,0)),1),0); 
  
%Now we see how the performance changes 
  
if Mr>0 &&  QS==QS_normal  
    E=E+exp(-1/((Mr/Munit)+ gov))*E*(1-E)-tetta*E; 
     
else 
    if Mr==0 && QS == QS_normal  
        E=E-tetta*E; 
         
else E = E+exp(-1/((Mr/Munit)+ gov_react*gov-(QS - 
damage)/perf_ef))*E*(1-E)-tetta*E; 
     
    end 
end 
FracCoop_1(j,i) = S1; 
FracCoop_2(j,i) = S2; 
Performance(j,i) = E; 
Provisioning(j,i) = Mr/Munit+gov; 
UpstreamC_B (j,i) = pi_c_1; 
UpstreamNC_B (j,i) = pi_nc_1; 
DownstreamC_B (j,i) = pi_c_2; 
DownstreamNC_B (j,i) = pi_nc_1; 
time (i) = i+1980; 
end 
  
%Activate this end for the j loop 
end 
  
%Now I graph some interesting variables: 
% Fraction of Cooperations 
subplot (2,2,1) 
plot(time,FracCoop_1,time,FracCoop_2) 
title('Cooperators Fraction (Si)') 
legend('S1','S2','Location','southeast','Orientation','vertical') 
% Infrastructure Performance 
subplot (2,2,2) 
plot(time,Performance)  
title('Hard Infrastructure Performance (E)') 
  
%Infrastructure Provisioning 
subplot (2,2,3) 
plot(time,Provisioning)  
title('Hard Infrastructure Provisioning ') 
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%Farmers Benefits 
subplot (2,2,4) 
plot(time,UpstreamC_B,time, UpstreamNC_B,time,DownstreamC_B, time, 
DownstreamNC_B)  
title('Farmers Benefits') 
%legend('Pi 1 C','Pi 1 NC', 'Pi 2 C', 'Pi 2 
NC','Location','southeast','Orientation','vertical') 
 
 
 
